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The basic problem out of which this study grows is that 
the United States economy produces farm incomes which many 
people deem unsatisfactory. A large portion of this agricul­
tural income problem appears to be attributable to several 
unique characteristics of agriculture as an industry. First, 
agriculture has been and continues to be undergoing a very 
rapid change in technology accompanied by expanding produc­
tion and major reorganization of its resource structure. 
Secondly, both the price and income elasticities of demand 
for most farm products are less than unity in absolute value. 
Thirdly, farming is an industry composed of a large number of 
small firms operating in an economy in which other industries 
have some of the characteristics of oligopolies. Finally, 
agriculture experiences wide fluctuations in output due to 
weather. 
Technological development is a complex process that is 
difficult to explain and even more difficult to predict. 
Some of the most important technical changes in United States 
agriculture have been the gradual adoption of the gasoline 
tractor and complementary equipment, the more rapid adoption 
of hybrid corn, and the increase in the use of fertilizer, 
herbicides and insecticides. These along with other innova­
tions have made possible a greatly expanded output of farm 
products for human use. Such technological change has been 
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fostered by deliberate government policy such as the Morrill 
Act of 1862 as well as by the efforts and ingenuity of indi­
vidual enterpreneurs, both farm and non-farm. 
Agriculture is not the only industry which has exhibited 
technological change and massive increases in output over the 
last half century. Yet, none of the other major industries 
seem to be quite so vulnerable to price and income problems 
as agriculture. Economic theory suggests some of the reasons 
for this phenomenon, and statistical demand studies bear them 
out. As income increases, consumers spend a lower percentage 
of their incomes for food and other necessities and a higher 
percentage for luxury or semi-luxury goods. Even when the 
price of food declines, only small changes in the quantities 
consumed result; i.e. small changes in the quantity of food 
supplied tend to be associated with large changes in the 
price of food. With an income elasticity of demand less than 
one, with a low price elasticity of demand and with rapidly 
expanding production, the prices of agricultural products 
tend to decline. 
As the value of agriculture's output declines, the 
rewards to agricultural inputs are depressed. Economic 
theory suggests that these agricultural inputs should be 
transferred to other industries where the income elastic­
ities of demand are higher; i.e. there should be an "agricul­
tural adjustment." However, this adjustment appears to be 
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inhibited by friction or resource immobility and by the 
oligopolistic nature of the non-agricultural sector of the 
economy. In many non-agricultural industries entry is 
restricted by high fixed costs. In contrast to agricultural 
firms, the firms in these industries tend to limit production 
to that quantity which is salable at an acceptable price. 
Agriculture not only shares with other industries the 
variations in demand associated with changes in general 
business conditions, but it also experiences large variations 
in supply due to weather. These variations in demand and 
supply result in fluctuations in farm incomes. Not only does 
this income uncertainty constitute a direct problem for the 
persons involved, but it also makes it more difficult for 
them to compare farming with alternative opportunities and 
make the appropriate adjustments. 
Government Programs to Raise Farm Incomes 
While farmers have lacked bargaining power in the market 
place, they have held a strong position politically. Their 
attempts to secure higher prices and incomes have been reflect 
ed in a large number of farm programs since World War I. Some 
of the earliest attempts to raise prices in this period in­
volved the restrictive tariff. Tariff and trade policies 
continue to be important, as witnessed by the large quantities 
of exports under Public Law 480 in recent years. However, the 
major tools of farm policy have been massive domestic programs 
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to support prices and control production. The Federal Farm 
Board's ill-fated attempts to raise farm prices in 1930-31 
constitute the first illustration. With the advent of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation in 1933 there appeared a number 
of production control and support measures many of which have 
carried over to the present with only minor modification. 
From the beginning, it has been easier for farm state 
legislators to agree on price support measures than on 
measures to control production. Meanwhile, farmers have been 
finding ways to produce more and more farm products on fewer 
acres. The result has been a recurring surplus of farm 
commodities which are not salable at the established price. 
By 19*+1 these surpluses were becoming burdensome. World War 
II and the post-war food shortages in other parts of the 
world temporarily relieved the surplus problem, but by 1955 
stocks again were becoming unwieldy and new methods of 
controlling production were sought. In 1956 the Soil Bank 
program was introduced under which farmers were paid in cash 
for taking land out of production. The Soil Bank program 
had two parts, the acreage reserve and the conservation 
reserve. The acreage reserve was a one year program applying 
only to certain surplus crops while the conservation reserve 
was a three to ten year program applying to all cropland from 
which crops had been harvested. The conservation reserve was 
revised and expanded for 1959 and i960 but it too was allowed 
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to expire in I960 and no new contracts have been signed since 
that time. In 1961 an emergency feed grain program was passed 
which also involved direct payments for taking land out of 
production. This program was similar to the acreage reserve 
except that it applied only to corn and grain sorghum and 
payments were made on no more than 40 per cent of the land 
devoted to these crops on any farm. The program was re-
enacted for 1962 and 1963 with the inclusion of barley in the 
list of eligible feed grains. A similar program was estab­
lished for wheat. 
The Scope of this Study 
This study is concerned with the control of agricultural 
production through the retirement of cropland with a program 
of the Soil Bank type. Such a program may be characterized 
as follows. First, it attempts to control production by 
withdrawing land from agricultural use. Secondly, participa­
tion is voluntary for individual farmers. Thirdly, the 
program applies to land used for the production of all crops. 
Fourthly, the program operates through rental contracts 
whereby farmers agree not to raise and harvest crops on 
specified tracts of land. Fifthly, the rental payment 
constitutes the major incentive for participation in the 
program. 
There are many possible land retirement programs with 
these characteristics. Both the average level of Soil Bank 
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payments and the structure or distribution of payments among 
farms or regions can be varied within this framework. A 
number of special features such as whole-farm bonuses, grazing 
privileges and bidding provisions can be incorporated into 
land retirement programs. This study is concerned with the 
effects of these alternatives as they relate to the control 
of agricultural production. 
The Plan of Analysis 
In order to analyze a government economic policy, it is 
necessary to identify the ends of such a policy, the alterna­
tives available and the way in which they are related. 
Chapter II discusses the contribution of economic theory to 
the process of formulating economic policy. Chapter III 
undertakes a conceptual analysis of land retirement as a 
means toward attaining the ends of agricultural policy. The 
empirical part of the analysis begins in Chapter IV where the 
experience with the Soil Bank from 1956 to I960 is surveyed. 
In Chapter V the relationships between payment rates, land 
productivity and various provisions of land retirement pro­
grams are analyzed. Chapter VI is concerned with the func­
tional relationship between the level of payment rates and 
participation in land retirement programs. The problem of 
estimating the effects of the- Soil Bank program on the use 
of land, labor and capital and on crop production in the 
subject of Chapter VII. In Chapter VIII the conclusions 
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drawn in earlier chapters are summarized in order to bring 
out their implications for future policy decisions. 
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THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY DECISIONS 
Because of its national character, the formulation of 
policy for agriculture is no different in principle from the 
formulation of other economic policies such as fiscal policy 
or trade policy. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze 
agricultural policies with the same tools used for the analy­
sis of these other public policies. The discussion which 
follows treats policy formulation in a general sense and is 
applicable to agricultural policy as a special case. 
In the United States the making of public policy is a 
complex process involving the interplay of many political and 
economic forces. The focal point of this process is the 
Congress but the Administration also plays a major role 
through the exercise of its discretion in interpreting and 
enforcing laws. With regard to national policy, therefore, 
the policy makers are the members of Congress and the 
President with his administrators. 
The next few pages briefly assess the role that economic 
theory can play in this process of formulating public policy. 
The problem is first sketched in the abstract language of 
decision theory. Next, the contribution of welfare economics 
to policy making is considered. Finally, some less elegant 
but more practical applications of economic theory to policy 
making are discussed. 
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The Problem of Social Choice 
Fundamentally, the process of public policy formulation 
is a problem in group decision making. Luce and Raiffa (29, 
p. 13) classify a decision-maker as, 
a single human being or organization - which can be 
thought of as having a unitary interest motivating 
its decisions .... 
Further, 
Any collection of such individuals having conflicting 
interests which must be resolved, either in open 
conflict or by compromise, will be considered a group. 
Decision making involves two fundamental concepts. First 
it involves the notion that different situations or outcomes 
can be ranked as to their desirability. This is a normative 
concept and is expressed in terms of goals, targets, objec­
tives, preferences, utility or welfare. Secondly, decision 
making involves the notion of a choice among alternative 
courses of action and their respective outcomes. To be mean­
ingful, the process must allow the decision maker to influence 
which outcome is actually realized. 
The decision making problem can be described as follows. 
The decision maker is to choose a situation x out of a set of 
possible situations S which maximizes a given index H(x); i.e. 
he chooses x° such that n(x°) > n(x) for all x in S. The 
heart of the problem is the specification of the index to 
be maximized, |i(x). In the theory of the firm, for example, 
t-i(x) is assumed to equal profit. In the theory of consumer's 
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behavior, however, no such simple assumption is appropriate. 
For this theory u(x) represents an ordinal scale of prefer­
ences which may be termed utility. 
When dealing with a single individual (a single decision 
maker) it is plausible to hypothesize that he maximizes a one 
domensional index of utility or welfare and that this index 
is identical to his preference function. For the analogous 
situation with a group of individuals, the index to be 
maximized may be termed a social welfare function. But now 
the problem of specifying the index is more complex. Some 
way must be found to combine the many preferences of individ­
uals into a single welfare function for society. In a 
capitalistic democracy this is accomplished tnrough the 
voting mechanism and through the market place. In general, 
neither of these mechanisms is entirely satisfactory nor is 
it possible to design a scheme with all the attributes 
desired. 
Kenneth Arrow (5) is responsible for some of the most 
penetrating investigations of this problem of social choice. 
He has formulated the social welfare problem as follows: 
Given the preference rankings of n members of a society among 
m alternatives, define a "fair" method of amalgamating this 
set of individual rankings into a single ranking for the 
society. A rule for transforming such an n-tuple of rankings 
- one for each individual - into a ranking for society is 
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termed a social welfare function. Arrow has shown that no 
social welfare function can meet all of the following five 
requirements of "fairness": (1) universal domain (the 
function applies to all conceivable profiles of preference 
patterns); (2) independence of irrelevant alternatives ; (3) 
positive association of individual values ; (4) citizen's . 
sovereignty and (5) non-dictatorship. 
Arrow's results point to the futility of attempting to 
establish a universal welfare function. Luce and Râiffa (29) 
suggest two possible means of circumventing this impasse. 
First, they suggest that it may be possible to relax some of 
Arrow's conditions. They propose relaxing the condition of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives and taking into 
account individual strengths of preferences. This approach 
leads directly to the difficult problem of making inter­
personal comparisons. As a second alternative, Luce and 
Raiffa suggest reformulation of the problem itself. One way 
of doing so is to restrict the domain of the welfare function; 
i.e., not require it to prescribe a social ordering for some 
of the most unlikely or unreasonable sets of individual 
preferences. Another way of doing this is to change the 
voting scheme in order to use either more or less inforrvtion 
about each individual's preferences. For example, one of 
Arrow's conclusions is that simple majority rule can lead to 
intransitivities in the rankings of society. More complicated 
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voting schemes have been suggested to resolve the problem of 
intransitivities in the simpler cases. However, these more 
complicated voting schemes are still subject to intransitiv­
ities under certain conditions. 
Paretian Welfare Criteria 
A less ambitious approach to the problem of social choice 
is based upon the work of Pareto (39). In this approach an 
economic situation is termed optimal if no change can be made 
which increases the well being of one individual without 
decreasing the well being of any other individual. The 
essential feature of this criterion is that the optimum 
specified is not unique. There are many possible situations 
that fulfill the condition. Each corresponds to a different 
distribution of real income among the individuals in the 
group. 
With the Paretian criterion a set of necessary conditions 
for welfare maximization can be established. They are 
embodied in the concept of economic efficiency. Following 
Samuelson (4-9, p. 238) these conditions can be stated as 
follows. First, there must be a common marginal rate of 
indifference between any two goods for every individual; this 
indifference ratio must equal the ratio at which these goods 
can be substituted for each other in production. Secondly, 
there must be for all individuals a common rate of indiffer­
ence between supplying more of any factor for production and 
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enjoying more consumption of a given good. Again, this ratio 
must be equal to the rate of transformation of the factor 
into the good in production. The arguments for competition 
as a means of maximizing welfare rely upon the ability of the 
price mechanism to equalize these marginal rates of substitu­
tion for any two goods or factors at all points of their 
consumption and production. 
It should be re-emphasized that these conditions for 
economic efficiency are only necessary and not sufficient 
conditions for welfare maximization. There are many possible 
economic situations which would fulfill the efficiency condi­
tions. Each one corresponds to a different distribution of 
income. The choice between the various "efficient" arrange­
ments can be made only by introducing interpersonal utility 
comparisons, or equivalently, by specifying the optimal 
distribution of real income. 
Agricultural policy involves not only matters of 
efficiency but also matters of income distribution. In fact, 
the major arguments for agricultural programs are based upon 
the alleged inequity between farmers' incomes and the incomes 
of non-farmers. For choosing between such government pro­
grams which involve major income transfers, the criteria of 
Paretian welfare economics are likely to be inadequate by 
themselves. 
Another objection to the unqualified application of 
In­
efficiency criteria to agriculture arises because these 
criteria are not universally met in other sectors of the 
economy. For example, oligopolistic firms apparently operate 
at the point where their marginal cost equals their marginal 
value product. This corresponds to a lower level of output 
than the point where marginal cost equals price. This 
violates the efficiency conditions. If the conditions are 
violated in one sector of the economy, it is no longer 
certain that fulfilling them in another sector is desirable 
from a welfare standpoint. 
Operational Approaches to the 
Problem of Policy Formulation 
In the previous section the process of public policy 
formulation has been treated in an abstract manner as a pro­
blem of social choice or welfare maximization. Even at such 
an abstract level, completely satisfactory solutions are 
absent; welfare economics provides solutions only in a limited 
sense. When we turn to policy decisions in the real world, 
the task is much more complex. Despite such great difficul­
ties, policy decisions must be and are reached by society. 
In this section some practical applications of economic theory 
to policy making are examined. 
Lionel Bobbins (48, p. 16) defines economics as, "the 
science which studies human behavior as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses," He 
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maintains that economics is entirely neutral between ends. 
Myrdal (32) on the other hand, has emphasized the changing 
nature of ends and the role played by the economist in defin­
ing them. In this study we choose an intermediate path, that 
is more akin to the approach of John Dewey (15). Under this 
approach the ends with which we are concerned are part of a 
continuum or hierarchy of ends. The immediate ends or ends-
in-view are only means to higher ends or values. The dis­
tinction between means and ends is essential if the scientific 
method is to be applied. But the economist may work at more 
than one level in the means-ends continuum and what constitute 
ends at one level may be looked upon as means to higher ends 
at a different level. For example, higher farm prices have 
been frequently treated as a legitimate end of agricultural 
policy. But, as Shepherd (54) has emphasized, a higher end 
for farm programs is to raise farmers' incomes ; raising farm 
prices is only a means toward the end of raising farm incomes, 
and not an effective means at that, over the long run. 
The problem oriented approach 
Much of economics including welfare economics has been 
oriented toward providing general solutions to economic prob­
lems. Such studies attempt to derive optimality conditions 
which are applicable to a wide number of situations. An 
alternative approach is to start with an economic problem 
itself and from there proceed to seek solutions. John Dewey 
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(15) was most influential in developing this method which has 
been fruitful in many areas of scientific inquiry. 
The approach of Dewey involves, first, determining the 
problem, then collecting, ordering and weighing the relevant 
facts and formulation and testing of hypotheses. Shepherd 
(55) has proposed the following steps for applying this 
approach to the analysis of agricultural programs. First, 
outline the problem. Secondly, determine the objectives of 
the policy-makers. Thirdly, compare the performance of the 
program with the objectives. Finally, estimate the effects 
of modifications of the program and the effects of alternative 
policy objectives. 
The advantage of the problem oriented approach is that 
attention is focused in a small area where analysis is more 
apt to be fruitful. This approach avoids wasting time in 
attempting to specify ultimate goals and universal optimal!ty 
conditions. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is 
a piecemeal approach offering only a partial solution. The 
problem oriented approach enables one to overlook some of the 
broader implications of various economic policies and may 
produce solutions to one economic problem which only aggravate 
other related problems. For example, if we concentrate on the 
problem of underemployment in agriculture, we may conclude 
that programs to move farmers out of agriculture are a solu­
tion. However, such programs might aggravate the unemployment 
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problem in the non-farm sector. If this is the case, the 
original problem must be more broadly defined. However, as 
we switch to broader and broader problems, we finally arrive 
back at the largest problem of all, namely how to increase 
the welfare of society as a whole. 
The use of policy models of the Tinbergen type 
Another practical method of simplifying and formalizing 
the problems of policy formulation is to employ policy models 
of the Tinbergen type. Tinbergen (61) assumes that the aims 
of the policy maker represent the appropriate aims for policy, 
thus by-passing the problem of transforming individual ends 
into social ends. Such an assumption is equivalent to reduc­
ing the policy making problem from a group decision making 
problem to an individual decision making problem. He discuss­
es three categories of economic policy; reforms, qualitative 
policy and quantitative policy. Reforms involve changes in 
the fundamental elements or foundations in society. Examples 
of reforms are changes which affect property rights or rights 
of religious belief. Qualitative changes involve changes in 
economic structure. These are less basic than reforms and 
include such actions as introducing or abolishing taxes or 
rationing. Quantitative policy involves those changes which 
are more frequently and easily made and are usually expressed 
in quantitative terms. The economic variables which serve as 
means for quantitative policy are called instruments. They 
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include such variables as tax rates, government expenditures, 
and exchange rates. In our case, a change in the Soil Bank 
payment rate level could be considered a quantitative change, 
with the instrument being the level of Soil Bank payments. 
The decision to have or not to have a Soil Bank program would 
most appropriately be categorized as a decision in qualitative 
policy involving structural change. 
In analyzing quantitative policy, Tinbergen works with a 
highly aggregative model. Economic data which can be changed 
to a greater or less degree by the policy maker are called 
instruments. Another set of variables representing the quan­
titative aims of the policy maker are called target variables. 
"Other data" is the term used to refer to those variables 
which are not subject to control by the policy maker and are 
not directly associated with his aims. 
The Tinbergen model is expressed in terms of equations 
representing functional relationships between the various 
variables. The relationships include behavioral relation­
ships such as the consumption function, technical relation­
ships such as the relationship between employment and output, 
and identities. The relationships are either estimated 
statistically or held to be true by definition. Tinbergen 
distinguishes between the fixed target case where specified 
levels are set for each target before the solution is sought, 
and the flexible target case where some target variable is 
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maximized. 
The advantage of the Tinbergen approach lies in its 
ability to handle a variety of targets and instruments at 
the same time. Conceptually, it is capable of providing a 
general solution instead of a partial solution such as is 
obtained by analyzing one problem at a time. The difficul­
ties with the Tinbergen approach arise because of the inade­
quacy of the methods and data available for estimating the 
relevant functional relationships. 
The approach used in this study 
A model of the Tinbergen type would be well suited for 
analysis of agricultural policy. Such a model would be highly 
aggregative in the non-farm sector and somewhat more detailed 
in the farm sector, Besides the usual instruments which 
include tax rates, government expenditures, and exchange 
rates, there would be special instruments of agricultural 
policy such as the level of Soil Bank payments, the level of 
feed grain program payments and the level of price supports 
for various farm commodities. The targets might include the 
income of the farmers, the income of non-farmers, the rate of 
growth in the farm sector and the non-farm sector, and the 
balance of payments. Desirable as it would be, such a model 
is beyond the scope of this study. We can go only so far as 
to unveil and quantify some of the relationships that are 
potentially useful for such a model. The instrument with 
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which we are most concerned is the Soil Bank payment rate. 
We first identify the relevant targets and then proceed to 
set up and test hypotheses to relate the Soil Bank payment 
rate to the targets. 
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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF LAND RETIREMENT ALTERNATIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. One purpose is 
to make certain qualitative comparisons of agricultural 
policy alternatives through deductive analysis. The second 
purpose is to establish the conceptual basis for the quanti­
tative analyses of later chapters. 
The Ends or Goals of Land Retirement 
The first task is to identify the economic variables 
that are relevant in choosing an agricultural program. These 
are categorized as either means or ends. Those that are 
assumed to be under the direct control of the policy maker 
are termed means. Those that bear value connotations for 
some members of society are called ends. 
The ends or goals that are considered in this study were 
derived from the statements of agricultural leaders and from 
the stated objectives in farm legislation. In expressing 
these goals or ends it is not intended to imply that they 
should be maximized or set at certain prescribed levels. 
Instead, it is intended merely to identify those economic 
variables which have strong value connotations for one or 
more groups in society. No list of ends can be complete nor 
is it expected that each end will be important to every 
individual. In general, the different ends are interdependent 
and occasionally they are directly conflicting. It is 
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essential that each end be quantifiable in some sense ; i.e., 
it should be possible to identify at least two distinct 
levels of its attainment. The following ends were considered 
relevant to this study: 
1. The quantity of crops produced 
2. The level of farm income 
3. The price of farm products and the price of food 
1+. The government cost of the agricultural program 
5. The quantity of capital and labor employed in 
agriculture 
Each of these ends represents a complex of lesser ends. For 
example, the level of farm income can be broken down by type 
of farm, by region, or even by individual farm. 
Conspicuously absent in this set of ends is the goal of 
economic efficiency or maximum social welfare. Efficiency 
involves equalizing the marginal social product of each input 
in all its alternative uses. Only if the marginal productiv­
ity of a given kind of land in all its alternative uses were 
zero, would efficiency criteria indicate that it should be 
idled. But, it is apparent that practically all of the crop­
land idled by land retirement would have a non-zero marginal 
product in at least one use, namely grazing.^ Efficiency 
considerations may imply transferring land, labor and capital 
-'•There is some mountainous and arid land which has 
approximately a zero marginal product under grazing, but 
this is not cropland. 
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from one agricultural use to another or labor and capital 
from agriculture to some other industry but they do not imply 
idling of land or idling any other resource. For example, 
Egbert and Heady (16) have demonstrated by means of a linear 
programming analysis that the conditions of economic effi­
ciency may imply taking certain regions out of the production 
of grains. Presumably, efficiency conditions would imply 
using the land in these regions for grazing, woodland or some 
other use although their model was not explicitly designed to 
p 
deal with this question. 
An economic program which idled resources would be dis­
missed immediately for a static and atomistically competitive 
economy in which the distribution of income was optimal. 
However, in a dynamic economy with elements of monopoly and 
oligopoly and a non-optimal income distribution, a program 
to idle resources cannot be so readily dismissed. In such 
an economy the marginal conditions of economic efficiency 
are not everywhere fulfilled. The failure of these condi­
tions to be met in other sections of the economy may 
^The Egbert-Heady model allowed three production activ­
ities in each region; the production of food wheat, feed 
wheat, and a feed-grain rotation. Only one combination of 
capital and labor inputs was considered for each of these 
production activities. In other words the intensity of 
capital and labor use was fixed for each activity in each 
region. It is possible that a model which did allow varia­
tions in capital and labor intensities for a given crop 
within a region would imply less intensive use of these 
inputs in many of the producing regions and at the same 
time bring some additional regions into grain production. 
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necessitate modifying them for agriculture. 
Two important arguments have been advanced by economists 
in support of agricultural programs and both can be applied 
to the idling of land. Both arguments recognize the level of 
farm income as a legitimate goal of farm programs. The first 
argument stresses the need for an "agricultural adjustment" 
to transfer labor and capital from agriculture to other 
industries which produce products with higher income elastic­
ities of demand. The quantity of capital and labor removed 
from agriculture is an important end for those persons who 
subscribe to this argument. They are also apt to be concerned 
with keeping the government costs of the program low. 
The second argument stresses the need for production 
control as a means of gaining marketing power in order to 
garner a larger share of the national income for agriculture. 
The quantity of agricultural production eliminated is an 
important end for the adherents to this argument. 
It is not the purpose of this study to develop or explore 
theoretical arguments for or against land retirement. Instead 
it is intended to show the relationship between the alterna­
tives available under land retirement and the ends considered 
relevant by various groups. 
The Means or Alternatives in Land Retirement 
A large number of agricultural policies can serve as 
means for attaining the ends listed above. Systematic 
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discussion of these alternative policies requires some scheme 
of classification. Government agricultural programs act 
through laws or regulations that directly control prices or 
quantities of various commodities. Such programs can be 
classed as price control programs or quantity control pro­
grams. An example of a pure price control program was the 
1959-60 corn price support program which had no acreage 
restrictions attached. More often, government programs have 
been designed to directly affect both prices and quantities 
at the same time. For example, the earlier corn program and 
the current wheat and cotton programs involve both price 
supports and acreage controls. The distinction between 
controlling quantities and controlling prices is not very 
helpful in dealing with the Soil Bank and similar programs. 
The Soil Bank was conceived as a program to control the 
quantity of land used in agriculture but it operates through 
offering rental payments which, in effect, set the price of 
land. 
Government agricultural programs can also be classified 
as applying directly to farm outputs or to farm inputs. This 
study is concerned with programs that control farm inputs. 
Agricultural input control programs include those programs 
designed to directly affect the prices or quantities of land, 
labor and/or capital used in agricultural production. 
A further distinction can be made between programs 
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designed to transfer products or factors from one use to 
another use and those designed to withdraw products or factors 
from consumption or production. Input transfer involves the 
movement of factors from the production of one product to the 
production of another product. The Homestead Act fell in this 
category since it had the effect of transferring labor into 
agriculture. Another example is the "Homesteads in Reverse" 
proposal of Schultz (51) which is designed to transfer labor 
out of agriculture. Input transfer has been advocated as a 
means to promote adjustment in the economy. According to 
this agrument, the economy is first moved out of equilibrium 
by changes in technology or consumers' preferences. The 
movement to a new equilibrium position is impeded by resource 
immobility or other barriers to adjustment. Input transfer 
is designed to move the economy toward an equilibrium that 
might, in time, take place by itself. 
By input or output withdrawal we refer to a program 
whereby the government prevents certain quantities of inputs 
or outputs from entering either into production or consump­
tion. An example of output withdrawal would be a program to 
purchase and destroy a farm commodity such as potatoes. The 
1961 and 1962 feed grain programs constituted input with­
drawal since the input affected, land in this case, was not 
transferred to another use, but instead, remained idle* 
The Soil Bank also was primarily an input withdrawal 
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program, but in those cases where the Soil Bank land was 
planted to trees or used for wildlife cover input transfer 
was involved. Similarly, if the land were used for grazing 
or recreational purposes, input transfer would take place. 
The transfer of productive cropland to a lower use may in­
volve both input transfer and input withdrawal if in its 
new use the land has a lower social product than it would 
have in crop production. To the extent that the social 
product of the land is lowered, input withdrawal takes place. 
Agricultural programs can also be classified as voluntary 
or involuntary. This distinction is one of degree. Involun­
tary controls restrict the farmer's freedom of choice to a 
greater extent than do voluntary controls. The term voluntary 
is usually used to refer to a program which operates through 
the setting of prices or payment rates applicable to all 
farms whereas an involuntary program sets the quantity of 
one of more inputs or outputs on each farm. For example, the 
1961 and 1962 feed grain programs are considered voluntary 
programs since participation was optional for each farmer. 
The tobacco allotment program, on the other hand, is a compul­
sory or involuntary program. 
Control programs can further be classified according to 
the factors or products which are directly affected. For 
input control in agriculture, it is convenient to consider 
the categories of land, labor and capital. The Soil Bank 
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program can be classified as a voluntary program of input 
withdrawal with land being the input that is directly affect­
ed. To distinguish the Soil Bank type of program from the 
feed grain type of program we can further categorize land 
input control programs as those which apply to all cropland 
and those which apply only to land used for certain crops. 
In this study, we are primarily concerned with only one small 
group of agricultural program alternatives. These are land 
retirement programs that are similar in nature to the 
conservation reserve of the Soil Bank. They share the 
following characteristics: 
1. Production is reduced by withdrawing land from 
agricultural uses. 
2. Participation is voluntary for individual farmers. 
3. The program applies to land used for the production 
of all crops. 
4-. The program operates through rental contracts 
whereby farmers agree not to raise and harvest 
crops on specified tracts of land. 
5. The rental payment constitutes the major incentive 
for participation in the program. 
Within the group of land retirement programs sharing these 
characteristics, a great many variations exist. These in­
clude : variations in the average level of payment rates, 
variations in the structure or distribution of payment rates 
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and special features such as whole-farm bonuses, grazing 
privileges and bidding provisions. 
The Economic Relationships 
In this study, we are primarily concerned with the 
relationships between the Soil Bank payment rate schedule 
and the various goals or targets identified in the preceding 
section. Figure 1 is a diagram of the conceptual framework 
employed. By necessity, such a framework is a greatly 
simplified picture of reality. It does not represent a 
complete economic model. It only illustrates the economic 
variables and the economic relationships with which this 
study is primarily concerned. 
In the diagram each box represents a certain economic 
variable or a composite of variables. The top row of boxes 
are those variables which have been designated as ends or 
targets. The bottom row of boxes are reserved for variables 
designated as means or instruments of economic policy. In 
this diagram only two instruments, the Soil Bank payment rate 
level and the level of farm price supports are shown. The 
intermediate row of boxes are used for supplementary variables 
which are convenient in formulating the relationships between 
the instruments and the targets. It is apparent that the 
choice of ends is somewhat arbitrary. Even the intermediate 
variables and the instruments themselves may bear value 
connotations for some members of society. For example, the 







































quantity of crops produced is shown as an intermediate 
variable but it may also be considered as an end in itself. 
The lines between boxes represent economic relationships 
between the respective variables. Some of these relationships 
are identities. For example, the level of government land 
retirement payments is equal to the number of acres in the 
program times the mean rate of payment per acre. Another 
group of relationships are primarily of a technical nature. 
The quantity of land in the program and the quantity"of crops 
produced are related by a technical relationship. A third 
group of relationships are the behavioral relationships. These 
include the relationship between payment rates and the quantity 
of land placed in the Soil Bank. Both the technical relation­
ships and the behavioral relationships must be estimated 
empirically. In the remainder of this chapter the implica­
tions of various hypotheses about the nature of the relation­
ships are examined. 
The Hypotheses 
Samuels on (4-9, p. !+) defines a meaningful theorem as "a 
hypothesis about empirical data which could conceivably be 
refuted if only under ideal conditions." A meaningful 
hypothesis must exclude certain outcomes or types of relation­
ships; otherwise, it is nothing but a tautology. Milton 
Friedman (18, p. 7) maintains that the appropriate criterion 
for judging a theory is not the realism of its assumptions 
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but the accuracy of its predictions. Friedman states that, 
"The ultimate goal of a positive science is the 
development of a 'theory1 or 'hypothesis' that yields 
valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions 
about phenomena not yet observed." 
He points out that empirical evidence is vital in two 
distinct stages; in constructing hypotheses and in testing 
their validity. The two stages proceed simultaneously. A 
hypothesis is never proven true; it is only tentatively 
accepted barring further evidence. Should such evidence 
prove the hypothesis fallacious, it must be either rejected 
or modified and tested again. The hypotheses advanced in the 
remainder of this chapter are of such a tentative nature. In 
later chapters, their validity is put to empirical test. 
The level of participation and the quantity of crops 
produced under a land retirement program depend upon the 
individual decisions of a large number of farmers. If one 
is to explain or predict Soil Bank participation for a region, 
it is appropriate to start with hypotheses about the behavior 
of these individuals. The most fundamental hypotheses are 
those that imply uniformities or similarities in the behavior 
of different individuals at different points in time and 
space. Hypotheses of this type are essential to any analysis. 
For example, the physicist finds that particles can be 
classified into groups such that the particles in each group 
behave in a similar manner at different points in time and 
space. Analogously, the economist must divulge similarities 
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in the behavior of individuals. If he is conducting a time 
series analysis, he must hypothesize similarities in the 
behavior of individuals at different points in time. If he 
is conducting a cross sectional analysis, similarities among 
individual's or groups of individuals at one point in time must 
be hypothesized. This study is a cross sectional study and, 
therefore, depends heavily upon the similarities in the 
behavior of different individuals. The data are from one 
time period, 1956-60, and do not allow for testing the con­
sistency of the hypothesized relationships over time. For 
purposes of prediction, these consistencies over time must be 
assumed. 
The hypothesis of maximizing behavior 
Samuelson (4-9) has stressed that the hypothesis of 
maximizing behavior underlies a large part of economic theory. 
Both the theory of production and the theory of consumer1 s 
behavior grow out of the hypothesis of maximizing behavior. 
In the former, it is the entrepreneur who maximizes profits ; 
in the latter, the consumer behaves as though he were 
maximizing an ordinal function which can be termed utility. 
The theory of production is less general than the theory 
of consumer's behavior, since a single goal, namely maximum 
profit, is assumed, whereas the theory of consumption allows 
a multiplicity of goals and only requires that they be 
related by a consistent system of preferences. Potentially, 
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the theory of consumer's behavior offers the possibility of 
explaining a much broader range of human behavior than does 
the theory of the firm. Its disadvantage from an operational 
standpoint is that it implies so few restrictions on the 
behavior of individuals that it may not be of much help in 
predicting such behavior. On the other hand, the theory of 
production implies a very specific form of behavior for 
individual entrepreneurs, namely maximization of profits. As 
a consequence it will more frequently be violated, but where 
it can be shown to hold true, it greatly facilitates the 
prediction of behavior. 
The hypothesis of "satisficine" behavior 
It has been pointed out by many persons and most 
effectively by Herbert Simon (56), that maximization of 
utility or of profits is an unreasonably demanding form of 
behavior for persons with imperfect knowledge and limited 
computational ability. He notes that the conventional theory 
of maximizing behavior requires that the choosing organism be 
able to specify and order each and every possible outcome. 
He concludes that, lacking the information and ability to 
rank every possible outcome, the decision maker may employ a 
simpler decision process whereby the outcomes are only 
partially ordered. In such a case, any one of a number of 
alternatives may be equally acceptable. For example, a man 
who is selling a house will not know just what price each 
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potential buyer will offer. If the seller had such knowledge 
he could maximize his utility by selecting the highest offer. 
Lacking such knowledge, the seller may be inclined to set a 
lower limit on the acceptable price and take the first offer 
which exceeds the lower limit. He is behaving as if all 
prices above the limit were equally desirable. 
The essential feature of satisficing behavior is that 
the decision maker who so behaves disregards some information 
in making his choice. This form of behavior may characterize 
the farmer who is comparing Soil Bank participation with crop 
production. For example, he may overlook the possible 
alternative return to his labor in off-farm employment and 
therefore decide to continue to use his labor in farming where 
it earns a very low return. 
The hypothesis of risk aversion 
Another hypothesis that has been advanced to explain 
individual behavior is the hypothesis of risk aversion. Under 
this hypothesis, the individual prefers an income with a given 
mean value and a low variance to an income with a higher mean 
value and a higher variance. Soil Bank payments constitute a 
less variable source of income than do the returns from crop 
production. If risk aversion characterizes the behavior of 
farmers in general, we would expect those farmers in the high 
risk areas to find the Soil Bank attractive as a means to 
reduce their income variance. 
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The hypothesis of diminishing returns 
Another group of hypotheses bearing upon land retirement 
programs relate not to the behavior of individuals but to the 
nature of the transformation relationships between factors 
and products in production. Like the behavioral hypotheses, 
these technical hypotheses are subject to empirical verifica­
tion or refutation. 
Agricultural production involves the use of several 
factors to produce one or more products. The hypothesis of 
diminishing returns states that as one factor is increased 
with all other factors held constant, the marginal product 
of the given factor declines. This is not a universal law 
since increasing returns to a given factor are possible and 
have been observed. However, it is hypothesized that 
diminishing returns are the usual state of affairs in 
agriculture. 
The hypothesis of unequal factor proportions 
Considering the wide heterogeneity of land, cropping 
patterns and cultural practices, we are led to expect that 
capital, labor and land do not each make up the same proportion 
of production costs on different farms and in different areas. 
We hypothesize that the rent for land and other fixed factors 
of production account for proportionally more of the cost of 
production on highly productive land than it does on less 
productive land. In other words, the variable costs for 
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capital and labor are larger in relation to land costs on the 
less productive land than on the most productive land. The 
plausibility of this hypothesis is suggested by the tendency 
for certain capital and labor inputs to be approximately the 
same on land of differing productivities, e.g., seedbed 
preparation and planting costs for corn production are about 
the same on low yielding soils as on high yielding soils. 
Before proceeding further, it is essential to clarify 
our use of the concept of land productivity. In economic 
analysis it is customary to assume that we are dealing with 
homogeneous products and factors in production. In the case 
of farm land, such an assumption is not justified. Within a 
single farm or even a single field land differs with respect 
to the crops for which it is suited, the cultural practices 
necessary for crop production, the mean yields of the various 
crops that can be produced, its susceptibility to drought, 
flooding and erosion, its weed infestation and its fertilizer 
and lime requirements. Between farms and between regions 
there are not only these differences but also differences in 
weather and climate. These factors are all elements of land 
quality or productivity. 
In general, there is no unique value that represents 
productivity for a given tract of land. Productivity is 
completely described only by use of a production function or 
transformation function which specifies the level of each 
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output for each possible combination of inputs used with the 
land. If a scalar value or index is to be assigned to 
productivity, the technology and the levels of all inputs 
must be assumed and a rule for aggregating the quantities of 
the various inputs and outputs must be established. Such a 
measure of productivity is arbitrary since a different set 
of input levels and aggregation rules could be devised which 
imply a different productivity rating for any given tract of 
land and a different ordering of productivity ratings among 
different tracts of land. 
Despite its arbitrary nature, a scalar measure or index 
of productivity is essential in this analysis. The measure 
of gross product used in this study is derived from historical 
data on yields, acreages and prices, and is intended to 
represent farmers' expected gross return from crop production. 
The hypothesis of unequal factor proportions is illustrat­
ed in Figure 2. The horizontal axis in the figure represents 
productivity measured by gross product in dollars per acre. 
Any tract of land can be located on the horizontal axis by 
transforming historical acreage, yield and price data into 
normal gross product in dollars per acre. The vertical axis 
in Figure 2 represents production costs. It is also scaled 
in dollars per acre. The line T-T' shows the relationship 
between total costs measured in the units on the Y axis and 
total product measured in the units on the X axis. Assuming 
Figure 2. The relationship between variable costs, fixed 
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competition, total costs equal total product and line T-T' is 
a straight line passing through the origin. 
For each tract of land it will be possible to divide 
costs into two groups. In the first group are those costs 
which can be terminated or recovered when the land goes into 
the Soil Bank. They are variable costs with respect to Soil 
Bank participation. These include expenditures for fuel, 
repairs, fertilizer, hired labor, hired machines and seeds. 
They may also include the operator's labor if he can obtain 
employment elsewhere and the depreciation, interest and 
insurance on the farm machinery that can be sold. The second 
group of costs are those costs which cannot be terminated 
upon placing the land in the Soil Bank. They are fixed costs 
with respect to Soil Bank participation. In the long run 
they include only land rent but in the short run they may 
include the depreciation, interest and insurance on farm 
machines and buildings and the value of the operator's labor. 
If we were to estimate the variable production costs 
for a number of tracts of land and plot them on the figure 
with X representing gross product and Y representing produc­
tion costs, we would expect the results to look something 
like the dots in the figure. Line C-C« represents the least 
squares regression line through these points. The vertical 
distance from each dot to the line T-T* represents the 
residual return to fixed factors for that particular tract 
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of land. The average fixed cost for each grade of land is 
represented by the shaded area between the two lines. In 
the figure the variable costs for labor and capital are 
higher for the more productive than for the less productive 
land, but they constitute a smaller fraction of total costs 
on the better land than on the less productive land. Land 
rent plus the cost or rent for other fixed factors makes up 
a larger fraction of total costs on the better land than on 
the less productive land. 
The relationship between variable costs and gross product 
is not an exact one. The part of capital and labor costs that 
are treated as variable differ among tracts of land of the 
same productivity. It is possible for variable costs to make 
up a larger proportion of total costs on a given high 
producing farm than on another low producing farm. The 
variable cost of crop production for a given grade of land can 
be treated as a random variable described by a distribution 
function. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The horizontal 
axis represents production costs in dollars per acre. It 
constitutes a vertical cross section taken at an arbitrary 
point on the horizontal axis of Figure 2. Total cost is 
represented by distance T. Variable cost is a random variable 
with a mean of V. The residual return to fixed factors or 
imputed fixed cost is the difference between total costs, T, 
and variable costs, V. The vertical axis represents the 
Figure 3• Hypothetical distribution of variable costs for 
land of a given productivity 
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frequency at which each particular level of variable costs 
appears. 
The Conditions for Soil Bank 
Participation on the Individual Farm 
The conditions of profit maximization for a firm operat­
ing under pure competition require that the value of the 
marginal product of each factor employed be equal to its 
price. Secondly, the marginal productivity of each factor 
must be declining. Assuming continuous first derivatives in 
the transformation function and diminishing returns throughout, 
it follows that an increase in the price of a factor will lead 
to a reduction in the quantity of the factor used. Further­
more, if the other inputs are variable and the firm has been 
operating at the lowest point on its long run average cost 
curve with zero profits, it will drop out of production since 
only negative profits are possible. The individual farm firm 
confronted with a high Soil Bank payment rate may find itself 
in such a situation. In effect, the Soil Bank payment rate 
sets a lower limit on the price of land. If the Soil Bank 
payment rate exceeds the marginal product of land in produc­
tion, and if capital and labor costs are variable, the farmer 
maximizes profit by going out of production and placing all 
of the land in the Soil Bank. 
Next, consider the case where a firm operating under 
competition finds the price of one of its inputs increases 
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and treats one or more of the remaining inputs as fixed. In 
this case the firm will seek a new short run equilibrium 
position where losses are minimized. The quantity of the 
input exhibiting the price increase will decrease until its 
short run marginal product equals the new price. The quanti­
ties of the various outputs will tend to decline in aggregate 
and the quantities of the remaining inputs may change in 
either direction or remain constant depending upon the degree 
of complementarity or substitution in the transformation 
function of the firm. This situation corresponds to the farm 
firm confronted with a favorable Soil Bank payment rate that 
finds part of its capital and labor inputs fixed. In this 
case, the farm would not go completely out of production; 
only part of the land would go into the Soil Bank. Actually 
the various inputs exhibit indivisibilities; i.e., they are 
lumpy. For example, the marginal increment of land may be a 
whole field or a whole quarter section. With indivisibilities 
profit is maximized when the increase in product resulting 
from the last increment of each variable factor employed 
equals or exceeds its cost and the increase in product 
resulting from an additional increment of each factor is less 
than its cost. 
In the case when some capital and labor inputs are fixed 
with respect to Soil Bank participation, the returns to these 
inputs along with the return to the fixed land input may be 
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treated as a residual after the variable costs of production 
have been subtracted from total product. To make Soil Bank 
participation the more profitable alternative, the Soil Bank 
payment must cover not only the rent imputed to land but also 
the rent imputed to these other fixed inputs in production. 
In other words, the Soil Bank payment must cover total fixed 
costs of production to make participation profitable. 
Whether the farmer treats capital and labor costs as 
fixed or variable greatly affects his willingness to enter 
the Soil Bank program at a given payment rate level. There­
fore, it affects the government cost of taking an individual 
farm out of production. If the farmer considers all costs 
fixed, the Soil Bank payment must cover total production 
costs, but under pure competition production costs exhaust 
the product. Thus, at this extreme, the government would 
have to pay a dollar for each dollar of production eliminated 
on the individual farm. At the other extreme, where only 
land rent is a fixed cost, the government would have to pay 
for only the portion of the product that is imputed to land 
to reduce production on the individual farm. So long as 
some costs are variable, the cost of retiring a given tract 
of land from production will be less than the normal value of 
its gross product if there are no administrative inefficien­
cies. This implies that it would cost less to remove the 
product of a given tract of land from the market by a land 
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rental program than it would cost to purchase its product 
after it has been produced. However, this conclusion applies 
only to an individual tract of land and not to agriculture as 
a whole. The aggregative implications are to be examined 
next. 
Aggregative Aspects of Soil Bank Participation 
If the Soil Bank program applied only to one farm or a 
few farms, the external effects of participation on other 
farms and other industries could be neglected and the analysis 
of the preceding section would not have to be extended. But, 
the purpose of the Soil Bank is to affect the aggregate 
production of the agricultural industry. Our theoretical 
analysis must be extended to take into account the implications 
of such programs on the industry as a whole and on the economy. 
Of particular interest are the external effects operating 
through the markets for agricultural capital and labor, As 
a starting point, we will consider the implications of input 
control under perfect competition. 
At equilibrium under perfect competition all firms are 
operating at the point of constant returns to scale and 
diminishing returns are general. Each input is priced at 
the value of its marginal product. The charges for inputs 
exhaust the product and profits are zero. If the price of one 
factor for a given industry is arbitrarily set at a level 
above the equilibrium price the following consequences ensue. 
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The use of this factor in the given industry tends to decline. 
The level of output for the given industry tends to decline. 
The price of the industry's product tends to riseThe use 
of other factors in the given industry and the prices of 
these other factors may increase or decrease depending upon 
whether they are substitutes or complements for the factor 
being controlled. 
If at the same time that the price of one input is 
increased, the price of the industry's output is held con­
stant, the possible outcomes are more limited. As before, 
the use of this factor in the given industry declines and 
the output of the industry declines. But this time we can 
state unequivocably that the quantities of other factors and 
the prices of these other factors also tend to decline. An 
increase in the price of one factor implies that all firms in 
the industry would be operating at a loss if an adjustment did 
not take place. Since each firm is already operating at the 
lowest point on its long run cost curve, the adjustment 
involves eliminating some of the firms. As these firms leave 
the industry, the industry's output declines and the prices 
of its products tend to rise. At the same time, the prices 
and quantities of other inputs may move in either direction 
depending upon the technical relationships. A new equilibrium 
would be established such that costs again equal returns. 
^We exclude the possibility of Giffen goods. 
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However, if the price of the industry's output cannot rise, 
the only way that costs can equal returns is for the prices 
and quantities of at least one other factor to decline. 
Therefore, production and the price of at least one other 
factor will decrease until the price of that factor is low 
enough so that the firms remaining in the industry can 
operate without loss. 
This situation seems to parallel the situation with 
respect to the Soil Bank. The Soil Bank rate structure sets 
the alternative price for land while the price support pro-
II. 
grams set the price for farm products. To the extent that 
this analogy is valid, we would expect the Soil Bank program 
to reduce agricultural production, to increase land rents, and 
to decrease either or both the quantity of capital and labor 
used in agriculture and the prices paid these factors. 
The theory of competition suggests some quantitative 
hypotheses about the aggregate effects of land retirement. As 
indicated in the previous section, the cost of reducing pro­
duction on the individual farm through land retirement is 
equal to the value of the product eliminated if all inputs are 
fixed or where the demand and supply for inputs outside the 
industry are perfectly inelastic. Under these conditions the 
^The support programs explicitly set lower limits on 
price. They, in effect, set an upper limit on prices if the 
government has a supply of farm commodities in storage which 
it is prepared to release when the prices exceed the support 
level. 
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cost of reducing agricultural production by land retirement 
would equal the value of the product eliminated. 
However, if the supply or demand for one or more of the 
inputs is not perfectly inelastic, different results are 
implied. If the supply of land for crop production is elastic 
part of the land that is retired will be replaced by new land 
and the quantity of production control attained may approach 
zero. On the other hand, if the supply of land is fixed and 
the demand for capital and labor outside of agriculture were 
perfectly elastic, production could be eliminated by paying 
only for the rent earned by the land. This is the most 
favorable situation that is possible where the objective is 
to maximize the amount of production eliminated per dollar of 
program costs. It provides a basis for setting an upper 
limit on the quantity of production that can be eliminated 
per dollar of land retirement cost. This upper limit equals 
the ratio of gross product to land rent. 
Initially, the government may be able to secure the 
reduction in production by paying only for the rent imputed 
to land while the associated labor and capital are absorbed 
by the non-farm sector. But as the scale of the program is 
increased, the labor and capital released can find employment 
outside of agriculture only at progressively lower prices. 
Since land rent is a residual after the variable costs have 
been subtracted from total product, it will tend to increase 
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when the prices for agricultural products are held constant 
and labor and capital prices decline. Thus, as more and more 
land is retired and with it more labor and capital released 
from agriculture, the rent imputed to the land remaining in 
production is increased and the necessary level of Soil Bank 
payment to make participation profitable rises. The cost of 
retiring an additional acre of land of the same productivity 
increases as more and more land is retired. The same acre of 
land would cost more to retire with large scale land retire­
ment program than with a small scale program. 
The market for farm capital and labor 
Although land retirement programs are designed to 
operate directly on the land input, their total effect 
depends to a large degree on how they affect agricultural 
labor and capital. One advantage of the Soil Bank program 
and particularly the whole-farm Soil Bank program over the 
feed grain program appears to be its ability to transfer 
capital and labor out of agriculture at the same time that 
it is withdrawing land. In the case of a part-farm program, 
the capital and labor associated with the land that is retired 
can be transferred to other land without a change of ownership 
of the capital or the employment status of the labor. With a 
whole-farm program these inputs can only be transferred to 
other land by a change in ownership or employment. For 
example, a part-farm participant can spend the time he 
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formerly used in farming his Soil Bank land in more intensive 
cultivation of his land which remains in production but a 
whole-farm participant must either acquire more land or work 
as a hired man on another farm to keep his labor in farming• 
The whole-farm program encourages the farmer to take his 
capital and labor to the market place where it may be trans­
ferred to non-agricultural uses. 
Whether the capital and labor released by land retirement 
end up in non-farm employment or in employment on other farms 
depends upon the demands for these inputs in these two uses. 
Certain types of agricultural capital, particularly farm 
machines, are not suitable for non-farm uses. For example, 
the demand for tillage, planting and harvesting equipment is 
negligible outside of agriculture. However, the used machines 
released by land retirement can be transferred to other farms 
where they substitute for new machinery. The production of 
new farm machines can decline and some of the inputs used to 
manufacture farm machinery can be transferred to other uses. 
While the non-farm demand for farm machines is inelastic, the 
non-farm demand for the inputs used to manufacture farm 
machines may be elastic. In this manner capital in the form 
of farm machinery can be transferred out of agriculture as 
land is retired. 
The situation is similar for farm labor. Many middle-
aged farmers who have no other work experience find little 
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demand for their services outside of farming. If they place 
some of their land in the Soil Bank, they are inclined to 
continue to use their labor on other land or in livestock 
production. If their labor is substituted for the labor of 
younger men who would otherwise be entering farming, a 
transfer of labor away from agriculture takes place. 
The market for farm labor and capital is not a perfect 
market. There are costs associated with the transfer of 
labor and capital from one farm to another farm. For example, 
the transfer of machinery from one farm to another is often 
accompanied by transportation and commission costs. The stage 
at which labor and capital can be most readily disassociated 
from a given tract of land is the point in time when new 
equipment or a new farmer is needed to continue production. 
Farms on which an older operator is to be replaced by a young 
operator or on which old machines are to be replaced by new 
machines exhibit low fixed costs for labor and capital during 
the period when these changes are taking place. Farms 
operated by operators nearing retirement age can be profitably 
put into the Soil Bank at a lower Soil Bank payment rate than 
equally productive farms operated by middle aged farmers who 
do not have the skills needed for off-farm employment. 
Similarly, farm operators who find themselves at the point 
of needing major items of new machinery to continue production 
are more likely to find the Soil Bank a profitable alternative 
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than farmers who already own almost new machines. 
The price that farm operators charge themselves for their 
own labor may also vary from region to region with variations 
in the off-farm demand for labor. For example, the farmer who 
lives near a growing manufacturing plant that needs new 
workers may place a high opportunity cost on his labor. 
Another farmer, who lives in an area of unemployed factory 
workers may place a low opportunity cost on his labor. If 
their land were similar in productivity, the first farmer 
would accept a lower Soil Bank payment rate than would the 
second farmer. This suggests that Soil Bank participation 
would be higher in areas of good off-farm employment 
opportunities than in areas without such opportunities. 
The degree to which labor costs are fixed with respect 
to Soil Bank participation is also affected by the tenure 
arrangements on each farm. The x>wner of a tenant operated 
farm is inclined to look upon the tenant's labor as a cost 
that is variable at the termination of the lease regardless 
of the tenant's alternative employment opportunities. In 
contrast, an owner-operator may consider his own labor a 
variable cost only if off-farm employment opportunities are 
readily available. Thus, we would expect higher levels of 
participation among owners of tenant operated farms than 
among owner-operators if no provisions were made to prevent 
displacing tenants. 
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THE NATURE OF SOIL BANK PARTICIPATION. 1956-1960 
Any prediction of the effects of future land retirement 
programs should take into account past experience with such 
programs. This chapter brings together the findings of a 
number of studies of the 1956-60 conservation reserve 
program. The hypotheses of the preceding chapter are examined 
for consistency with the effects observed in these studies. 
Provisions of the Conservation Reserve Program 
The Conservation Reserve came into being on May 28, 1956 
with the passage of the Agricultural Act of 1956, Public Law 
5^0, 84-th Congress (67). It was designed as a long term 
measure to help adjust farm production to market demands and 
to increase the conservation of soil, water, forest, and 
wildlife resources. It was applicable to all land used to 
grow crops and operated through contracts of three, five or " 
ten years duration whereby farmers agreed to keep conserva­
tion reserve land out of production and to establish a 
permanent vegetative or woody cover on such land. 
The major incentives for participation were the annual 
rental payments for the land under contract. The annual 
payments were to be shared by tenants and no tenant was to 
be displaced in.order to place land in the Soil Bank. There 
were also cost-sharing payments for carrying out conservation 
measures on the conservation reserve land. These payments 
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were designed to cover up to 80 per cent of the costs of 
carrying out such practices as establishing cover crops, 
planting trees, building dams and ponds, planting wildlife 
cover and shallow flooding for wildlife. 
Changes in the conservation reserve over time 
The national conservation reserve rental rate for the 
1956-58 period was $10.00 per acre. The rate ranged from 
$7.00 to $13.00 for the different states. County rates 
ranged from $5.00 to $16.50 per acre. These rates applied to 
land taken out of production of Soil Bank base crops. The 
Soil Bank base crops included cultivated crops, grains, and 
most other crops except hay and forage. A nondiversion rate 
equal to 30 per cent of the regular rate was paid for eligible 
cropland that was in excess of the Soil Bank base for the farm 
when all of the Soil Bank acreage was put into the program. 
In 1958 county ASC committees were authorized to raise 
the nondiversion payment rate to 50 per cent of the regular 
rate when all eligible land on a farm was placed in the 
conservation reserve. Also, all farmers were allowed to put 
land into the conservation reserve at the nondiversion rate 
up to the number of acres they put into the program at the 
regular rate. This privilege had previously existed only for 
farmers with a Soil Bank base of 30 acres or less. 
In 1959 the national basic rental rate was raised from 
$10.00 to $13.50 per acre. A 10 per cent bonus was established 
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for farms on which all eligible land was put into the program 
for 5 years or longer. Provision was made for setting pay­
ment rates for each farm based upon productivity. Farmers 
who wished to participate were allowed to submit bids below 
the basic rate set for their respective farms. Farmers who 
made the lowest bids received the highest priority in the 
awarding of contracts. 
In I960 a number of modifications were made in the 
program to make it more effective and to prevent abuses. 
Only applicants who bid below the basic rate established for 
their land were accepted. The legislation did not provide 
for the signing of any new contracts after i960. 
Setting the Soil Bank payment rates for 1959-60 
As a basis for setting the 1959-60 conservation reserve 
payment rates for the states, the Soil Bank Division 
established a composite index of land productivity (76). 
To derive the composite index, the following three indexes 
were weighed by four, two and four respectively: 
1. Index of gross income per acre of selected 
nonirrigated crops 
2. Index of nonirrigated plowland values 
3. Index of 1956-58 conservation reserve state rates. 
The first is a measure of the gross product and the second is 
a measure of the net product of land. The last reflects both 
productivity concepts. 
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Indicated state rates were computed by multiplying the 
composite index times $13.50, the national payment rate level. 
Then an arbitrary constant of $3.00 to cover fixed costs 
which would continue under the program was added to each 
indicated rate to obtain an adjusted rate for each state. 
Finally, the adjusted rates were multiplied by a constant so 
that the weighed average of the state rates equalled $13.5°. 
Thus, the state rates that were finally established reflected 
not only the gross productivity and the net productivity of 
land but also a constant factor for all states. The use of 
the constant meant that the less productive states received 
higher rates and the more productive states received lower 
rates than the rates indicated by using the composite index 
alone. 
The county payment rates were set by the respective 
state ASC committees. It was not possible to use a uniform 
indexing scheme for counties in different states because of 
differences in cropping patterns and differences in the 
acreage, yield, and production data available in the 
different states. The state committees were urged to place 
heavy weight on the total value of nonirrigated crops per 
acre and include land values, 1956-58 conservation reserve 
rates, and cash rental rates in their computations. The use 
of a constant to cover fixed production costs was also allowed 
in setting county rates. 
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To set payment rates for individual farms the county ASC 
committees established township productivity indexes and the 
township committees established productivity indexes for all 
the farms in each township. These indexes were combined so 
that the resulting farm indexes averaged 100 for the county. 
Special indexes were established for part-farms when it was 
determined that the part-farm was significantly less produc­
tive than the farm as a whole. The basic payment rate for 
each farm was set by multiplying the farm's productivity 
index times the basic rate for the county. Whole-farm 
participants were awarded a ten per cent bonus. All farmers 
who wished to offer land to the government were required to 
submit bids with the lowest bidders having the highest 
priority when funds did not allow acceptance of all offers. 
Characteristics of Soil Bank Participants 
One step in the analysis of factors associated with Soil 
Bank participation is to study the characteristics of 
participating farmers and farmland and compare them with the 
characteristics of non-participants. This method is useful 
in testing our hypotheses about Soil Bank participation but 
it does not provide the functional relationships that are 
necessary to predict the effects of proposed land retirement 
programs. 
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Results from other studies 
A number of researchers throughout the country have 
studied the characteristics of conservation reserve partici­
pants. Table 1 summarizes some comparisons between partici­
pants and non-participants drawn from these studies. These 
results indicate that in most of the areas studied Soil Bank 
participants were older and had more off-farm jobs than did 
non-participants. 
Table 2 shows the same comparisons between full partici­
pants and part participants. The full participants tended to 
be older and have smaller farms than did the part participants. 
Comparison of participants and non-participants in seven 
counties of Minnesota. North Dakota and South Dakota 
This section reports the results of a study involving 
seven counties in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota. 
The study was conducted during the summer of 1961. The 
counties were selected as being typical of high participation 
areas in each state. In each county two samples were drawn, 
one of Soil Bank participants and one of non-participants. 
Table 3 shows the number of participants and non-participants 
drawn in each county. The samples were drawn from the ASC 
files beginning at a random point and then drawing names at 
regular intervals from each list in order to obtain approxi­
mately fifty participants and fifty non-participants in each 
county. Information on farm size and tenure was obtained 
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[•able 1. Characteristics of Soil Bank participants and non-parti ci pants, results from other s tu 
Per cent Pex 
Average age over 65 off 
Year Non- Non-
of Partie- partie- Partie- partie- Pari 
Region survey ipants ipants ipants ipants ipai 
Rock County, Wisconsin (50, pp. 150, 152) 57 —— — 26 1ka 5C 
Aroostook County, Maine (69, p. 11) 57 52b 51 -- — —  51 
Franklin and Kennebec Counties, Maine (69, p. il) 57 53 — —— 8i 
Central Wisconsin dairy area (69, p. Uj) 57 58b 52 " —— hi 
South Carolina, upper coastal plain (69, p. 19) 57 51 51 -- kt 
Texas Panhandle, dryland faims (69, p. 2k) 57 51 19 — —— 1C 
Texas Panhandle, irrigated farms (69, p. 2lt) 57 kS la —— — —  11 
North Central South Dakota (69, p. 28) 57 18 ko — *  3( 
Southeastern South Dakota (69, p. 28) 57 50 U6 —* — 11 
Columbia Basin wheat area, Oregon (69, p. 31) 57 ii5b 50 —— —— 2f 
Aroostook County, Maine (12, p. 2) 58 58 53 —— —— 3i 
Franklin and Kennebec Counties, Maine (12, p. 2) 58 57 52 — — —•*  5: 
South Central Iowa (U7, p. 5) 59 5k 52 k2d 27 d 2( 
Currie and Roosevelt Counties, New Mexico 
2lb (60, pp. 11, 12, 15, 16) 59 50 15 li 
Torrance County, New Mexico (60, pp. 11,12,15,16) 59 57 hk 35 5 15 
Georgia Piedmont (30, pp. 8, 9, 10) 60 55 55 32 28 51 
Georgia Coastal Plain (30, pp. 8, 9, 10) 60 52 55 21 30 k: 
Johnson, Pawnee, Webster and Franklin 
Counties, Nebraska (26, p. 20) 60 57, 61 — —  —«W ki 
Wisconsin (9, pp. 15, 35) 60 58^ k9a 35h 13a — 
aData from the Census of Agriculture, 195k and 1959. 
bData for full participants and part participants combined. 
^Part-time farmers. 
^Age 60 and over. 
eFull-time, off-farm work. 
f 
Part-time farmers or full-time nonfarmers. 
SKon-farm income greater than #500. 
^Whole-faim participants only. 
suits from other studies 
Per cent Per cenb with Per cent owners Average ! acres Operators in 
over 65 off-farm job or part i owners of cropland sample 
Non- Non- Non- Non- Non-
Partic­• partic­ Partic­ partic­ Partic­ part ic- Partic­ partic- Partic­ partic-
ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants 
26 lUa 5°, 39a __ 189 __ 
—— — — 5i*b 15 MM —— 100b 119 76 52 
—— —— 85b 30 —— hob 68 38 36 
—— l*5b 23 — — — — 101b 103 71* 75 
—— 1*8 2k 85 76 225 92 11*7 159 
—— 
—— 10c 20° 79 61* 920 6l6 69 25 
— 
—— li;c 10c 81 60 976 951 1*3 83 
--
— 30 0 92 72 h90 561* 50 50 
—* —— Hi 8 88 1;6 175, 186 1*2 1*0 
— —— 25 8 ll*b 75 1,713 1,107 65 65 
—— 
—— 37 12 —— —— 70 92 121* 1*6 
— — —— 51 31 —— —* 1*2 52* 101 1*2 
U2d 27d 20e 8e 111 11*2 163 107 
21£ 15 17b 13 97? 86 359b 295 91* 61* 
35 5 19b 15, 97 90 l+05b 290 69 20 
32 28 31^  — — —— 112 68 176 65 
21 30 i*if 27 — —  181 11*0 160 60 
U8§ 29g 11*9 120 90 63 
35h 13a — ~ — 62h 88a 7283 
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Table 2 = Characteristics of full participants and part participants, results from other studies 
Per cent Per ce 
Average age over 65 off-fa 
Year Full Part Full Part Full 
of Partic­ Partic­ Partic­ Partic­ Partic­
Region survey ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants 
Aroostook County, Maine (69, p. ll) 57 58 hi _ _  58 
Franklin and Kennebec Counties, Maine (69, p. 11) 57 57 53 — —  *** 81 
Central Wisconsin dairy area (69, p. Hi) 57 60 57 — —  — —  50 
Columbia Basin wheat area, Oregon (69, p. 31) 51 U8 U5 — — — —  100 
Currie and Roosevelt Counties, New Mexico 
(60, pp. 11, 12, 15, 16) 59 61 5D h6 9 17 
Torrance County, New Mexico (60, pp. 11, 12, 
15, 16) 59 59 53 h3 22 25, 
Georgia Piedmont (30, pp. 8, 9, 10) 60 55 55 36 30 59 
Georgia Coastal Plain (30, pp. 8, 9, 10) 60 5L 5u 2h 19 59a 
Johnson, Pawnee, Webster and Franklin 
52b Counties, Nebraska (26, p. 20) 60 53 53 — — — 
New York State (Hi, pp. 5, 7, 9, 15) 60 56 51 3h ll; 58 
^Part-time farmers or full-time nonfaimers» 
bNon-faim income greater than $$00» 
rem oth er s tu die s 
Per cent Per cent with Per cent part Average acres Operators in 
over 65 off-fam .job owners or owners of cropland sample 
EI Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part 
tic- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie- Partie 
its ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants ipants 
- — —  58 50 — —  — —  57 lli2 38 38 
-
— —  81 86 —  —  — —  2ii 52 16 22 
- — —  50 h2 — —  — —  97 108 2li 50 
-
— 100 18 100 85 181 1824 5 60 
5 9 17 3 100 95 290 738 28 66 
3 22 25, 8 98 96 287 581 2*2 27 
S 30 59 51* — —  — 58 139 61 115 
4 19 59a 31a — —  88 226 52i 106 
mm 52b iiiib 119 168 35 55 
l 11; 58 62 — - - 69 115 316 58 
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Table 3. Numbers of participants and non-participants in 
sample by county 
Per cent 
Number of Number of of crop­
partici­ non-par­ land in 
pants in ticipants Soil Bank 
County sample in sample in I960 
Eddy, North Dakota 52 45 19.8 
Williams, North Dakota 50 53 18.2 
Hand, South Dakota 51 49 13.9 
Marshall, South Dakota 52 51 18.2 
Ziebach, South Dakota 4-3 39 15.9 
Norman, Minnesota 47 50 13.7 
Roseau, Minnesota 50 55 33.5 
Total 345 342 — -
from the ASC records. Information on farmers' ages , off-farm 
employment and farmers' residences was obtained by interview-
ing the respective county ASC committees and ASC office 
personnel. The interviewees were not able to provide each 
item of information desired on every one of the operators in 
the samples, but for no item of information were more than 
five per cent of the observations missing. 
Table 4- summarizes the findings with respect to farmers' 
ages, off-farm employment, residence, tenure, and farm size. 
It shows that a higher per cent of participants than non-
participants were over 65, worked off their farms, were full 
owners, had less cropland than average for the county and 
lived off the farm. Chi-square tests indicate that the 
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Table 4. Characteristics of farmers in seven high Soil Bank 
participation counties 
Per cent of 
Per cent of non-partic­
participants ipants 
Below 55 years of age 53-3 69.2 
55 to 64 years of age 26.6 19.7 
Age 65 or older 20.0 11.1 
Worked off farm prior to C.R. 25-3 — — 
Worked off farm after C.R. 36.8 17.5 
Lived off farm 15.9 12.2 
Full owner 62.8 47.7 
Part owner 21.9 27.3 
Tenant 15.3 25.0 
Acres of cropland below average 
for county 72.0 69.2 
differences in age, ownership and off-farm work were larger 
than would be expected in such samples 99 per cent of the 
time if there were actually no differences between partici­
pants and non-participants. However, the sample differences 
in farm size and operator's residence were not significant at 
the 99 per cent level. 
The Land in the Conservation Reserve 
Conservation reserve participation was 1.4 million acres 
in 1956 and climbed to 28.7 million acres in I960. The 
largest increase came in 1959 when 12.6 million acres were 
added to the program followed by i960 which saw an increase 
of 6.2 million acres. The 28.7 million acres in the Soil 
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Bank in I960 made up 6.4 per cent of the nation's cropland as 
estimated in the 1959 Census of Agriculture. Since I960, 
Soil Bank acres have been declining as conservation reserve 
contracts expire, In 1962 there were still 26.3 million acres 
in the program. By 1968 this will have fallen to 10.2 million 
acres. By 1971 all contracts will have expired. 
The geographic pattern of Soil Bank participation 
Every state except Nevada had some land in the conserva­
tion reserve in i960, but the level of participation varied 
markedly from one section of the country to another. Figure 
4- shows I960 Soil Bank acreage as a per cent of the 1954 
Census cropland by county for the United States. The heavily 
shaded areas of higher participation tend to be areas of 
lower land values and lower productivity. For example, there 
is a region in northern Minnesota, North Dakota and South 
Dakota, another region in Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma and 
Texas and a third region in Georgia and South Carolina where 
participation was especially heavy. In contrast, the highly 
productive area in the central cornbelt exhibited low levels 
of participation. 
The productivity of Soil Bank land 
The geographic pattern of Soil Bank participation suggests 
that more low producing land than high producing land was 
placed in the program. To test this conclusion, the regression 
Figure b. Cropland in the conservation reserve 
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of participation levels on productivity was examined using 
states as observations. The productivity measure was the 
value of land and buildings per acre as reported in the 1959 
Census of Agriculture. This measure reflects the net pro­
ductivity of land ; i.e., the residual return to land after 
capital and labor costs have been subtracted from gross 
product. It also reflects the value of buildings used for 
livestock production and family living as well as the value 
of woodland and non-cropland pasture, it probably overstates 
the value of land for production of crops in areas of high 
livestock densities and understates cropland values in areas 
with large acreages of low valued woodland or non-cropland 
pasture. 
A weighted least squares regression was computed using 
as weights the number of acres of cropland in each state. 
The data for the regression are presented in Table 5* The 
resulting equation was : 
Y = 9.814 - 0.024%, r = -.553, 
(0.007) 
where Y is the per cent of 1959 Census cropland in the 
conservation reserve in I960, X is the value of land and 
buildings per acre as reported in the 1959 Census of Agri­
culture and the figure in parenthesis is the computed standard 
error for the regression coefficient. The regression 
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Table 5» Total cropland, land values and Soil Bank 
participation by state 
Value of land Per cent of 
Total crop- and buildings, cropland in 
land, 1959 dollars Soil Bank, 
State 1000 acres per acre i960 
Maine 1,078 83.ll 11.43 
N. H. 306 104.00 3.85 
Vermont 984 81.49 3.31 
Mass. 445 310.14 .64 
R. I. 55 379.98 .11 
Conn. 351 444.13 1.34 
New York 7,121 146.13 7.14 
New Jersey 892 520.12 5.61 
Pennsylvania 6,595 184.65 5.66 
Ohio 12,255 247.11 4.28 
Indiana 13,660 265.02 3.62 
Illinois 23,960 315.87 1.84 
Michigan 9,957 193.11 7.24 
Wisconsin 12,250 132.12 6.23 
Minnesota 21,930 154.22 9.09 
Iowa 26,402 253.82 2.51 
Missouri 18,170 112.40 4.58 
N. Dakota 27,707 51.63 9.76 
S. Dakota 19,165 50.76 9.43 
Nebraska 22,828 88.66 3.86 
Kansas 29,624 100.04 4.88 
Delaware 496 235.98 3.71 
Maryland 1,951 284.12 4.34 
Virginia 4,427 138.60 2.65 
W. Virginia 1,551 74.27 3-82 
N. Carolina 6, 4l6 I85.61 4.23 
S. Carolina 4,035 I34.OI 15.81 
Georgia 7,458 97.08 14.24 
Florida 3,401 217.72 6.74 
Kentucky 9,927 135.37 3.90 
Tennessee 8,499 130.30 5.88 
Alabama 6,028 89.45 6.80 
Mississippi 7,093 105.97 4.73 
Arkansas 8,436 109.19 7.16 
Louisiana 4,907 170.63 4.45 
Oklahoma 14,044 83.86 10.62 
Texas 35,599 82.11 10.30 
Montana 15,078 3^.69 4.18 
Idaho 5,784 111.69 5.07 
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Table 5» (Continued) 
Value of land Per cent of 
Total crop- and buildings, cropland in 
land, 1959 dollars Soil Bank, 
State 1000 acres per acre I960 
Wyoming 2,738 21.39 4.56 
Colorado 11,033 52.94 11.75 
New Mexico 2,292 23.46 37.82 
Arizona 1,586 48.53 .49 
Utah 2,008 59.50 11.84 
Nevada 787 30.54 0 
Washington 7,910 131.14 4.30 
Oregon 5,380 87.42 4.39 
California 12,966 353.12 1.58 
coefficient is negative indicating that the per cent of crop­
land in the Soil Bank tended to be lower in states with 
higher land values.^ 
To investigate the relationship between land productivity 
and Soil Bank participation on a county basis, a sample of 
eighty counties in five midwest states was studied.^ The 
states were North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota 
and Iowa. These states include parts of four type of farming 
areas: the range livestock area, the spring wheat area, the 
dairy area and the cornbelt. Two measures of productivity 
^The standard error for the weighted regression was com­
puted by the formula presented in Klein (28, p. 308). The t 
test is not applicable since all states were represented in 
the data. 
^The sampling technique employed and the counties in the 
sample are given in Appendix A. 
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were used. The first was value of land and "buildings per acre 
of farmland in 1959 as reported in the 1959 Census of Agri­
culture . This is a measure of the net product or marginal 
product earned by land in production. The second measure of 
productivity was an estimate of gross product or normal value 
of crops produced per acre of cropland. It was estimated 
from historical yield and acreage data.^ Table 21 in Appendix 
A shows the participation and productivity estimates for the 
counties in the sample. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the relationship between 
these two productivity measures and Soil Bank participation. 
o 
The least squares regression lines are shown on the figures. 
Both figures illustrate the tendency for participation to be 
high and uneven in the lower producing counties and 
consistently low in the more productive counties in the 
region. 
Comparison of the productivity of Soil Bank land and 
other cropland for farms within a county is made difficult 
?See Appendix A, pages 224-229, for details of the 
method used to estimate average gross product per acre by 
county. 
g 
In Figure 5 three counties were eliminated from the 
computed regression. They were Hennepin County, Minnesota, 
and Douglas and Scotts Bluff Counties, Nebraska. Hennepin 
and Douglas are strongly affected by urban influences and 
Scotts Bluff has approximately 33 per cent of its cropland 
irrigated. For these counties the census land values over­
estimate the value of cropland that would normally be 
eligible for the Soil Bank. 
Figure 5» The relationship between land value and Soil Bank 
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by the lack of suitable measures of gross product for 
individual farms. For most farms, detailed cropping and 
yield data, which could be used to estimate productivity, 
are not available. For an individual farm, the selling price 
of land represents a poor index of productivity because of 
the thinness of the market for farm land. The buyer and 
seller often reach a price agreement with only very sketchy 
knowledge about productivity. Individual farmers' estimates 
of land value and productivity indexes assigned by county ASC 
committees are subject to error for the same reasons. 
One of the more objective means of estimating productiv­
ity on an individual farm basis is by use of the soil maps 
and yield estimates provided by agronomists. In a pilot 
study this method was used in the analysis of productivity 
for 48 Soil Bank participants' farms and 48 non-participants' 
farms in Hand County, South Dakota.^ Table 6 summarizes the 
results. The estimated yields were 2.6 per cent higher for 
corn and 2.2 per cent higher for wheat on the non-partici­
pants' land than on the Soil Bank land. However, differences 
as large as this would be expected almost 50 per cent of the 
time in samples of this size if the differences between the 
population means were zero. Apparently, in Hand County, the 
Soil Bank land was not greatly different from the non-
participants' land in productivity. 
^The details of this analysis are given in Appendix B. 
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In summary^ the evidence indicates that the less 
productive regions had higher rates of participation in the 
Soil Bank than did the more productive regions. But within 
one county in South Dakota the Soil Bank land appeared to 
be approximately as productive as the non-participants' 
cropland. 
Table 6. Summary of soil productivity estimates for Hand 
County, South Dakota 
Mean for Mean for Standard 
Soil Bank non-par- Differ- error of 
participant ticipant ence difference 
Estimated wheat yield 
bu./acre 10.696 10.932 .236 .332 
Estimated corn yield 
bu./acre 15*316 15*708 .392 .585 
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THE STRUCTURE OF PAYMENT RATES FOR LAND RETIREMENT 
A basic characteristic of the production control programs 
under study is that cash payments are made to farmers for 
withdrawing land from crop production. The effects of such 
programs depend upon the average level of the land retirement 
payments offered and upon the structure or distribution of 
such payments. In this chapter we are concerned with the 
structure of payment rates and the contractual arrangements 
under which payments are made. 
Payment Rates and Land Productivity 
In the preceding chapter, it was shown that the payment 
rate structure for the Soil Bank from 1956 to I960 resulted 
in high levels of participation in the less productive areas 
and low levels of participation in the more productive areas. 
The question has been raised, Would it not be better to have 
higher payment rates on the more productive land and lower 
payment rates on the less productive land so that more of 
the productive land would be retired? In this section some 
of the hypotheses presented in Chapter III are tested and 
their implications are examined in attempting to answer 
this question. 
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Empirical analysis of the relationship between factor 
proportions and land productivity for five midwest states 
In Chapter III the hypothesis of unequal factor propor­
tions was introduced. The essence of this hypothesis is that 
a larger proportion of crop production costs tend to be fixed 
on high producing land than on low producing land. Since 
land retirement payments must cover the fixed costs to make 
participation in the program profitable for the farm operator, 
this hypothesis implies that the payment per bushel necessary 
to eliminate production tends to be higher on the high produc­
ing land than on the low producing land. Such an implication 
is meaningful for agricultural policy purposes only if the 
underlying hypothesis is consistent with the observed cost 
structure over broad areas. This section reports the results 
of a study of the cost structure for crop production that was 
undertaken to test the hypothesis for five midwest states. 
No direct measures of the production costs which farmers 
treat as fixed with respect to Soil Bank participation are 
available. In lieu of such measures, various cost components 
were examined individually. It is convenient to divide crop 
production costs into three parts: land rent, labor costs 
and capital costs. The cost for land is a fixed cost with 
respect to the Soil Bank for all farms. However, the degree 
to which capital and labor costs are fixed with respect to 
Soil Bank participation varies from farm to farm. There are 
81 
certain production costs such as expenditures for fuel and 
fertilizer which are variable to virtually all farmers. But, 
there is another group of costs such as machinery depreciation 
and the operator's labor which some farmers may treat as 
fixed costs and other farmers may treat as variable costs. 
Two sources of cost estimates were considered for this 
study. The first would involve the use of cost estimates for 
different regions derived, from various economic studies. The 
difficulties here are that such studies often cover only a 
small sample of farms; they cover only selected areas in each 
state; and many of them are outdated because of changes in 
technology. To use such cost estimates, the analysis would 
have to be confined to the comparison of just those areas on 
which cost studies had been made. The use of a single esti­
mate of production costs for a given crop or group of crops 
for two or more areas of differing productivities makes 
factor proportions unequal for those areas by assumption. 
This would amount to assuming the conclusion which we set 
out to test. 
The second source of cost estimates is the Census of 
Agriculture (64). The problem with these data is that crop 
production costs are not isolated from costs for livestock 
production and the production of forest and nursery products. 
However, some of the reported expenditures are for inputs 
used primarily or exclusively for crop production. The 
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Census reports for each county the quantity of fertilizer 
purchased; the quantity of lime purchased; expenditures for 
petroleum fuel and lubricants; expenditures for seeds, bulbs, 
plants and trees; expenditures for hired labor and expendi­
tures for hired machines. Purchases of fertilizer, lime, and 
seeds, bulbs, plants and trees are almost wholly associated 
with crop production except in a few counties where produc­
tion of forest and nursery products is very large. Fuel and 
lubricant costs and hired machine costs are also almost 
exclusively for crop production. Hired labor costs, although 
primarily for the production of crops are partly attributable 
to livestock production, particularly in the areas of heavy 
livestock concentrations. Unfortunately, the Census of 
Agriculture does not report certain other crop production 
expenditures such as machinery repairs and expenditures for 
herbicides and insecticides. 
This analysis made use of county data from the Census of 
Agriculture and other sources for the sample of 80 midwest 
counties first mentioned on page 71*"^ Gross product per 
acre of cropland was estimated by making use of historical 
price, yield and acreage data for eight crops and cropland 
pasture in the respective counties. The methods by which the 
gross product estimates were derived are explained in detail 
•^See Appendix A for a list of the counties in the 
sample and the method by which they were selected. 
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in Appendix A. It is essential that such estimates be 
constructed in such a way as to avoid introduction of 
systematic errors. It is most serious if the errors in the 
gross product estimates have a non-zero mean or are correlated 
with the variable itself. For example, in an earlier pilot 
study, the value of corn, oats and soybeans produced per acre 
of cropland was used as an estimate of gross product for Iowa 
counties. This measure tended to underestimate gross product 
per acre of cropland for each county beside the omission of 
other crops including hay, sorghum and cropland pasture. Such 
an estimate could serve as a satisfactory index of gross 
product if it were proportional to actual gross product for 
all counties. But, the underestimation of gross product 
appeared to be proportionally greater for the low producing 
counties with larger acreages of hay and cropland pasture than 
for the high producing counties. 
For this analysis yields and acreages for eight major 
crops were employed along with estimates of the value per acre 
of cropland pasture. The harvested cropland for other crops 
was assumed to have the same product per acre as for the 
eight crops. Obviously, such a procedure cannot entirely 
eliminate systematic errors in valuing such crops as hay or 
cropland pasture or errors in omitting crops which were not 
specifically considered. It can only be argued that the 
systematic error was reduced to a practical minimum in the 
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gross product estimates obtained. 
Even if the errors in the estimates of gross product have 
a zero mean and are not correlated with the gross product 
itself, such errors lead to difficulties. In order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of linear parameters by least squares 
regression, it is essential that the independent variables be 
measured without error. As Wold (79, pp. 38, 39) demonstrates 
the presence of observational errors in the independent 
variable tends to bias the estimates of the regression 
coefficient downward in simple regression. The estimate of 
the intercept is biased upward. In this study we were 
particularly concerned with determining if the intercepts or 
values were different from zero. But, if the independent 
variables are subject to observational errors the usual tests 
may indicate that the intercepts are significantly greater 
than zero when such is not the case. The only counter to 
this criticism is to point out again that the gross product 
estimates were constructed with care making use of a large 
amount of data on productivity for each county in order to 
reduce the error to a practical minimum. 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between selected 
expenditures per acre and estimated gross product per acre 
for the 80 counties studied. The selected expenditures 
include expenditures for fertilizer; lime; seeds, bulbs, 
plants and trees; fuel and lubricants; hired labor and 
Figure 7» The relationship between selected production 
expenditures and estimated gross product per 
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hired machines.11 The figure shows the regression line 
computed for 77 of the 80 counties."^ The regression line 
passes very near the origin indicating that these expendi­
tures were almost proportional to estimated gross product 
from crop production for the region studied. This is 
contrary to our hypothesis of unequal factor proportions. 
To further investigate this relationship the regression was 
computed separately for the 4-2 cornbelt counties and for 35 
non-cornbelt counties. Table 7 summarizes the results. The 
computed regression line passes slightly below the origin 
for each area. Apparently these selected expenditures are 
approximately proportional to gross product throughout the 
region studied. If farmers treated all costs as fixed except 
these selected expenditures, fixed costs would equal approxi­
mately the same percentage of total costs in all counties and 
there would be little difference in the cost of reducing 
production between the high producing land and the low 
The expenditure data were obtained from the Census of 
Agriculture. Expenditures for fertilizer and lime were 
computed from data on quantities purchased. The method used 
to compute gross product is explained in Appendix A. 
1^Data for this regression and subsequent regressions 
are given in Appendix A. Hennepin County, Minnesota, and 
Douglas and Scotts Bluff Counties, Nebraska, were omitted 
from this and subsequent computed regressions. Hennepin and 
Douglas Counties are highly affected by urban influences. 
Scotts Bluff has approximately 33 per cent of its cropland 
irrigated whereas no other county in the sample had more 
than 7 per cent of its cropland irrigated. 
88 
Table 7» The regression of selected expenditures on gross 
product per acre 
Area covered a b s^ sa r 
77 counties -.326 .280 .013 .408 .926 
42 cornbelt 
counties -.811 .286 .019 .714 .915 
35 non-cornbelt 
counties 
-.934 .322 .025 .436 .912 
producing land. 
To further examine the relationship between variable 
costs and gross product the various expenditures were 
examined individually. Figure 8 shows the relationship 
between fuel and lubricant costs and gross product. These 
costs tend to constitute a greater fraction of gross product 
on the less productive land than on the more productive land. 
No satisfactory measures of the other machine costs includ­
ing repairs, depreciation, interest and insurance were avail­
able on a county basis. Data on the numbers of machines 
were rejected as an indicator of machinery costs because of 
the wide differences in type and size of machines used over 
the area studied. For the United States, repairs and 
depreciation costs on farm machinery are about three times 
as great as fuel and lubricant costs. If these other 
machinery costs are proportional to fuel and lubricant costs 
Figure 8. The relationship between expenditures for fuel 
and lubricants and estimated gross product per 
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they too would make up a larger fraction of total costs on the 
less productive land than on the more productive land. If 
these other machine costs were added to the expenditures 
shown in Figure 7» the regression line would pass above the 
origin. 
Figure 9 shows the relationship between fertilizer costs 
and estimated gross product per acre of cropland. Figure 10 
shows the relationship between costs for seeds, bulbs, plants 
and trees and estimated gross product. Both of these costs 
tend to be proportionally larger on the more productive land 
than on the less productive land. Examination of these two 
costs reveals part of the reasons why total expenditures do 
not fit the hypothesis of unequal factor proportions. Certain 
crops and certain soils are more responsive to fertilizer or 
other capital inputs than are other crops or other soils. In 
this case, high rates of fertilizer application per dollar of 
gross product are shown for the cornbelt counties while low 
rates of fertilizer application are revealed for the less 
productive counties outside of the cornbelt. 
Figure 11 shows the relationship between expenditures 
for hired machines and gross product per acre of cropland. 
Figure 12 shows the relationship between hired labor expendi­
tures and gross product. Both of these costs are almost 
proportional to gross product for the counties in the region. 
The study of these five crop production costs 
Figure 9• The relationship between expenditures for 
fertilizer and estimated gross product per 
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Figure 10. The relationship between expenditures for seeds, 
bulbs, plants and trees and estimated gross 
product per acre of cropland for 80 midwest 
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machines and estimated gross product per acre 
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Figure 12. The relationship between expenditures for hired 
labor and estimated gross product per acre of 
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Individually helps to explain why their total is approximately 
proportional to gross product over the region. Fuel and 
lubricant costs fit the hypothesis of unequal factor propor­
tions. But, the high expenditures for fertilizer and seeds 
in the high producing cornbelt counties make these costs 
larger in relation to gross product in these counties than in 
the less productive counties outside of the cornbelt. If the 
other costs for machinery were proportional to fuel and 
lubricant costs, and if they were added to the expenditures 
shown in Figure 7> the regression line would cut the vertical 
axis slightly above the origin. 
The available measures of land costs, labor costs and 
fixed capital costs are less satisfactory than the measures 
of expenditures discussed above. Data are available on land 
values and on the number of persons employed in agriculture, 
but these data reflect not only inputs for crop production 
but also inputs for livestock production. The land values 
reported in the Census of Agriculture represent all farmland 
and include the value of farm buildings. In counties with 
heavy concentrations of dairy cattle, hogs and poultry, these 
land values probably overstate the value of cropland for crop 
production because of the inclusion of the value of farm 
buildings used for livestock. In other counties with large 
acreages of low valued woodland or non-cropland pasture, the 
estimated land values may understate the value of cropland 
101 
for crop production. 
Figure 13 shows the relationship between farmland values 
and estimated gross product from cropland for the 80 counties 
in the sample. If the rent earned by the cropland were 
proportional to farmland values, this would indicate that 
land costs absorb a larger percentage of the gross product 
from cropland on the more productive land than on the less 
productive land. However, the use of farmland values instead 
of cropland values probably biases the regression coefficients 
shown in Figure 13. Because of the high concentrations of 
livestock in the more productive counties, the farmland values 
may tend to overstate the value of land for crop production 
in these counties. In the less productive counties, the 
large acreages of non-cropland pasture may cause the farmland 
values to understate cropland values. If these errors were 
removed, the regression line would probably pass nearer the 
origin. 
The measurement of costs for operator and family labor 
is also complicated by the problem of separating crop inputs 
from livestock inputs. Figure 14 shows the relationship 
between the number of operator and family workers per thousand 
acres of cropland and gross product per acre. A larger 
proportion of the labor on the more productive land than on 
the less productive land must be charged to livestock produc­
tion. Nevertheless, the figure strongly suggests that 
Figure 13. The relationship between land values and 
estimated gross product per acre for 80 
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Figure 14. The relationship between the number of operator 
and family workers per thousand acres of cropland 
and estimated gross product per acre of cropland 
for 80 midwest counties in 1959 
105 
30 Y 1 







Y = -1.514 + .283 X 
r = .809 









0 10 20 30 40 50 
ESTIMATED GROSS PRODUCT, DOLLARS PER ACRE 
106 
operator and family labor makes up as large a percentage of 
gross product on the more productive land as on the less 
productive land. Several counties exhibited extremely high 
numbers of operator and family workers. These include 
Custer County, South Dakota, and the northern Minnesota 
counties where many operators are only part time farmers. 
Results of the various cost analyses allow only tentative 
conclusions about the relative costs of retiring good land and 
poor land. The preponderance of evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that rent makes up a smaller fraction of total 
product on the less productive land than on the more produc­
tive land. Figure 15 illustrates the indicated cost structure 
for the region studied. To construct the figure the results 
from the various cost analyses were combined under the 
following set of assumptions. Operating expenses were set 
equal to selected expenditures as computed by the equation 
shown in Figure 7 plus an additional charge for machinery 
repairs. Both the costs for machinery repairs and the 
costs for machinery depreciation were assumed proportional 
to fuel and lubricant costs. The constants of proportionality 
employed were 1.063 and 1.865 respectively. These represented 
the average ratios for the respective costs for the United 
States over the eleven year period, 1950-1960 as reported in 
the Farm Income Situation (77, pp. 48, 50). The repair costs 
are included in operating expenditures in the figure. 
Figure 15. The indicated structure of crop production costs 
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Machinery depreciation is shown as a separate item. 
The residual, after operating expenses and machine 
depreciation were subtracted from gross product, was divided 
between land rent and returns to operator and family labor by 
assuming that land rent was equal to four per cent of land 
value at the mean and further assuming that the charge for 
operator and family labor was proportional to gross product 
as suggested by Figure Î4-. 
From the results illustrated in Figure 15 some condition­
al comparisons can be made between the costs for retiring 
various grades of land in the region studied. For land with 
a gross product of $20 per acre the indicated rent constitutes 
about 15 per cent of the gross product. For land with a gross 
product of $40 per acre the indicated rent makes up approxi­
mately 22 per cent of the gross product. If production can 
be controlled by paying only for the rent earned by land, each 
dollar in payments would eliminate $6.66 worth of production 
on land with a $20 gross product or $4-. 5^- worth of production 
on land with a $40 gross product. However, if the payment 
must cover not only land rent but also part of the capital 
and labor costs, the production reduction per dollar of pay­
ment is less and the difference in the cost of controlling 
production on different grades of land declines. For example, 
if the government payment must cover machine depreciation and 
operator and family labor costs in addition to land rent, a 
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a dollar of payment would eliminate approximately $1.60 worth 
of production on all grades of land. 
The fixed costs of production tend to vary among farms 
of the same productivity because of differences in the 
flexibility of the labor and capital used on the various farms. 
Consequently, the cost of eliminating production differs among 
farms of a given level of productivity. A program to reduce 
production at the minimum cost to government would not 
concentrate solely on poor land or on good land initially, 
but would take out those farms or fields in each area on 
which production could be reduced at the lowest cost. In 
the long run as all inputs except land become variable, 
participation would become more concentrated in the less 
productive areas. 
Some criteria for setting payment rates for land retirement 
If minimizing government costs for a given level of 
production eliminated is the dominant goal of land retirement, 
the payments offered for each increment of land must be 
proportional to the product eliminated by retiring that 
increment of land. If the program results in removing the 
associated capital and labor as well as the land from 
agricultural production, the retirement of an acre of land 
results in the elimination of the total product of that acre. 
In this case, the payment offered must be the same percentage 
of gross produce or yield on each acre of land. If the 
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associated labor and capital remain in agricultural production 
when land is retired so that only the product of land is 
eliminated, the payments must be proportional to land rent or 
to the net product of land in order to minimize government 
costs. Since part of the capital and labor inputs remain in 
agriculture and part are removed from agriculture, some 
intermediate rate formula is indicated. 
If the same fraction of capital and labor costs are 
fixed on different grades of land, payment rates can be based 
upon a composite index reflecting both net productivity and 
gross productivity to minimize government costs of production 
control. We define the following symbols for the ith farm 
or the ith increment of land: represents the gross product 
per acre; represents the net product or land rent; 
represents the value of the labor and capital on the farm 
which remains in agriculture when the land is retired; 
represents the value of the labor and capital which is 
removed from agriculture when the land is retired and Rj_ 
represents the indicated Soil Bank payment rate per acre. 
The requirement that payment rates be set proportional to 
the product removed by retiring each farm can be written as 
follows : 
R^ — k-^(Vj^+Nj^ ), i — 1,2, •. »n, 
where k% is the payment offered per dollar's worth of 
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production control and n is the number of farms. By the 
assumption that costs exhaust the product, we have, 
G^ = Vj^ + F^ + , i = 1, 2, . •. n« 
Assume that a represents the fraction of capital and labor 
that is transferred away from agriculture by land retirement 
and that it is the same for all farms. This can be expressed 
as, 
Vj_ = a(Vi + F^), i = 1, 2, ... n. 
Combining the three equations and eliminating F^ and we 
obtain the following payment rate formula: 
Ri = kl£aGi + (l-a)Ni], i = 1, 2, ... n. 
This formula prescribes a payment rate that is proportional 
to gross product when all capital and labor are removed from 
agriculture by the Soil Bank and a rate proportional to land 
rent when no capital and labor are removed. When only part 
of the capital and labor are removed the prescribed rate is 
a linear function of gross product and net product for each 
farm. The major task in applying this formula is to estimate 
the fraction of capital and labor that is removed from agri­
culture by land retirement. This problem is taken up in 
Chapter VII. 
If maximizing the transfer of labor and capital out of 
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agriculture for a given level of government payments is the 
dominant goal, the payments offered for each increment of 
land must be proportional to the amount of labor and capital 
removed from agriculture by retiring that increment of land. 
If the same percentage of the labor and capital is trans­
ferred away from agriculture on all grades of land, this 
would involve setting payment rates on each farm proportional 
to the amount of labor and capital employed per acre. The 
highest rates per acre would be paid in areas of small farms 
and intensive use of labor and capital and the lowest rates 
would be paid in areas of large farms and low labor and 
capital intensities. 
The conditions for maximizing labor and capital transfer 
can also be expressed algebraically. Using the symbols 
previously defined, the requirement that the payment rate be 
proportional to the quantity of labor and capital removed can 
be written, 
Rj_ — kg(V^), i = 1, 2, ... n, 
where kg is a new constant of proportionality representing the 
payment per dollar's worth of labor and capital transferred. 
By combining this with the second and third equations on 
page 112 the condition becomes, 
— kga(G^ - N^), i = 1, 2, ... n. 
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This formula would prescribe the same rate structure as the 
formula given on page 112 only if land rent made up the same 
fraction of gross product on all farms. The goals of maximum 
labor and capital transfer and minimum government costs per 
unit of production control cannot be attained simultaneously 
by land retirement if rent is not everywhere proportional to 
gross product. 
It is unlikely that policy makers will choose either the 
minimization of government costs or the maximization of labor 
and capital transfer as the sole aim of land retirement. 
Instead, they are apt to seek a little bit of both along with 
other goals. Some legislators may even be concerned with 
minimizing the transfer of capital and labor out of agricul­
ture for a given level of production control. With a 
combination of such goals, an intermediate rate formula is 
indicated. To prescribe such a rate formula, a scheme for 
weighing the various goals must be devised. For example, if 
k]_ represents the price that the government is willing to 
pay to eliminate one dollar1 s worth of production and k^ is 
the price that the government is willing to pay to transfer 
one dollar's worth of labor and capital away from agriculture, 
the two preceding formulas can be combined as follows: 
This can be rewritten 
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R.j = (k"j a + kga )G^ + (k-j - k-j a — k^a )N^j i = 1,2, . • .n 
This condition prescribes payment rates that are a linear 
function of gross product and net product for any set of 
weights for the two goals. 
The effects of various rate formulas for land retirement 
An alternative approach to the analysis of payment rate 
structures is to examine the implications of various assumed 
rate formulas. Three different formulas bear consideration. 
First is a constant level of payment per acre for all grades 
of land. Second is a formula prescribing a payment rate that 
is proportional to land rent. Third is a formula which sets 
rates proportional to yield or gross product of land. 
The implications of the constant rate formula are direct. 
Such a formula would attract more low producing land than high 
producing land. It would not minimize the cost of production 
control since it would involve paying more per bushel of 
production eliminated on low producing land than on high 
producing land. Similarly, it would not maximize the transfer 
of labor and capital away from agriculture so long as the 
quantities of labor and capital used per acre were not the 
same in all areas. Such a payment rate formula would severely 
cut production in the less productive areas resulting in large 
contractions in the demand for goods and services offered by 
non-farm businesses in these areas. 
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Differences in productivity among farms and regions can 
be taken into account by basing payment rates either on an 
index of land rent or on an index of gross product or some 
combination of the two. In general, we would expect that the 
land rent index would result in larger differences between 
payments for good land and poor land than would the gross 
product index because of the tendency for rent to be larger 
relative to gross product on the more productive land than on 
the less productive land. However, if the rent earned by land 
in crop production is proportional to gross product over the 
various grades of land, there will be no differences in the 
two formulas. 
Basing payments upon an index of net product would offer 
equal profit incentives for participation on all types of 
land. Presumably, the resulting levels of participation 
would be about the same on the good land as on the poor land. 
Basing rates on gross product would have different results if 
land rent did not equal the same percentage of gross product 
on all grades of land. If land rent makes up a smaller 
fraction of gross product on the less productive land than 
on the more productive land, we would expect higher levels of 
participation in the less productive areas when payments are 
based upon gross product. 
The rate structure for the 1956-60 Soil Bank program 
From the manner in which Soil Bank rates were set for 
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1959 and I960, we would expect them to be closely correlated 
with various measures of productivity. Figure 16 shows the 
regression of conservation reserve payment rates on the value 
of land and buildings per acre for the sample of 80 midwest 
c o u n t i e s . T h e  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n  l i n e  i s  s h o w n  i n  
t L  
the figure. If payment rates had been exactly proportional 
to land value, the regression line would pass through the 
origin. Instead, it intercepts the Y axis at a point 
significantly above zero indicating that Soil Bank rates were 
high in relation to land values in the less productive counties 
and low in relation to land values in the more productive 
counties. 
Figure 17 shows the regression of Soil Bank payment rates 
on estimated gross product per acre for the counties in the 
15 
sample. Again the regression line intercepts the vertical 
axis above the origin and the a value is significantly 
^The data on land values apply to all farmland instead 
of cropland only. They reflect urban influences, the value of 
improvements and the value of woodland and non-cropland 
pasture. They may overstate cropland values in suburban areas 
or areas of high livestock densities and understate cropland 
values in areas with large acreages of woodland or non-cropland 
pasture. No estimates were available of the value of cropland 
per se. 
-^"Hennepin County, Minnesota, and Scotts Bluff and 
Douglas Counties, Nebraska, were eliminated from the computed 
regression. Hennepin and Douglas Counties are both strongly 
affected by urban influences. Scotts Bluff has approximately 
33 per cent of its cropland irrigated. 
-^For an explanation of the method by which gross product 
per acre of cropland was computed see Appendix A. 
Figure 16, The relationship between 1959-60 Soil Bank 
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Figure 17. The relationship between 1959-60 Soil Bank 
payment rates and average gross product per 
acre for 80 midwest counties 
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different from zero at the five per cent level. The positive 
intercept apparently results from the constant factor used in 
the payment rate formula. 
In summary, the higher levels of participation in the 
low producing areas can be partly explained by two factors. 
First, the rates were based partly upon an index of gross 
productivity. It was shown that such a rate formula may tend 
to induce higher levels of participation in the low producing 
areas than in the high producing areas because more of the 
production costs are variable in the less productive areas. 
Secondly, a constant was introduced into the payment rate 
formula which raised rates in the low producing areas and 
lowered rates in the high producing areas in relation to the 
rates indicated by the productivity index by itself. It 
appears that more production control could have been attained 
for the same cost if the constant had not been included in 
the payment rate formula. Participation would have been 
lower in the less productive areas but would have remained 
higher there than in the highly productive areas. 
Special Provisions of Land Retirement Programs 
The effects of a land retirement program depend not 
only upon the level and distribution of the rental payments 
but also upon the conditions under which payments are made. 
By altering these conditions, the effects of the program can 
be changed. Among the special features which can be 
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incorporated into a land retirement program are bidding 
provisions, bonuses for whole-farms and provisions for 
transferring land to alternative uses. 
Price discrimination in retiring land 
Price discrimination involves simultaneously selling or 
purchasing the same commodity at different prices on different 
isolated markets. Because of the imperfections in the market 
for land, it may be possible for the government to practice 
price discrimination in retiring cropland from production. 
If the government could discriminate perfectly, it might 
choose to pay each farmer no more than the minimum necessary 
to pursuade him to take his land out of production. Two 
methods of price discrimination have been employed in land 
retirement. The first method involves setting a low payment 
rate initially in order to retire the land that can be rented 
most cheaply and then raising the payment at a later date to 
retire additional land. The second method involves requiring 
farmers to submit bids for land retirement contracts and 
accepting only the lowest bidders. 
The conservation reserve program incorporated the first 
type of price discrimination when basic payment rates were 
raised from $10.00 per acre to $13*50 per acre in 1959 without 
raising payments on contracts already in existence. Farmers 
who placed their land in the program in the 1956-58 period 
were being paid less for the same kind of land in 1959 and 
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1960 than were farmers who placed their land in the program 
during the latter period. Price discrimination of this type 
is effective only if farmers incorrectly predict the actions 
of the government. If farmers had known during the 1956-58 
period that conservation reserve rates were going to "be 
raised in 1959» fewer would have entered the program in the 
earlier period. Those that found it profitable to enter in 
the earlier period would have accepted only the shortest-term 
contracts available in order to be able to obtain the higher 
rate during the second period. 
The 1959-60 bid program of the Soil Bank also incorporat­
ed price discrimination features. Farmers who desired Soil 
Bank contracts were required to submit bids at or below the 
payment rate established for their land. Farmers' applica­
tions were grouped according to how low their bids were in 
relation to the basic payment rates assigned to their 
respective farms. The groups with the lowest bids were 
accepted first, the second lowest group second, etc. 
The bid system operated on the assumption that some 
farmers would be willing to place their land in the Soil Bank 
at rates below the basic rental rates established for their 
farms. In other words, it attempted to rent each farmer's 
land at the minimum rate he would accept. To the extent that 
this was successful, it eliminated the producer's surplus. 
However, an applicant may not choose to bid the lowest 
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acceptable rate, but Instead, to bid the rate that he feels 
is necessary to give him what he considers adequate assurance 
of winning a contract. In other words, he may set subjective 
probabilities on his likelihood of obtaining a contract for 
various bids and choose the set of probabilities that he 
prefers. For example, a farmer may choose a strategy which 
gives him a subjective probability of .5 of getting a $16.00 
per acre contract to a strategy which gives him a probability 
of .9 of getting a $12.00 per acre contract. In the 1959-60 
program farmers were told the basic payment rate for their 
land and many chose to bid just below this rate. Because of 
the possibility of this type of behavior, we cannot expect a 
bidding scheme to completely eliminate the producer's surplus. 
It appears that the bid system did lower the cost of 
reducing production in 1959 and I960 since some farmers 
accepted contracts at rates lower than the basic rates set 
for their farms. Such a scheme is appropriate as a means of 
allocating contracts when funds are limited and it is 
impossible to estimate in advance the payment rate level which 
will result in just using the available funds. 
Special inducements for whole-farm participants 
The 1959-60 Soil Bank program offered a ten per cent 
bonus to farmers who retired all of their cropland. In 
contrast, the feed grain programs of 1961 and 1962 made no 
provision for retiring more than 4-0 per cent of the acreage 
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in feed grains on any one farm. A third possible alternative 
would be a program which retired only whole farms. The choice 
between a whole-farm program and a part-farm program depends 
upon which goals are weighed most heavily by the policy 
makers. 
If the object is to reduce production at minimum cost 
per bushel, both part-farm and whole-farm contracts should be 
accepted. The payment rates for each type of contract should 
be proportional to the value of the inputs removed from 
agricultural production by that type of contract.^6 Since 
whole-farm participation tends to be associated with removal 
of more capital and labor from agricultural production than 
does part farm participation, the payment rates for whole-
farms should be higher than the payment rates for part-farms 
of the same productivity. If we assume that a whole-farm 
contract removes two-thirds of the associated capital and 
labor from agriculture, the indicated whole-farm bonus for 
minimizing the cost of production control can be computed with 
the formulas given on page 113. The whole-farm payment rate 
formula would be, 
^Included in the removal of inputs from agriculture are 
transfer of inputs into non-farm employment, idling or with­
drawal of inputs, and recombination of inputs in such a manner 
that their product declines. For example, a part-farm partic­
ipant who continues to employ all of his capital and labor by 
more intensive cultivation of the land remaining in production 
experiences some reduction in the marginal product of his 
capital and labor because of diminishing returns. This would 
be equivalent to input removal. 
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rT = klf§ Gi + O Nil> i = 1, 2, ... n, 
and the part-farm formula would be, 
+ Y 1 - I; 2, ... n, 
where R^ is the whole farm payment rate for farm i, R^ is the 
part-farm payment rate for farm i, kj is a constant for all 
farms representing the cost per dollar of production control 
attained; G^ is the gross product per acre and Nj_ is the net 
product of land per acre on farm i. For the five midwest 
states studied it was estimated that land rent constituted 
19 per cent of gross product; i.e., on the average farm, 
Nj_ = .19 G^. We can insert this value for in the two 
payment rate formulas as follows: 
Hi = kl[f + J (-19 Gi5] = -73 ki Gj 
Ri = klR °i + f ( -19  ai'] " M kl Gi 
The ratio of the whole-farm rate to the part-farm rate would 
be, 
*1 izim = 1.0 
rJ .46 k^i 
In other words, a 58 per cent bonus for whole-farms is 
indicated if the cost of production control is to be minimized. 
The appropriate bonus varies from area to area and from farm 
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to farm depending upon the resource structure in each area. 
The estimates of the per cent of capital and labor removed by 
land retirement are only approximate, but the implication is 
that whole-farm bonuses substantially larger than ten per cent 
would be appropriate under the assumed goal of minimizing 
costs of production reduction. 
Should the transfer of labor and capital out of agricul­
ture be the prime consideration in choosing between whole-farm 
and part-farm programs, the implications are direct. To 
maximize the transfer of either labor or capital or some 
combination of the two, the payment must be proportional to 
the quantity of these inputs transferred with the retirement 
of each increment of land. This goal would imply even larger 
bonuses for whole-farm participants. The indicated whole-
farm bonus to maximize labor and capital transfer under the 
above assumptions can be shown algebraically as follows: 
where k2 is a new constant of proportionality and the other 
variables are as previously defined. The ratio of the whole-
farm rate to the part-farm rate is, 
- kg * ) 
Ri = k2 ' 3 (Gi - Hi> 
i— 1. 2. ... n 
i = 1, 2. ... n 
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This implies whole-farm bonuses of 100 per cent. Such a 
program would concentrate almost exclusively on whole farms. 
In contrast, if the goal were to minimize the transfer of 
labor and capital for a certain level of production control, 
only part-farm contracts would be used. 
Provisions for transferring land to lower uses 
Programs for removing cropland from crop production can 
be designed to transfer the land to alternative uses as well 
as to idle it completely. The alternative use can be either 
a public use or a private use. Among the public uses which 
have been considered are recreation and wildlife protection. 
The private uses include timber production and grazing. The 
Soil Bank program carried provisions for transferring land to 
timber production and wildlife use. Approximately 7 per 
cent of the Soil Bank land was planted to trees and 1 per cent 
was used for wildlife cover and feed. 
The criteria for economic efficiency may imply transferr­
ing cropland to alternative uses even though they do not imply 
idling of cropland. Indeed, if we confine ourselves to 
programs which meet the efficiency criteria only programs of 
resource transfer can be considered. Only when the marginal 
social product of land in an alternative use exceeds its 
marginal social product in crop production would such transfer 
be indicated. However, in this study, we have not limited 
ourselves to the consideration of programs in which the 
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efficiency conditions are fulfilled. 
If the Soil Bank land is made available for public use, 
the payment rate formula can be modified to take into account 
the value of the land to the public. For minimizing the cost 
of production control this would imply inserting an additional 
term in the condition given on page 112. The resulting rate 
formula would be: 
R± = Sj_ + k3[aGi + (1-a) %] 
where S^ represents the product of land on farm i in its 
alternative use, k^ is a constant representing the government 
payment for unit of production control and the other symbols 
are defined on page 111. The formula can be modified for 
maximizing labor and capital transfer if desired. The value 
of land in its alternative use, Sj_, must be estimated for 
each tract of land. If reducing production was not a goal 
and only the value of land in its alternative uses were 
considered, k^ would become zero and Rj_ would be set equal 
to Sjy This rate formula would be consistent with the 
efficiency conditions. 
If the Soil Bank land is to be transferred to an 
alternative private use, the payment rate formulas on pages 
113 through 115 are applicable. This will tend to increase 
participation for a given level of payment rates since the 
participants can recover part of their fixed production costs 
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through the alternative use. As Bottum, _et al. (6, p. 26) 
show, when grazing is allowed on the Soil Bank land, the 
cost of eliminating crop production is reduced. 
From the results of such studies as Egbert and Heady's 
(16) it appears that transfer of cropland to grazing is in 
line with long run goals of efficient resource use. 
Presumably, a government program to promote such transfer 
would need only to pay for the costs of transition. Once 
established, grazing would be more profitable than crop 
production and government rental payments would no longer 
be necessary. The transfer of cropland to grazing tends to 
expand the production of cattle and sheep. Since more beef 
and veal can be marketed only at lower prices, a redistribu­
tion of income from beef and sheep growers to grain producers 
is involved. Some compensation for beef and sheep growers 
might be appropriate under such a program. 
The transfer of cropland to timber production appears to 
be desirable in areas adapted to forestation. Forest products 
are in less plentiful supply than are most food products. 
Nevertheless, such a transfer probably involves some income 
sacrifice on the part of present holders of forest resources. 
One of the problems in establishing timber on individual 
farms is that such small timber tracts are not well suited to 
modern methods of timber management. 
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Timing of land retirement 
The continuity of land retirement programs and the 
duration of the contracts under such programs influence the 
level of participation and the amount of production control 
attained. This influence arises "because some of the factors 
of production cannot be diverted from agricultural production 
in the short-run but can be diverted from agricultural 
production over a longer period. 
Whether the farmer considers certain capital and labor 
costs as fixed or variable with respect to Soil Bank partici­
pation depends upon the duration of the Soil Bank contract as 
well as the market for these capital and labor inputs. For 
example, he may be able to sell his machinery now and replace 
it three years hence only at an unacceptable loss. In this 
case, part of the depreciation, interest and insurance costs 
for the machinery constitute fixed costs with respect to 
Soil Bank participation. Similarly, the operator may treat 
the cost for his own labor as a fixed cost if he looks upon 
Soil Bank participation as a temporary change. 
In general, the longer the duration of the Soil Bank 
contract, the fewer are the costs that are fixed with respect 
to Soil Bank participation. For example, with a long term 
contract the loss involved in disposing of farm machines and 
equipment can be spread over a longer period. Similarly, the 
costs of finding off-farm employment can be spread over a 
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longer period. Even if the participant could not sell his 
equipment at all, he could reduce his fixed costs under a 
long term contract by not replacing machines as their 
depreciated value reached zero. Since the Soil Bank payments 
must cover all fixed costs, these considerations suggest that 
long term contracts would retire land at less annual cost to 
the government than would short term contracts. 
The 1956-60 conservation reserve program provided for 
contracts of three, five or ten years duration. The estimated 
average period that all U.S. i960 contracts would be in force 
17 
was 7.26 years. This suggests that farmers preferred the 
l^ The i960 conservation reserve program was operated on 
a competitive bid basis. Farmers' applications were grouped 
according to how low their bids were in relation to the basic 
payment rates assigned to their respective farms. The group 
with the lowest bids was accepted first, the second lowest 
group second, etc. In the event that all applicants in a 
given group could not be accepted, applicants were given 
priority in the following order: 
1. Applications offering land from farms on which previous 
contracts were expiring. 
2. Applications offering all eligible land on the farm. 
. Applications offering land for the longest period. 
. Applications offering land which would be devoted to tree 
planting, dams, and water and marsh management. 
5. Applications offering the lowest annual payment rate per 
acre. 
6. Applications offering the largest acreage. 
In those counties where criterion number 3 above was applied, 
the average duration of the contracts accepted would be longer 
than the average duration of the contract applications made by 
farmers. Thus, the average length of contract applications 
for the country in I960 may have been less than 7.26 years 
which was the average length of contracts accepted in i960. 
However, in no state was the average length of contracts in 
force less than 5 years. 
134 
longer term contracts to the three year contracts at the same 
rate of payment. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
fixed costs, and hence the necessary level of Soil Bank 
payments, are lower for long-term Soil Bank contracts than 
for short-term contracts. 
The time element may affect participation in a land 
retirement program in another way. For each farmer the part 
of his capital and labor costs which he considers fixed may 
change from year to year. As his machinery reaches the point 
where it is fully depreciated, depreciation becomes a 
variable cost because of the possibility of not replacing 
the machinery. Similarly, he may discover an attractive 
off-farm employment opportunity which changes his own labor 
from a fixed cost to a variable cost during the period while 
the job is available. Also, he may reach the age where his 
own labor must be replaced by hired labor or a tenant's 
labor or when he becomes eligible for Social Security. At 
this time labor becomes a variable cost. Thus, the profit­
ability of Soil Bank participation may vary over time for a 
given farm. Not all potential participants will sign 
contracts the first year during which a given level of pay­
ments are offered. New participants may sign up over a 
period of several years as each reaches a period when his 
capital and labor can be most readily transferred away from 
farming. A land retirement program which operates continuously 
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over a period of years can catch each farm at a period of low 
fixed costs whereas a one year program may only attract those 
farmers who find their capital and labor inputs variable 
during the given year. 
For example, in 1959, 21.9 per cent of the farmers in 
the United States were between the ages of 55 and 64. This 
percentage ranged from 14.9 to 27.9 for the 80 counties 
studied in the five midwest states. If each of these 
farmers were to place his land in the Soil Bank as he reached 
the age of 65 and retired, approximately one-fifth of the 
farms in the United States could be withdrawn from production 
over a ten year period without moving any established farmers 
into off-farm jobs. 
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THE LEVEL OF PAYMENT RATES AND PARTICIPATION 
In this chapter we turn to the problem of establishing 
functional relationships between the level of Soil Bank pay­
ment rates and the level of Soil Bank participation. We seek 
to answer such questions as: How much would Soil Bank 
participation change with a ten per cent increase in payment 
rates? 
The Soil Bank Land Supply Function 
For any given tract of land there will be some arbitrar­
ily high Soil Bank payment which will make participation in 
the program more profitable for the operator than non-
participation. Similarly, at some arbitrarily low payment 
rate, Soil Bank participation will not be profitable. At 
some intermediate payment rate, the operator will be indiffer­
ent between participation and non-participation. For each 
possible level of Soil Bank payments for a given farm, some 
level of Soil Bank participation will result; i.e., a certain 
number of acres will be supplied to the government. Hence­
forth, this relationship between the level of the Soil Bank 
payment and the quantity of land supplied to the government 
l8 
will be termed the supply function for Soil Bank land or 
l^This involves treating Soil Bank land as a product. 
Alternatively, Soil Bank land could be treated as an input 
and the price-quantity relationship could be called the 
farmer's demand function for Soil Bank land. The choice of 
terms here is arbitrary. 
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simply the land, supply function. 
Figure 18 illustrates a hypothetical Soil Bank land 
supply function for an individual farm. In this case, the 
farmer does not place any land in the Soil Bank for payment 
rates below $8 per acre. For any level of payment above $8 
but less than $15 he is willing to put one 50 acre tract in 
the program. At any payment level above $15 per acre he puts 
all of his land in the Soil Bank. 
In this illustration the Soil Bank land supply function 
is discontinuous. It is horizontal at zero up to the payment 
level where the first increment of land is placed in the Soil 
Bank. At that point it rises vertically and discontinuously 
and then once again it is horizontal up to the payment level 
where the next increment of land is added to the Soil Bank. 
This step function is more realistic than a continuous 
function because land is not perfectly divisible. Instead 
it comes in lumps; i.e., lots, fields or quarter sections. 
There are two reasons why a farmer who is maximizing 
profits may choose to place only part of his farm in the Soil 
Bank. First, if his capital and labor inputs are variable and 
his land differs in productivity from field to field, the 
payment rate available may make it profitable to put only the 
less productive fields in the program. Secondly, if some 
inputs other than land are fixed, he may maximize profits by 
putting one or more fields in the Soil Bank even if there is 
Figure 18. Hypothetical Soil Bank land supply function for 
an individual farm 














5 10 15 20 
PAYMENT RATE, DOLLARS PER ACRE 
30,000 
20,000 
10 15 20 0 5 25 
PAYMENT RATE, DOLLARS PER ACRE 
l4o 
no difference in productivity among fields. In both cases, 
the reduction in total product resulting from the retirement 
of the last field retired must be less than the Soil Bank 
payment received for the field plus the reduction in costs. 
The reduction in total product resulting from retiring an 
additional field must be greater than the Soil Bank payment 
that would be received for the additional field plus the 
reduction in costs. 
The aggregate supply function for a homogeneous product 
is obtained by summing horizontally over the individual 
supply functions of the various firms. If the aggregate Soil 
Bank land supply function were drawn for a homogeneous region 
containing many farms, a step function with a large number of 
steps would result. For such a region the land supply 
function could be approximated by a smooth curve such as the 
one shown in Figure 19. 
Together, the hypotheses of profit maximization, 
diminishing returns and imperfectly elastic markets for labor 
and capital imply that the land supply curve for a homogeneous 
region has an upward slope. In a heterogeneous region 
differences in rent or fixed costs also contribute to the 
upward slope of the curve. Indeed, with differences in rent 
or fixed costs among farms, the supply curve would have an 
upward slope even if diminishing returns were absent and the 
demands for farm products, farm capital and farm labor were 
3M 
all perfectly elastic. 
In summary, there are two separate conditions, each of 
which "by itself implies an upward slope to the supply curve 
for Soil Bank land. Each assumes profit maximization on the 
part of farm operators. The first condition is that there be 
diminishing returns to capital and labor in agriculture and 
imperfectly elastic demands for these inputs outside of 
agriculture. The second condition is that rent or fixed 
costs are not the same on all types of land. 
Methods of Estimating the Supply Function for Land 
Three methods were considered for estimating the Soil 
Bank land supply function. The simplest and most direct 
method is to ask farmers what level of payment they would 
accept to retire their land. A second method involves 
making certain assumptions about farmers' behavior and 
through a deductive process working out the implications of 
these assumptions on Soil Bank participation. The third 
method is to observe farmers' behavior under past land 
retirement programs and assume that it will be similar 
under future programs. 
Under the first method, individual farmers from a sample 
may be asked to state the lowest payment rate at which they 
would place their land in the program. Brown and Weisgerber 
(8) used this technique in studying Soil Bank participation 
for Gillian and Morrow Counties, Oregon, in 1957» Each 
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farmer in their survey was asked to estimate the minimum rate 
of payment that he would accept for putting all of his crop­
land into the program for a period of several years. They 
demonstrate graphically the relationship between payment rate 
and participation and fit a mathematical function to their 
data. Their estimated response function was the following: 
Z = 1 - 2.678 e -°*l638x^ 
* 
where Z is the proportion of cropland in the program and x is 
the payment rate in dollars per acre. 
Their first analysis did not take into account differences 
in productivity among farms in the sample. In order to con­
sider the implications of differences in productivity, the 
authors converted payment rates to dollars per bushel of 
normal wheat yield. For the dependent variable they use 
cumulative per cent of total wheat production that would be 
eliminated by the program. This time their plotted observa­
tions exhibited an S shaped curvature. The authors fitted a 
linear function to the lower three-fourths of the observations 
obtaining the following regression equation: 
Z' = -46.66 + 62.39 x*, 
where Z1 is the cumulative per cent of total wheat production 
in the program and x1 is the payment rate per bushel of 
normal yield. 
1^3 
Botturn, et al. (6, pp. 28ff) used the same technique to 
derive Soil Bank land supply curves for 25 areas in nine 
states. Their study involved asking each farmer in the 
sample to state the minimum payment rates necessary to pursuade 
him to put 5, 15 and 25 per cent of his land in each of three 
types of land retirement programs. No attempt was made to 
take into account differences in land productivity within each 
region. The derived supply curves were positively inclined 
and exhibited an S shaped curvature. 
Butcher and Heady (10) used farmers' estimates of the 
payment rates that they would accept to determine the relation­
ship between payment rate per bushel of grain production and 
and the per cent reduction in grain production for Iowa. They 
estimated that a payment rate of 55 cents per bushel would 
reduce Iowa grain production 18 per cent if landlords were 
allowed to participate, 
Bottum, _et al. (6, pp. Mfff) estimated a response curve 
for whole-farm participation using data from the 1958 
conservation reserve bid program which was a pilot program 
put into effect in four states. The resulting positively 
inclined response curves exhibited an S shape. This study 
had the advantage that the data involved actual bids offered 
by farmers for real contracts and not their estimates of the 
payment rates they would accept. However, there was no 
attempt to take into account differences in land productivity 
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within states when deriving the supply curves. 
The difficulty with the first approach is that farmers 
may react differently to a hypothetical situation than to a 
real situation. Certain factors that a farmer overlooks in 
answering a hypothetical question may greatly influence his 
decision in the real world. His actual decision may be 
reached only after lengthy and careful consideration of the 
alternatives which cannot be done during the short period of 
an interview. There is also the possibility that the farmer 
may deliberately mislead the interviewer. 
To use the second method, it can be assumed that farmers 
put their land in the Soil Bank whenever the Soil Bank pay­
ment exceeds the rent that their land and other fixed factors 
would earn in production. This method does not require any 
previous experience with land retirement programs in order to 
make predictions. Botturn, et al. (6, pp. 9ff ) used this 
approach to estimate the level of participation for the 
country as a whole for three levels of payment rates and 
three types of Soil Bank programs. They assumed that Soil 
Bank payments would have to cover net income over variable 
costs to induce participation. 
The second approach is subject to error on three counts. 
First, it assumes that farmers actually behave as if to 
maximize profits whereas their behavior may be conditioned 
by other goals. For example, farmers may prefer farming to 
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alternative employment even at a lower income. Secondly, as 
discussed in Chapter III, different farmers may view their 
costs differently. Some may treat certain labor and capital 
costs as fixed with respect to Soil Bank participation whereas 
other farmers consider the same costs variable. To assume 
that farmers consider only certain costs fixed with respect to 
Soil Bank participation is arbitrary. 
The third method of predicting participation in land 
retirement programs involves examining participation in pre­
vious programs and attempting to unveil relationships between 
payment rates and participation which hold true over time. 
The major difficulty with this approach is that past 
experience only provides information about the lower portion 
of the land supply curve. This method was used by Buse and 
Brown (9) in a study of Soil Bank participation in Wisconsin. 
It is the method used in this study. 
Statistical Considerations 
A causal relationship between the level of Soil Bank 
participation and the payment rate offered is postulated. In 
other words, it is assumed that the level of payment rates 
affected participation but that participation did not 
influence the level of the payment rates. The one directional 
nature of this relationship can be defended on the grounds 
that the persons who set the payment rates did not know the 
levels of participation that would be associated with the 
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rates and therefore, the participation levels could not have 
affected their decisions about rates. On the other hand, the 
farmers who made the decisions regarding participation did 
have knowledge of the payment rates and presumably made use 
of this knowledge in making their decisions. 
Least squares regression is an appropriate technique for 
estimating relationships of this type if certain additional 
conditions are fulfilled. First, the regressors must be 
measured without error. This condition is seldom fully met 
with economic data. Secondly, the observations must be 
mutually independent. This is a source of difficulty in 
time series analysis where autocorrelation exists or in cross 
sectional analysis where observations adjacent in space are 
correlated. Thirdly, the relationship must be linear in the 
original values or in some transformation of the original 
values. Further, if significance tests are to be applied, 
the distribution of the residuals must be normal. 
Unfortunately for purposes of statistical estimation, 
each tract of land has had just two applicable Soil Bank 
payment rates, the rate that applied from 1956 to 1958 and 
the 1959-60 rate. Since only two observations are available 
for a time series analysis a cross sectional analysis is 
necessary. Although a time series analysis may give some 
indication that the underlying economic relationships exhibit 
stability over time, a cross sectional analysis provides no 
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such evidence of the intertemporal stability of the estimated 
relationships. A further disadvantage of the cross sectional 
approach is that the problem of correlation among observations 
adjacent in space is more perplexing than the problem of auto­
correlation in a time series analysis. 
The Choice of Variables for Estimating 
the Land Supply Function 
For analyzing Soil Bank participation with cross section­
al data, four levels of aggregation were considered. They 
were: use of data on individual farms, use of township data, 
use of county data, and use of state data. In this study, 
data on 80 midwest counties were employed.The use of 
individual farm data was ruled out because of the high cost 
of obtaining such data for more than a few counties. Township 
data were not generally available for all of the variables 
considered important. State data would have provided too 
few observations. 
Measuring the level of participation 
The fraction of cropland in the Soil Bank was used as a 
measure of the level of Soil Bank participation. Census 
cropland includes cropland harvested, cropland used only for 
pasture and cropland not harvested and not pastured. All of 
-^The counties involved and the method by which they 
were selected are given in Appendix A. 
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the cropland harvested would have been eligible for the 
conservation reserve. The cropland used only for pasture 
includes land which the operator considers suitable for 
crops without additional improvement. It would have been 
eligible for the Soil Bank if it had been in a regular rota­
tion or if tame hay had been harvested from it during three 
of the preceding four years* Cropland not harvested and not 
pastured includes fallow land, land in the Soil Bank or other 
conserving uses, land on which crops failed and idle land. 
Most of this land would have been eligible for the conserva­
tion reserve. 
Measuring the level of payment rates 
The payment rate variable was not intended to measure 
absolute payment rates, but instead, to measure the rate of 
payment in relation to land productivity. Three measures were 
considered: the ratio of the Soil Bank payment rate to land 
value, the ratio of the Soil Bank payment rate to gross prod­
uct per acre and the ratio of the Soil Bank payment rate to 
gross product minus selected expenditures. The first would 
be most appropriate if farmers consider capital and labor 
costs variable with respect to Soil Bank participation. The 
second would be appropriate if they behave as if capital and 
labor costs were completely fixed. The third variable is 
suitable for the intermediate situation where farmers consider 
expenditures for fuel, fertilizer, lime, seeds, hired labor 
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and hired machines as variable and other capital and labor 
costs as fixed. These three variables are closely but not 
proportionately correlated. 
Measuring other variables associated with Soil Bank 
participation 
The relationship between payment rates and the level of 
participation is of primary importance in predicting the 
effects of proposed Soil Bank programs. In estimating this 
relationship an attempt was made to take into account other 
variables which might help to explain differences in the 
level of Soil Bank participation among counties. The 
results discussed in Chapter IV suggested that variables 
representing farm size, farmers' ages, yield uncertainty, 
changes in farmers' expectations, and off-farm job opportu­
nities might be associated with differences in the level of 
Soil Bank participation among counties. 
Farm size Studies of the characteristics of Soil 
Bank participants had indicated that participation was higher 
among small farms than among large farms within a county. But 
the average number of acres of farmland or the average number 
of acres of cropland does not give a satisfactory measure of 
the relative economic size of farms among counties in the 
region studied. An acre of land in the cornbelt is not 
equivalent to an acre of land in the winter wheat area. A 
more meaningful measure of farm size among counties is the 
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value of products sold per farm. For this analysis the farm 
size variable was the per cent of total farms that were in 
classes V and VI or were part-time farms according to the 
1954 Census of Agriculture. Farms in classes V and VI are 
those farms on which there was less than $5000 worth of farm 
product sales in 195^. The part-time farms were farms with 
less than $2500 worth of sales on which the operator worked 
off of the farm 100 or more days or received more income 
from off-farm sources than from farm sources. 
Farmers ages Two variables were used to represent 
farmers' ages. They were the proportion of farmers over 65 
in 1959 and the proportion of farmers over 55 in 1959* Evi­
dence from other studies had indicated that participation 
was generally higher in the over 65 group than in the under 
65 group. Little preliminary evidence was available on the 
levels of participation in the 55-65 age group as compared 
with other age groups. 
Yield variability With prices stabilized by govern­
ment supports the major element of risk in crop production 
is yield variation. In the five states studied, yield 
variation decreases from west to east. In western North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska crop failure and years of 
extremely low yields are more frequent than in eastern Iowa 
and Minnesota. As a measure of yield variation, the 
coefficient of variation of an index of corn, wheat and oats 
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yields over the 11 year period, 1950-60, was used. The index 
was computed by weighing annual yields of the three crops 
with their respective acreages in 1954 and with their 1959 
20 
county prices. 
Farmers' expectations Each farmer bases his decisions 
on his own expected prices and yields which may differ from 
the prices and yields which are realized. After a series of 
years with low yields, he may adjust his expected yield down­
ward. Similarly, after a series of high yields, he may 
adjust his expected yield upward. These changes in expecta­
tions may cause him to react differently to the Soil Bank 
program than if his yield expectations were static. There 
are no measures of farmers' expectations by themselves. We 
can only measure factors which appear to be related to 
expectations. As an indicator of the change in farmers' 
yield and price expectations, a ratio of an index of yields 
for the period, 1955-58, over an index of 1951-54 yields was 
employed. To construct the indexes, the yields for both 
periods were weighed by 1954 acreages. The production for 
the earlier period was valued at 1954 prices and the production 
21 for the later period was valued at 1959 prices. It was 
was hypothesized that low yields in the 1955-58 period 
2°See Appendix A, page 231, for additional information. 
Q"| 
See Appendix A, page 232, for additional information. 
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compared to the 1951-54 period would be associated with 
higher levels of participation in the Soil Bank in 1959 and 
I960. 
Off-farm employment The proportion of employed males 
working outside of agriculture in 1954 was used to represent 
the availability of off-farm employment. It was assumed that 
the availability of off-farm employment would increase as the 
proportion of males working outside of agriculture increased; 
i.e., farmers in counties with a high percentage of workers 
in non-farm jobs in 1954 would find it easier to obtain off-
farm employment than would farmers in counties with few non-
farm workers. If this is the case, the farmers in the 
counties with many non-farm workers would place a higher 
opportunity cost on their own labor. In these counties we 
would expect higher levels of participation for a given pay­
ment rate on similar land. 
Tenure The per cent of cropland harvested by owners 
and part-owners in 1954 was used as a measure of the degree 
of ownership in each county. Other studies had indicated 
higher levels of participation among owner operated farms 
than among tenant operated farms. This is partly attributable 
to the program's provision that tenant operated land could 
not be retired without the tenant's consent. 
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Results and Interpretation 
Figure 20 shows the relationship between per cent partic­
ipation in the Soil Bank and the rate of payment per dollar 
of gross product. Figure 21 shows the relationship between 
per cent participation in the Soil Bank and the payment rate 
per dollar of land value. In each case there is some indica­
tion of a positive relationship but the scatter is very wide. 
Two groups of counties exhibited extremely large deviations 
from the regression lines. These were the range livestock 
counties of western Nebraska and South Dakota which had 
relatively high payment levels and low Soil Bank participation 
and the dairy area counties of northern Minnesota which 
exhibited very high levels of participation and moderate pay­
ment levels. They are shown by X's on the figures while the 
cornbelt and wheat counties are shown by dots. Both the 
range livestock counties and the dairy counties represent 
areas which are marginal for crop production. For this 
reason two sets of least squares regressions were computed, 
one for all 80 counties and one for the 59 counties represent­
ing the cornbelt and wheat areas. 
Initially, the simple regression of per cent of the 
cropland in the Soil Bank on each of the ten independent 
variables was computed. The variables were defined as 
follows : 
= Per cont of cropland in the Soil Bank in I960; 
Figure 20. The relationship "between Soil Bank participation and the Soil 
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= Soil Bank payment rate / estimated gross product 
per acre; 
Xg = Soil Bank payment rate / estimated gross product 
minus selected expenditures per acre ; 
X)+ = Soil Bank payment rate / value of land and 
buildings per acre; 
X^ = Proportion of farms in classes V, VI and part-time 
in 1954; 
Xg = proportion of farmers over 65 in 1959; 
Xy = Coefficient of variation of gross product ; 
Xg = Farmers' expected returns, 1959 / farmers' expected 
returns, 1955; 
X9 = Proportion of farmers over 55 in 1959» 
Xio = Proportion of males employed in agriculture in 1950; 
X]2 = Proportion of cropland harvested by owners and part-
owners in 1954. 
The results are summarized in Table 8. The regression 
coefficients for all three payment rate variables were more 
than twice as large as their computed standard errors in the 
cornbelt and wheat counties. However, only the ratio of Soil 
Bank payment to land value exhibited a coefficient that was 
twice as large as its standard error for the regressions 
including all 80 counties. There was evidence that Soil Bank 
participation tended to be higher in counties where a large 
percentage of the cropland was harvested by owners or part-
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Table 8. Simple regressions with Soil Bank participation 
as the dependent variable 
Inde­
pendent 59 cornbelt and 
vari- wheat counties 80 counties 
able a b s% r a b r 
X11 
-.142 .383 .061 .637 .016 .081 .054 .166 
-.123 .257 .047 .589 .032 .035 .030 .130 
-.007 .468 .076 .632 .022 .254 .067 • 393 
.024 .145 .074 .251 .003 .271 .040 .608 
.060 .108 .186 .077 .031 .223 .181 .138 
.009 .164 .062 .332 .047 .040 .063 .072 
.029 .020 .027 .097 .052 .005 .031 .017 
.031 .056 .134 .055 -.021 .246 .125 .217 
.025 .053 .028 .245 .046 .023 .028 .092 
-.067 .182 .040 .516 -.085 .209 .033 .581 
owners. Also, participation was higher in counties where a 
large proportion of the farms were in classes V, VI and part-
time. In the cornbelt and wheat areas participation tended 
to be higher in counties where yields were more variable. 
The coefficients for the remaining independent variables 
were less than twice their standard errors in both sets of 
regressions. 
The reasons for the large difference in the results from 
using all 80 counties and the results from using only the 59 
cornbelt and wheat area counties are apparent in Figures 20 
and 21. Participation levels were very erratic for the 
marginal crop producing areas represented by the 31 counties 
in the grazing area and the dairy area shown by X's in the 
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figures. 
For the cornbelt counties, each of the payment rate 
variables, X2, X^ and X^, explains only 35 to 40 per cent of 
the variation in Soil Bank participation. Apparently other 
factors have important effects on the level of participation. 
Table 9 shows the results of introducing some of the other 
independent variables one at a time into the regression with 
Xg. Such a procedure invalidates the statistical tests, 
since with repeated trials other variables would inevitably 
be found with significant coefficients. None of the six 
Table 9* Multiple regressions with Soil Bank participation 




no. a Xg Xcj X^ Xy Xg X-^q X]_^ R 
1 -.143 .370 .041 .641 
(.064) (.061) 
2 -.157 -392 .099 .641 
(.063) (.149) 
3 -.147 .355 .078 .655 
(.064) (.052) 
4 -.141 .384 -.002 .637 
(.063) (.023) 
5 -.145 .369 .022 .645 
(.063) (.023) 
6 -.154 .306 • .079 .663 
(.073) (.043) 
Mean .0487 .4974 .1692 .1071 .2409 .9270 .4406 .6389 
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variables employed exhibited regression coefficients that 
were as large in absolute value as twice their standard 
errors. Each was accompanied by only a small increase in 
the coefficient of multiple correlation. Apparently, 
differences in such factors as farmers' ages, availability 
of off-farm employment, yield variability and tenure do not 
account for much of the difference in Soil Bank participation 
among cornbelt and wheat area counties. Much of the differ­
ence in participation among these counties appears to be 
attributable to unrecognized factors or factors for which 
there are no measurements available such as farmers' 
attitudes or the attitudes of county ASC personnel. Errors 
in measuring the variables also contribute to the unexplained 
residual. 
Table 10 summarizes the results of two multiple 
regressions designed to explain Soil Bank participation for 
all 80 counties. A new independent variable, Xj2, was 
introduced in an attempt to take into account the special 
characteristics of the range livestock counties. One possible 
explanation for the low participation in the range livestock 
area is that livestock producers in this area tended to have 
a fixed requirement for winter feed that could not be met if 
they placed their cropland in the Soil Bank. The variable, 
Xi2, is the ratio of acres of pasture to acres of farmland 
for each county. It is an indicator of the importance of 
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Table 10. Multiple regressions with Soil Bank participation 
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Mean .0564 .4967 .1369 .1967 .6791 .2250 
of range livestock production in relation to crop production. 
The regressions for all 80 counties consistantly exhibit 
lower coefficients for the payment rate variables than do the 
regressions for the 59 cornbelt and wheat area counties. 
This difference may be due to basic differences in the 
response of farmers to Soil Bank payment rates in the two 
areas, to errors in the data and/or to errors in specifying 
the model. These differences plus the low correlation 
coefficients indicate that there are important factors 
related to Soil Bank participation which we are unable to 
measure or which have been overlooked. Nevertheless, the 
estimated relationships may be useful if the assumptions 
underlying the use of regression analysis in econometric 
research are fulfilled. The assumption that the level of 
participation was causally related to the level of payment 
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rates appears reasonable even though the two variables are not 
highly correlated. A more critical assumption is the assump­
tion that the independent variables were measured without 
error. Also, the possibility that the payment rate variables 
were correlated with other unrecognized variables affecting 
participation constitutes a serious limitation on the use of 
the results for predictive purposes. Another limitation of 
the approach results from the correlation of observations 
adjacent in space. The cornbelt counties tended to have low 
payment rates in relation to productivity whereas the non-
cornbelt counties had high payment rates in relation to 
productivity. The assumption of linearity is a reasonable 
approximation for only a small area around the mean. Since 
the variables were ratios, the assumptions of homoscedasticity 
and a normally distributed error are apt to be violated. 
Because of these difficulties little reliance can be placed 
upon the estimated standard errors of the regression 
coefficients. 
The estimated equations can be used to indicate the levels 
of participation that would have prevailed in i960 under 
different levels of payment rates. For example, by using 
equation 6 in Table 9, we can estimate the average level of 
participation in the cornbelt and wheat counties for a 25 per 
cent higher level of payment rates. The mean ratio of the 
payment rate to gross product was .497 in 1959-60. This 
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resuited in an average level of participation of 4.87 per 
cent. A 25 per cent increase in payment rates would increase 
the mean ratio to .624. This would imply an average level 
of participation of 8.7 per cent. In order to have doubled 
participation, rates approximately one-third higher would 
have been necessary. 
The coefficient estimated for X^ indicates an average 
level of participation in the cornbelt and wheat areas of 
6.3 per cent for 25 per cent higher rates in 1959-60. This 
coefficient and the results from the analyses using all 80 
counties would indicate that rates 75 to 100 per cent 
higher would have been necessary to have doubled partici­
pation. 
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EFFECTS OF THE SOIL BANK ON CROP PRODUCTION 
In the preceding two chapters the relationship between 
Soil Bank payment rates and the level of Soil Bank participa­
tion was examined. The task in this chapter is to see how 
payment rate levels and participation in a land retirement 
program affect crop production. The objective is to uncover 
useful relationships for predicting the effects of alternative 
land retirement programs which might be considered in the 
future. Much of the effort is devoted to the special problem 
of measuring the production eliminated by the 1956-60 Soil 
Bank program. 
Two factors which greatly complicate the task of esti­
mating the effects of land retirement on crop production are 
the heterogeneity of land and the variability of weather. In 
addition to these, the effect of changing technology on yields 
and cropping practices and the effects of other government 
programs must be taken into account. 
The most direct way of estimating the effects of the 
1956-60 Soil Bank program on production is to compare crop 
production in i960 with the program in effect with crop 
production in 1955 before the program was in operation. 
However, this procedure does not isolate the Soil Bank 
effect from the effects of weather, changes in technology 
and other government programs. For example, from 1955 to 
i960 corn production in the United States increased from 
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3,230 million bushels to 4,353 million bushels while 28.7 
million acres were added to the conservation reserve. The 
termination of corn acreage allotments, good weather, and 
improved technology increased corn production more than the 
Soil Bank decreased it. The situation for other crops is 
similar. If the effects of other programs, weather and 
technology could be accurately quantified, the effect of the 
Soil Bank could be assumed to equal the residual after these 
other effects had been subtracted from the total change in 
production. However, these other effects are no easier to 
measure than the Soil Bank effect itself. 
Effects of the Soil Bank on the Land Input 
The problem of dealing with the weather effect can be 
deferred by limiting ourselves to the relationship between 
the level of Soil Bank participation and the quantity of 
resources devoted to crop production. In other words, we 
can study the effect of the Soil Bank on the quantities of 
land, labor and capital used for crops. 
In the preceding chapter a causal relationship between 
the Soil Bank payment rate and the level of participation was 
assumed. The relationship between Soil Bank participation 
levels and the quantities of resources used for crop produc­
tion is of a different nature. The two are determined 
simultaneously; i.e., a farmer makes his decisions about Soil 
Bank participation and crop production at the same time. It 
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is misleading to state that Soil Bank participation causes a 
reduction in crop production; it is correct to state that Soil 
Bank participation and the reduction in crop production are 
associated. The two are determined simultaneously in the 
light of other factors such as Soil Bank payment rates, 
expected crop prices and production costs. 
Effects of the Soil Bank on the acreage used 
for crop production 
The effect of land retirement programs on crop acreage 
can be divided into two components. The first component is 
the direct effect whereby each acre under contract reduces 
the amount of land available for crops by one acre. To 
estimate this effect one needs only to know the number of 
acres in the program. 
The second effect or indirect effect of land retirement 
programs on crop acreage has two parts. First, there is the 
change in crop acreage due to the program which takes place 
on land that is not under contract. For example, the program 
may encourage non-participating farmers to increase their 
acreages of crops. Secondly, some of the land in the Soil 
Bank would not have been used for crop production in the 
absence of the program. In these instances the government 
is paying to retire land that would have been removed from 
crop production without such a payment. Both of these effects 
tend to offset some of the direct effect of the program. 
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One method of taking the indirect effects into account 
is to examine the total change in crop acreage over the 
period when the program was in effect. The first question 
that arises is, should we study the change in planted acres 
or harvested acres. In order to circumvent the problem of 
dealing with weather effects, the use of planted acres is 
indicated. However, with the use of planted acres there is 
the possibility that the land remaining in production was less 
subject to crop failure than the land taken out of production. 
If this were the case, the reduction in production with 
normal weather would be smaller in percentage terms than the 
reduction in acres planted. 
Table 11 summarizes the annual changes in Soil Bank 
acres, acres planted, and acres harvested for the United 
States over the period, 1955-60. Over this period the land 
in the Soil Bank increased to 28.7 million acres while planted 
acreages declined 25.2 million acres and harvested acreages 
declined only 12.1 million acres. During the first years of 
the Soil Bank the reduction in acreages planted was smaller 
than the acreage placed in the program. In 1957-58 there was 
a simultaneous decrease in Soil Bank land and cropland planted. 
The changes in planted acreages from 1958 to I960 were 
approximately equal to the changes in Soil Bank acres. 
From 1956 to I960, the 28.7 million acres added to the 
conservation reserve represent the direct effect of the program 













acres acres acres acres acres acres acres 
Increase in conservation 
reserve 0 1.4- 5.0 3.5 12.6 6.2 28.7 
Increase in acreage reserve 0 12.2 9.2 -4-.2 -I7.2 0 0 
Total increase in Soil Bank 0 13.6 14.2 -0.7 —4-#6 6.2 
CO CM 
Decrease in acres planted8. OA 9.1 11.6 3.6 
-5.3 6.2 25.2 
Decrease in acres harvested 5.3 14-.3 —0.1 -2.1 -1.9 1.9 12.1 
^Changes in planted acreages and harvested acreages were estimated from data 
reported in Agricultural Statistics, 1961 (68, pp. Vf9, 4-5°). 
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on the acreage planted to crops. The 3 = 5 million acres 
difference between this figure and the change in acreage 
planted represents the indirect effect of the conservation 
reserve plus the effects of other factors such as price 
changes, land reclamation and conversion of cropland to other 
uses. The problem is to separate the effect of the conserva­
tion reserve from the effects of these other economic changes. 
Changes in the quantity and utilization 
of cropland during the Soil Bank 
Several of the economic changes outside of the Soil Bank 
which affect crop acreages also affect the total quantity of 
cropland. These include land reclamation and the conversion 
of cropland to building sites. In contrast, the Soil Bank 
probably has little effect on the total amount of cropland. 
Its primary effect is to shift the existing cropland from one 
use to another. This suggests that part of the effects of 
other economic changes can be isolated from the Soil Bank 
effects by considering the change in total cropland that took 
place over the period of the Soil Bank. 
The Census of Agriculture divides cropland into three 
categories: cropland harvested, cropland used only for 
pasture and cropland not harvested and not pastured. The 
latter category includes fallow land, idle land, land on which 
crops failed and land used for soil conserving crops. Fallow 
land and land on which crops failed along with cropland 
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harvested can be considered as land utilized for crop produc­
tion. Idle cropland and land used only for soil conserving 
crops outside of the Soil Bank are relatively minor categories. 
Table 12 shows the change from 1954- to 1959 in acreages of 
three categories of cropland for five midwest states and for 
the United States. This period was chosen in order to make 

























Land in Soil Bank 0.5 1.8 0.7 1.8 1.3 6.1 22.5 
Change in cropland 
utilized for crops 0.3 -1.9 -0.9 -1.7 -2.3 -6.5 -33.8 
Change in cropland 
pastured -0.4- -0.2 0.2 0 0.5 0.1 -.8 
Change in total 
cropland 0.4- -0.3 0 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -12.1 
use of data reported in the Census of Agriculture. The first 
row shows the number of acres in the Soil Bank in each state 
for 1959» The second row shows the change in cropland 
utilized for crops which, in this case, is defined to include 
cropland harvested and cropland not harvested and not 
pastured minus Soil Bank land. The third row shows the change 
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in cropland pastured and the fourth row shows the change in 
total cropland. The change in total cropland equals the sum 
of the changes in the other three categories. 
The table indicates a close correspondence between Soil 
Bank acreage and land utilized for crops for Minnesota, 
Nebraska and North Dakota. For Iowa, however, cropland 
utilized for crops increased at the same time as Soil Bank 
participation increased. In South Dakota, the land utilized 
for crops decreased by almost twice as many acres as were 
placed in the Soil Bank. For the United States, the decrease 
in cropland utilized for crops was about 50 per cent larger 
than the Soil Bank acreage. For the country as a whole, the 
decrease in total cropland accounted for a considerable part 
of the decrease in land utilized for crops. The decrease in 
total cropland accounted for part of the decrease in land 
utilized for crops in Minnesota and South Dakota. Iowa 
exhibited an increase in total cropland and Nebraska and 
South Dakota exhibited little change in total cropland over 
the period studied. 
Regression analyses of acreage changes for five midwest states 
Table 12 illustrates the difficulties involved in 
distinguishing between the effects of the Soil Bank and the 
effects of other economic changes associated with changes in 
the total acreage of cropland. An attempt was made to isolate 
the effects of the Soil Bank with regression analysis using 
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the sample of midwest counties described in Appendix A. The 
variables were expressed as ratios of 1959 acreages to 1954-
acreages. The model was as follows: 
bi bg 
%i = a%li %2i 
where, 
Yj_ = acres of eight major crops planted (or harvested) in 
county i in 1959 / acres of eight major crops plant­
ed (or harvested) in county i in 1954, 
Xn = total acres of cropland in county i in 1959 / total 
acres of cropland in county i in 1954-, 
%2i = total acres of cropland minus Soil Bank acres in 
county i in 1959 / total acres of cropland in 
county i in 1959. 
The eight crops considered here were corn, sorghum, wheat, oats, 
barley, flax, soybeans and hay. The sample included 80 
counties in Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and South 
Dakota. Only in Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota were 
data on planted acreages available. The variables were 
converted to logarithms and the resulting equations were 
estimated by least squares. Two regressions were computed, 
QQ 
one for the 43 cornbelt counties and one for 32 non-cornbelt 
22The following counties were omitted from the non-corn-
belt group because of their individual peculiarities : Itaska 
and Hennepin Counties, Minnesota, Morril and Scotts Bluff 
Counties, Nebraska, and Custer County, South Dakota. 
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counties. The results are shown in row 1 of Table 13. 
The constant term in the equations represents the pre­
dicted ratio of 1959 acres to 1954- acres for the eight crops 
when the total acres of cropland are held constant and no 
land goes into the Soil Bank. For example, the predicted 
ratio of 1959 acreage to 1954- acreage for cornbelt counties 
with no change in total cropland and no Soil Bank acres is 
1.011; i.e., acreage of the eight crops tended to increase 
1.1 per cent from 1954- to 1959 when total cropland remained 
constant and no land was put into the Soil Bank. Similarly, 
the equations indicate a 7.8 per cent reduction in the acreage 
of the eight crops in the non-cornbelt counties under the 
same assumptions. 
The coefficient b]_ can be interpreted as the per cent 
change in the acres of the eight crops associated with a one 
per cent change in total crop acres. The coefficient b^ is 
approximately equal to the per cent reduction in acres of 
the eight crops for each one per cent of total cropland that 
is in the Soil Bank. For a one per cent increase in cropland 
there corresponds a 1.024 per cent increase in acres of the 
eight crops in the cornbelt counties. For each one per cent 
of the cropland put into the Soil Bank there was an indicated 
•516 per cent reduction in the acreage of the eight crops for 
the cornbelt counties. 
The results indicate approximately a one to one 
Table 13. Regressions to explain changes in crop acreages, 1954—59 
32 wheat and small grains, dairy 
4-3 cornbelt counties and range livestock counties 
Crop a 
*1 b2 R a *1 b2 R 











































































correspondence between the percentage change in total cropland 
and the percentage change in cropland utilized for the eight 
crops in both regions. However, the results suggest that for 
cornbelt counties, each one per cent of the cropland in the 
Soil Bank was associated with only a 0.5 per cent reduction 
in land utilized for crops and for the non-cornbelt counties 
Soil Bank participation was associated with a slight increase 
in crop acreage. 
These results may understate the effects of the Soil 
Bank on crop acreages because of problems of simultaniety 
and multicollinearity. For the non-cornbelt counties the 
correlation between X]_ and X2 was higher than the correlation 
between X^ and Y indicating that the data did not permit 
distinguishing between the effects of the two independent 
variables. Also, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Y 
and ¥-2 are determined simultaneously indicating that least 
squares will give biased estimates of the coefficient express­
ing their relationship. With an R^ in the vicinity of 0.7 
and the problem of multicollinearity, the estimates of b2 
must be interpreted with caution. The results suggest that 
the quantity of land used for the eight crops was influenced 
more by other factors than by the Soil Bank. The magnitude 
of the R^ itself indicates that the relationship between 
cropland available and cropland utilized for the eight major 
crops was not one to one. In both regions the independent 
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variables explained only about 70 per cent of the change in 
acreage utilized for the eight crops. 
The effect of the Soil Bank on acreages of individual crops 
The effectiveness of land retirement in controlling 
production is lessened if the acreage reductions are concen­
trated in the low valued crops such as oats or hay instead of 
the high valued crops such as corn and wheat. In order to 
investigate the Soil Bank effect on cropping patterns regres­
sions were computed for the various crops individually. For 
these regressions the dependent variable was the ratio of 
1959 acres to 1954 acres for the given crop. The independent 
variables were the same as for the preceding analysis. The 
results for corn, wheat, other grain, hay and cropland 
pasture are summarized in Table 13 on page 175-
As one would expect, the total acreage of the eight crops 
is more highly correlated with the available acres of cropland 
than is the acreage of any individual crop. The acreages of 
the less important crops are least closely related to total 
acres. Wheat in the cornbelt counties provides a good example 
o 
where the R is less than .05 and neither regression 
coefficient is as large as its standard error. 
The coefficients in which we are most interested are those 
that measure the relationship between Soil Bank participation 
and acreage utilized for each of the five crops: corn, wheat, 
other.grains, hay and cropland pasture. These coefficients 
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are all small in relation to their standard errors. They tend 
to be negative for the non-eornuelt counties. As indicated 
earlier, the high correlation between and Xg for the non-
cornbelt counties prevents us from accurately distinguishing 
between the Soil Bank effect and the effect of changes in 
total cropland in this area. 
The dependent variable for the last equation shown in 
Table 13 for each region is the ratio of the value of the 
eight crops produced in 1959 to their value in 1954. To 
compute the value of eight crops grown, acreages of the eight 
crops were weighed by value per acre to compute total value 
for the cropping pattern which existed in each period. If 
the Soil Bank had resulted in a concentration of production 
on the higher valued crops, we would expect b2 in the last 
equation to be smaller than bg in the first equation for each 
region, but there was little difference in the two coefficients. 
There is no evidence that the Soil Bank resulted in more in­
tensive planting of high valued crops on the land remaining in 
production. 
The effect of land selection on estimated production 
Another problem in estimating the effects of the Soil 
Bank on crop production arises because of the heterogeneity of 
land. In Chapter IV it was shown that participation in the 
1956-60 Soil Bank program tended to be higher in states with 
lower land values than in states with higher land values. It 
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was also shown that participation was higher in the less 
productive counties than in the more productive counties for 
five midwest states. Christensen and Aines (11, p. 26) 
report that estimated yields on the Soil Bank land were 
approximately 30 per cent lower than the average for the 
country. 
In Chapter V it was shown that part of the difference 
in participation levels between high producing areas and low 
producing areas can be explained by the structure of payment 
rates that existed. It was noted that the constant used in 
the rate formula tended to raise rates in the lower producing 
areas and lower rates in the higher producing areas as com­
pared to the rates that would have been implied by the 
productivity indexes alone. Under these rates there was a 
tendency to select the high high producing land for crop 
production and the low producing land for the Soil Bank. 
This selection process operated between states of the United 
States and between counties in the midwest states studied. 
It probably operated between farms and even within individual 
farms where part-farm contracts were involved. 
Because of land selection the average productivity of 
the Soil Bank land in each region tended to be lower than the 
average productivity of all cropland in the region. But, the 
only yield and productivity measurements that are readily 
available apply to whole regions, not just to the Soil Bank 
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land in the regions. Such measurements tend to over estimate 
the yields or productivity of the Soil Bank land by itself. 
One way to reduce this bias is to use smaller regions; e.g., 
the use of county yields is less biased than the use of 
state yields. 
To examine the bias involved in estimating the production 
eliminated by the 1956-60 Soil Bank program, such estimates 
were made using four different sizes of regions for the 
sample counties from the five midwest states. For the value 
of crops produced per acre the computed gross product per acre 
of cropland by county in 1959 as shown on Table 21 of Appendix 
A were used. For the first estimate, the value of crops 
produced per acre of Soil Bank land was set equal to the 
average gross product per acre for the five states as a whole. 
For the second estimate, average gross product by state for 
each of the five states was used. The third estimate used 
average gross product by subregion for each of the 21 sub-
regions. The fourth method used average gross product by 
county for each of the 80 counties. 
Table 1*+ summarizes the results showing the total value 
of crop production eliminated and the value of crop production 
eliminated per acre as computed under each estimation proce­
dure. As expected, the estimated value of production 
eliminated declines as smaller and smaller regions are used 
in the computations. The first method over estimates the 
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Table 14 Results of 
effect on 
















mate no. 4 
1 1,402,121 50,086,639 28.59 119.6 
2 1,402,121 36,118,460 25.76 107.8 
3 1,402,121 3^,809,351 24.83 103.9 
4 1,402,121 33,515,144 23.90 100.0 
effect of the program by 19.6 per cent; the second method over 
estimates the effect by 7»8 per cent and the third method over 
estimates the effect by 3*9 per cent as compared with the 
fourth method which is the least biased. 
Although the fourth method is the least biased one, it 
still has a tendency to over estimate the reduction in 
production due to the Soil Bank if there is land selection 
within the counties. The use of estimates of average gross 
product per township would be less biased. But, the only way 
to completely eliminate the bias due to land selection is to 
obtain productivity estimates that apply directly to Soil Bank 
land. One way to accomplish this is to use the soil maps and 
soil productivity estimates provided by agronomists. 
The use of soil maps to estimate the potential yields on 
Soil Bank land represents many practical difficulties. First, 
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up to date soil maps with soils classified as to productivity 
are available for only a few counties. Even the productivity 
estimates derived from these maps are subject to large errors. 
For example, no account is taken of the effect of past manage­
ment practices on yields. To estimate yields on selected 
tracts of land from soil maps is an extremely laborious task. 
Each type of soil in each field must be identified and 
measured. Appendix B summarizes the results of a study 
conducted for Hand County, South Dakota, using this technique. 
The Hand County study indicated a 2.2 to 2.6 per cent 
difference in productivity between Soil Bank land and non-
participants' cropland. However, sample differences of this 
magnitude would be expected about one-half of the time if 
there were no actual differences in the average productiv­
ities of the two groups. Additional studies making use of 
up-to-date soil maps are needed before the merits of the 
approach can be fully assessed. 
An alternative method to measure differences between 
yields on Soil Bank land and average yields on all cropland 
in a county is to compare the Soil Bank rate actually paid in 
the county with the basic payment rate that was established 
for the county. The rates actually paid were based upon the 
productivity indexes of the participating farms. If the 
participating farms had lower productivity indexes than the 
other farms in the county, the actual payment rate for the 
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county would be lower than the basic payment rates established 
for the county. Buse and Brown (9> P« 23) used this technique 
to estimate the production of five major crops eliminated by 
the Soil Bank in Wisconsin. For a 3*96 per cent reduction in 
total cropland in Wisconsin they estimated that production of 
the major crops was reduced 4.4 per cent.^3 
This technique relies on the accuracy of the conservation 
reserve indexes set by local ASC committees. If the indexes 
were set so that they clustered too closely about the mean, 
the procedure would estimate a smaller difference in produc­
tivity between Soil Bank land and all cropland than actually 
existed. We would expect that those farms in any county 
which were over-ratëd by the ASC committee would tend to 
exhibit higher levels of participation than the farms that 
were under-rated. To use the conservation reserve indexes 
of the participating farms to estimate the relative yields 
on the Soil Bank land would produce estimates that were biased 
upward. This is illustrated by the results of the land 
productivity study for Hand County, South Dakota. Table 26 
of Appendix B shows that the conservation reserve indexes on 
the Soil Bank participants1 land in Hand County averaged 
23îhey suggest that for the five most important crops in 
Wisconsin, "C.R. whole farm cropland seems to be very close to 
the average in terms of productivity." However, if a 3*96 per 
cent reduction in acreage reduced production of the major 
crops by 4.4 per cent, the Soil Bank land was apparently more 
productive than the average for all cropland in the state. 
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higher than the conservation reserve indexes on the non-
participants' land although the non-participants' land was 
more productive as measured by yield estimates based upon soil 
type. 
Several other practical difficulties are involved in 
using this procedure. First, it is not applicable to the land 
that went into the conservation reserve from 1956-1958 since 
all the land in each county was paid at the same rate during 
that period. Secondly, whole-farm and part-farm Soil Bank 
land must be treated separately since the former was eligible 
for a ten per cent bonus whereas the latter was not. Thirdly, 
the average rates paid farmers were determined by the farmers' 
bids in 1959 and i960. 
Effects of the Soil Bank on 
Labor and Capital Inputs 
To assume that the Soil Bank land would have produced the 
same quantities of crops as the other land in each area 
implies that the capital and labor originally associated with 
the Soil Bank were transferred out of agriculture. In reality 
some of the labor and capital remained in agriculture and were 
used to increase yields on land remaining in production. The 
transfer of labor and capital from the land going into the 
Soil Bank to the land remaining in production can take place 
most easily on the farms of part-time participants where such 
transfer can occur without any change in ownership or 
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employment of the inputs. 
Measuring labor transfer associated with 
Soil Bank participation 
When land is retired the associated labor may be either 
transferred out of agriculture, transferred to other agri­
cultural uses or idled. Most of the Soil Bank studies have 
indicated that only a few operators increased their off-farm 
work upon placing their land in the Soil Bank. Buse and 
Brown (9, p. 39) found that only 12.3 per cent of Wisconsin 
participants reported an increase in off-farm employment. 
Johnson (26, p. 26) reported that less than 6 per cent of the 
participants interviewed in Nebraska would seek off-farm 
employment. Conklin and Rice (14, pp. 15, 28) found only 
small differences in off-farm employment before and after 
placing land in the Soil Bank in New York State. Andrews and 
Frick (3, p. 20) found that only four out of 120 whole-farm 
participants in Coos County, New Hampshire, were added to the 
off-farm labor force. 
Soil Bank participation may result in the transfer of 
labor out of agriculture without moving established farm 
operators into off-farm jobs. If the operator retires upon 
placing his land in the Soil Bank, the younger man who would 
have taken over in the absence of the program may be forced 
to take an off-farm job. The results reported in Chapter IV 
indicated that one-fourth to one-third of the participants in 
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most areas were of retirement age. 
Analysis of the labor transfer associated with Soil Bank 
participation in seven high participation midwest counties 
Tables 15 and 16 summarize the reported changes in 
employment associated with Soil Bank participation for a 
sample of farmers in each of seven counties in North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Minnesota. The counties were selected as 
being representative of high participation areas in these 
states. The samples were drawn in the summer of 1961 and 
included approximately 50 Soil Bank participants in each 
OIL 
county. The changes in employment status were obtained 
by interviewing ASC committeemen and ASC employees in the 
respective counties. 
Each Soil Bank participant was given a score of either 
zero, one or one-half depending on whether the Soil Bank was 
associated with no change in employment on the farm, with 
the transfer of one man out of farming, or with the transfer 
of less than one man out of farming. Scores were assigned 
under the following set of rules: A score of zero was given 
if the operator devoted his released time to other farming on 
the Soil Bank farm or another farm that he operated before 
the Soil Bank, or if farm work was a minor part of the 
operator's employment prior to the Soil Bank. A score of 
pji 
The procedure used to draw the samples is discussed 
in more detail on page 61. 
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Table 15. Estimated labor transfer associated with Soil Bank 
participation in seven high participation midwest 
counties, part-farm contracts 
Transferred out of farming 
County One man 1/2 man No labor Total 
Eddy County 1 1 13 15 
Hand County 4- 1 9 14-
Marshall County 0 if 14- 18 
Norman County 1 1 7 9 
Rosseau County 1 1 10 12 
Williams County 1 2 . 5 8 
Ziebach County 0 2 5 7 
Total 8 12 63 83 
Table 16. Estimated labor transfer associated with Soil Bank 
participation in seven high participation midwest 
counties, whole-farm contracts 
Transferred out of farming 
County One man 1/2 man No labor Total 
Eddy County 7 6 23 36 
Hand County 17 5 15 37 
Marshall County 6 8 20 34-
Norman County 12 9 17 38 
Rosseau County 12 6 20 38 
Williams County 11 8 23 4-2 
Ziebach County 8 6 22 36 
Total 63 4-8 14-0 261 
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one was given if the operator took a full time off-farm job, 
quit work because of illness, retired, or died shortly before 
or after the land entered the Soil Bank providing no new 
worker took over. A score of one was also given if one 
hired worker was no longer employed upon entering the Soil 
Bank. A score of one-half was given if the operator took a 
part-time off-farm job, went into partial retirement, went 
from partial to complete retirement, or switched from part-
time off-farm work to full time off-farm work. Also a score 
of one-half was given if one part-time worker was no longer 
hired or if a full time worker was replaced by a part-time 
worker. The results suggest that approximately one man was 
released for each three whole-farm contracts or each six part-
farm contracts in the counties studied. 
Results of regression analyses using county data 
Table 17 summarizes the results of four regression 
analyses designed to determine if the level of Soil Bank 
participation was associated with changes in the labor input 
from 1954 to 1959. The sample of 80 midwest counties previous­
ly discussed was used for the analysis.The independent 
variables are defined on page 174. The first dependent 
^^See Appendix A for an explanation of the techniques 
used to select the sample and a list of the counties involved. 
Itasca and Hennepin Counties, Minnesota, Morril and Scotts 
Bluff Counties, Nebraska, and Custer County, South Dakota, 
were omitted from the computed regressions. 
Table 17. Regressions to explain changes in labor inputs 
32 wheat and small grains, dairy 
4-1 cornbelt counties and ranee livestock counties 
a b]_ b2 R a bj b2 R 
Expenditures for I.O87 0.191 O.I33 .038 1.161 0.092 2.213 .703 
hired labor (I.382) (1.255) (0.280) (0.4-76) 
Males employed 1.028 -0.14-0 0.733 . 292 0.74-1 0.198 0.733 . 533 
in agriculture (0.440) (0.4-00) (0.178) (0.303) 
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variable is the ratio of hired labor expenditures in 1959 to 
hired labor expenditures in 1954. The second variable is the 
ratio of males employed in agriculture in I960 to males 
employed in agriculture in 1954. The variables were converted 
to logarithms for estimation. 
Both dependent variables appear to be related to Soil 
Bank participation. The coefficients for the non-cornbelt 
counties are more than twice as large as their standard 
errors. Such results do not imply that Soil Bank participa­
tion caused a reduction in labor used in agriculture. They 
only suggest that Soil Bank participation and the reduction 
in labor used in agriculture are related. 
Changes in capital inputs associated with Soil Bank 
participation 
The individual farmer can easily terminate his expendi­
tures for such items as fertilizer, fuel and repairs upon 
placing his land in the Soil Bank. Other capital inputs such 
as interest, depreciation and insurance on farm machinery and 
farm buildings cannot be so readily removed from agricultural 
production. In the short run, we would expect the Soil Bank 
to have more influence on the first group of inputs than on 
the second group. 
Most of the machinery, equipment and buildings used in 
farming are not suitable for employment outside of agriculture. 
Once manufactured, machines may be transferred from farm to 
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farm, but they cannot be readily transferred to non-agricul­
tural uses. Even the transfer of machines from farm to farm 
is impeded by imperfections in the market for used farm 
equipment. The depreciation costs for machines can be 
terminated most easily at the time when the old machines are 
due for replacement. According to Parsons (4-0) the life of 
farm machines ranges from about 10 to 15 years. Thus, only 
about 7 to 10 per cent of machines are due for replacement 
each year. 
The normal life for farm buildings is longer than that 
for farm machines. Although some farm buildings have other 
uses, most of them are only suitable for agricultural purposes 
on the farm where they are located. In many instances, farm 
buildings and equipment may be merely idled by land retire­
ment. The costs for the depreciation, interest, and 
insurance on these items continue, but they make no contribu­
tion to the total product of agriculture. Like the associated 
land, they are withdrawn from production. 
Even some of those inputs which are most easily varied, 
such as fertilizer and fuel, may remain in agricultural 
production when the associated land is withdrawn. Such 
inputs can be transferred to the land remaining in production 
most easily on part-farm participants' farms. For example, 
farmers operating with limited capital may be at the point 
where the marginal product of capital exceeds its cost0 When 
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such farmers place some land in the Soil Bank, they will find 
it possible and profitable to increase the intensity of 
capital used on their land remaining in production. 
Measuring the reduction in capital inputs 
associated with the Soil Bank 
Few of the Soil Bank studies have attempted to measure 
the effects of the Soil Bank on capital inputs. McArthur (30, 
pp. 15, 17) found that the fertilizer used per acre of crop­
land harvested remained approximately constant on partici­
pants' farms in Georgia. In other words, total fertilizer 
use declined in proportion to the decline in acreage of crops. 
In the two areas studied, he found only 7 and 2b per cent of 
whole-farm participants reporting any change in the use or 
number of farm machines. For part-farm participants the 
percentages were 10 and 7» He found 11 and 15 per cent of 
whole-farm participants reporting a change in the use or re­
pair of farm buildings. In both areas 9 per cent of the 
part-farm participants reported changes in farm buildings. 
In New Mexico, Taylor (60, p. 17) found that the number of 
combines and tractors on part-farm participants' farms 
increased slightly less rapidly than on non-participants' 
farms from 1956 to 1959» Tractors and combines on farms with 
whole-farm contracts decreased 9 per cent over the period. 
Taylor, et al. (59, p. 19) found that 44 per cent of the 
whole-farm participants in their North Dakota study sold some 
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machinery. Christensen and Micka (12, p. 18, 28) report 33 
of the 110 participants studied in Maine who had farm 
machinery sold some of their machines or planned to do so. 
Results of regression analyses using county data 
Table 18 summarizes the results of a set of regression 
analyses designed to determine if the level of Soil Bank 
participation was associated with changes in purchased inputs 
from 195^ to 1959» The same sample of counties was used as 
in the preceding analyses of acreage changes and labor trans­
fer . The independent variables are defined on page 174. The 
dependent variables are ratios of expenditures in 1959 to 
expenditures in 195^ for the various items. The variables 
were converted to logarithms prior to estimation. The 
multiple correlations were very low. The results for the 
cornbelt counties suggest that high Soil Bank participation 
was associated with a slight increase in fertilizer use and 
little change in expenditures for the other inputs. However, 
all of the coefficients were smaller than twice their 
estimated standard errors. For the non-cornbelt counties, 
Soil Bank participation appeared to be associated with 
reductions in the use of all the inputs considered. Again, 
none of the coefficients were as large as twice their standard 
errors. 
Table 18. Regressions to explain changes in capital inputs, 1954-59 
43 cornbelt counties 
R 
32 wheat and small grains, dairy 
and range livestock counties 
a bi bo R 
Total use of 1.059 
fertilizer 
Per acre use of 1.04-8 
fertilizer 
Total expenditures 0.929 
for hired 
machines 
Total expenditures 1.124 
for fuel and 
lubricants 
1.693 -O.93O .129 
(2.077) (1.885) 
0.619 -1.416 .117 
(2.098) (1.904) 
-1.477 0.266 .222 
(1.074) (0.975) 
0.399 -0.006 .164 
(0.426) (O.386) 
2.676 4.858 O.932 .505 
(1.796) (3.046) 
2.996 3.706 1.268 .402 
(1.913) (3.244) 
1.059 -0.820 1.938 .314 
(0.674) (1.143) 
1.128 0.347 0.416 .560 
(0.153) (0.260) 
195 
Estimates of the Production Eliminated by 
the Soil Bank in Five Midwest States 
From the preceding discussion the difficulties in 
measuring the effect of the Soil Bank on crop production are 
apparent. Nevertheless, such estimates are essential for 
formulating policy. Christensen and Aines (11, p. 27) have 
estimated that each dollar of rental payments in I960 reduced 
crop production in the United States by $2.80. Buse and 
Brown (9, p. 36) estimated that $6.6 million in Soil Bank 
payments to whole-farm participants in Wisconsin reduced 
production by $22.2 million. This is a reduction of $3.36 
per dollar of rental payments. Both of these estimates used 
the historical crop acreages reported by Soil Bank partici­
pants as estimates of the crop acreages that would have 
existed on the Soil Bank land in the absence of the program. 
The total effect of land retirement on crop production 
can be divided into two parts. First is the effect of the 
program on the land input. To estimate this effect we must 
consider not only the direct change in the acreage available 
for crops but also the indirect effect of the program on crop 
acreage. This may include non-Soil Bank land that is brought 
into crop production as a result of the program and Soil Bank 
land that would have been taken out of production in the 
absence of the program. We also must consider the effects of 
land selection and changes in cropping patterns. 
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The second major effect of land retirement on production 
operates through the induced changes in capital and labor 
inputs. The retirement of land may result in removing the 
associated capital and labor from agriculture, idling the 
capital and labor, or transferring it to other land where its 
contribution to total output may be changed. 
To estimate the amount of production control attained by 
the Soil Bank the direct effect on crop acreage can be taken 
as a starting point. Yields can be set equal to yields on 
all cropland in the same area. Then the other effects can 
be brought in as adjustments or corrections in the original 
estimate. To use this approach we began with the fourth esti­
mate in Table Î4- on page 181. This estimate was obtained by 
assuming that the Soil Bank land in each county would have 
the same yields and cropping patterns as existed in the 
county as a whole. The indicated value of the production 
eliminated per acre of land in the Soil Bank in i960 was 
$23.90. The average government rental payment per acre of 
Soil Bank land for the five states considered was $11.18 in 
I960. Disregarding the indirect acreage affects, the effect 
of intensified use of labor and capital on the land remaining 
in production, and the effect of land selection within 
counties, the estimated reduction in the value of crop 
production per dollar of rental payments was $2.14. 
The evidence is not very satisfactory on the magnitude 
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of the other effects. From the information that is available 
it seems reasonable to assume that the indirect acreage effect 
would offset at least 15 to 20 per cent of the direct acreage 
effect. Land selection within counties and more intensive 
use of capital and labor on the land remaining in production 
probably offset at least another 5 per cent of the direct 
acreage effect. Assuming that these other effects reduced 
the amount of production control attained by one-fifth, we 
would estimate that each dollar of government rental payments 
reduced production by $1.71. 
In addition to the rental payments the government made 
payments for establishing conservation practices. These 
payments were usually made during the initial year of the 
contract. If the practice payments had been spread evenly 
over the full term of the contracts, they would have averaged 
$.70 per acre annually for the five states studied. If the 
practice payments are to be considered as additional costs of 
production control, the estimated reduction in production per 
dollar of government costs is reduced to $1.61. No satis­
factory estimates of administrative costs are available, but 
if they were included the production reduction per dollar of 
government costs would be still less. 
This estimate of $1.61 worth of production reduction per 
dollar of government payments is well below the estimate of 
$2.80 reported by Christensen and Aines for the United States. 
198 
Most of the difference between the two estimates appears to 
be attributable to differences in the estimating procedures 
and not to basic differences in the effect of the program 
between the Midwest and the rest of the country. Christensen 
and Aines did not include the cost of conservation practice 
payments in their estimate. Also they did not adjust their 
estimate downward for the indirect effect of the Soil Bank 
on crop acreage and for more intensive use of labor and 
capital on the land remaining in production. A further basic 
difference is that their estimate was based upon historical 
crop acreages reported by participants whereas our own 
estimate assumes that the Soil Bank land would have had the 
same cropping pattern as all cropland in the same county in 
19 54. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study the conservation reserve program is analyz­
ed as a means of controlling agricultural production. Atten­
tion is focused on its immediate effects on crop production, 
government costs and labor and capital employed in agriculture. 
Although such a program may promote some transfer of labor and 
capital out of agriculture, it is not an effective instrument 
for attaining the long run goals of economic efficiency and 
economic growth. Efficiency criteria imply transferring 
resources away from agriculture whenever the marginal social 
products of the resources outside of agriculture exceed their 
marginal social products in agriculture. But the marginal 
social product in non-agricultural uses is near zero for much 
of the land in crop production. In contrast, some of the 
capital and labor used in agriculture has a potentially high 
marginal product outside of agriculture. This is particularly 
true of the labor of young people who have time to develop the 
necessary non-agricultural skills. Thus, efficiency criteria 
imply removing much labor and perhaps capital from agriculture 
but little land. By concentrating on land, the Soil Bank and 
similar programs promote the long run goals of efficiency only 
in an indirect manner. For purposes of promoting optimal 
resource use, measures which directly transfer labor to non-
farm employment without idling land or other fixed agricultur­
al inputs would be better suited. 
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Despite its inapproprlateness as a measure for increasing 
total income or welfare, land retirement may be supported by 
some groups as a means of income redistribution. It provides 
for the transfer of income from the non-agricultural sector 
to the agricultural sector through two channels. First the 
Soil Bank payments represent a direct transfer of purchasing 
power to the persons who control land resources. Secondly, 
income is transferred to agriculture through the market place 
by reducing production in the face of an inelastic demand. 
The quantity of income transferred through each channel can 
be varied by changing the level of Soil Bank payments and/or 
the support prices for agricultural products. The arguments 
for such income transfer from the non-agricultural sector to 
agriculture most often rest upon two alleged imperfections 
of our economic system. First is the immobility of resources 
which retards economic adjustments resulting in undue penal­
ties for the holders of those resources which must be trans­
ferred. It is argued that this works an unfair hardship on 
the persons who possess agricultural labor and capital. The 
second imperfection is in the market structure. It is held 
that firms in other industries manage to limit production in 
order to maintain an acceptable price whereas agricultural 
firms do not. 
Perhaps the merit of land retirement is that it provides 
the income transfer desired by certain groups in a politically 
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palatable form which does not unduly restrict the attainment 
of the long run goals of economic efficiency and economic 
growth. Although possessing many faults, such a program 
probably hinders agricultural adjustment less than a program 
of high price supports and surplus disposal. But it is only 
a palliative and not a cure for the problems of maladjustment 
in agriculture. By operating on the land input it only 
indirectly promotes the needed adjustments in labor and 
capital. 
The Structure of Payment Rates 
This study was primarily concerned with the effects of 
alternative sets of Soil Bank payment rates. Payment rates 
can be varied both in their average level and in their struc­
ture or distribution among farms. It was shown that the 
1956-60 Soil Bank program resulted in higher levels of 
participation among states with low farmland values than 
among states with high land values. For five midwest states 
it was shown that participation was higher among the less 
productive counties than among the more productive counties. 
The higher levels of participation in the less productive 
areas can be partly explained by the higher level of payment 
rates in relation to gross product or land rent in these 
areas. The payment rates were based upon a composite 
productivity index plus a constant factor for all states 
intended to cover costs which would continue on the Soil Bank 
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land. This constant narrowed the rate differential "between 
high producing land and low producing land making the Soil 
Bank a more profitable alternative in the less productive 
areas. 
Differences in the structure of crop production costs 
suggest that the government can obtain more reduction in 
production and more transfer of labor and capital out of 
agriculture per dollar of rental payment in some areas than 
in other areas. Results for the five midwest states studied 
are consistent with the hypothesis that land rent makes up a 
smaller share of total production costs on the less productive 
land than on the more productive land. This implies that, in 
the long run when labor and capital are variable, it costs 
less to withdraw the less productive land from production than 
to withdraw the more productive land. At the same time, more 
capital and labor would be released per dollar of payment on 
the less productive land. 
In the short run, however, when not all of the capital 
and labor are variable, the differences in the cost of 
reducing production or transferring labor and capital are not 
so great. The data indicated that operating expenditures for 
crop production are almost proportional to gross product for 
the five midwest states studied. Thus, the remaining costs 
make up approximately the same percentage of gross product on 
all grades of land. For a short term program where farmers 
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find that only their operating expenses can be terminated upon 
participation, little difference in the cost of reducing 
production among different areas would be expected. 
Because of differences in the flexibility of capital and 
labor among farms, the costs of reducing production or trans­
ferring labor and capital varies on farms of the same level 
of productivity. A land retirement program designed to 
reduce production at least cost would not concentrate solely 
on the good land or the poor land. Instead, those farms in 
each area would be retired where production could be control­
led least expensively. The rules or formulas by which pay­
ment rates can be set to attain this objective are of major 
importance. 
If the primary goal is to reduce production at the lowest 
cost to government, the payments offered on each tract of 
land should be proportional to the value of the resources 
removed from agricultural production by retiring that tract 
of land. Under the assumption that the labor and capital 
would be removed, this implies basing payment rates on an 
index of gross productivity. Because of the structure of 
costs, payments based upon gross product tend to be larger 
relative to land rent on the less productive land than on the 
more productive land. This suggests that payments based upon 
gross product would retire a larger percentage of the less 
productive land than of the more productive land. If part of 
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the labor and capital remain in agriculture, the cost of 
production control can be minimized by basing payments on a 
composite index of gross productivity and net productivity. 
If the dominant goal of land retirement is to promote 
more efficient use of resources, payment rates should be 
designed to promote the transfer of labor and capital out of 
agriculture. To maximize the transfer of capital and labor 
per dollar of payment in a land retirement program would 
involve setting the payment rate for each increment of land 
proportional to the quantity of labor and capital removed 
from agriculture by retiring that increment of land. Since 
labor and capital tend to constitute a smaller percentage of 
total inputs in the more productive areas than in the less 
productive areas, this implies smaller differentials in 
payment rates between areas of different productivities than 
would be established by basing rates on either land rent or 
gross productivity. In other words, to maximize the transfer 
of labor and capital away from agriculture, a flatter payment 
rate schedule is needed than to maximize the reduction in 
production per dollar of government payments. A program 
designed to maximize the transfer of labor and capital out 
of agriculture would probably result in higher levels of 
participation in the less productive areas than would a 
program designed to minimize the government costs of produc­
tion control. 
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Payment rates for the 1959-60 Soil Bank program were 
based upon a composite index of net productivity and gross 
productivity plus a constant factor for all states. Such a 
composite index is appropriate where the goal is to reduce 
production at the lowest cost to government and some capital 
and labor inputs are fixed on the participating farms. But 
it appears that the cost per dollar's worth of production 
control attained under the Soil Bank would have been lower if 
the constant had not been included in the rate formula. 
Without the constant, participation levels would have been 
higher on the more productive land but probably not as high 
as participation levels on the less productive land. On the 
other hand, the flatter rate schedule resulting from use of 
the constant may have increased the amount of capital and 
labor transferred out of agriculture. This would be in line 
with long run goals of economic efficiency. However, it 
resulted in rather severe economic adjustments in some of the 
less productive areas, particularly among the suppliers of 
farm inputs and the handlers of farm products in those areas. 
Special Features of Land Retirement Programs 
A number of special features can be incorporated into 
land retirement programs to enhance their effectiveness in 
attaining certain .economic ends. Among these are bidding 
provisions, bonuses for whole-farms and provisions for 
transferring land to lower uses. 
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Requiring farmers to bid for Soil Bank contracts is a 
special form of price discrimination whereby the government 
attempts to rent land from each farmer at the lowest price 
that the farmer will accept. Another form of price discrimi­
nation in land retirement involves contracting land for a 
period of years for a low rate initially and then raising 
the rate in succeeding years to attract those farmers who 
would not enter the program at the initial rate. Such price 
discrimination schemes can reduce the government cost of 
removing land, labor and capital from agricultural production 
so long as farmers are unable to predict each others bidding 
behavior and the future actions of the government. However, 
such schemes cannot be expected to be 100 per cent effective 
in eliminating the producer's surplus. As farmers gain 
experience with , such bid programs for land retirement they 
may learn to predict more accurately the rate necessary to 
obtain a contract on their respective farms for a given year 
and refuse to bid below this rate. 
The bid program probably lowered the cost of removing 
agricultural inputs from production in the 1959-60 Soil Bank 
program where the extent of the program had to be limited to 
available funds and farmers lacked bidding experience. 
However, for a program which continues to retire additional 
land over a period of years, the government's savings are not 
apt to be large. A program which consciously attempts to 
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to discriminate by raising rental rates over time can do so 
successfully only if farmers are not informed of the govern­
ment's intentions. This seems to be a highly questionable 
procedure where the farmers are part of the voting public. 
In 1959-6O the Soil Bank program provided a ten per cent 
bonus for whole-farm participants. Whole-farm land retirement 
is more effective in removing capital and labor from agricul­
ture than is part-farm land retirement. To minimize the 
cost of production control whole-farm bonuses in the 
neighborhood of 60 per cent may be in order. If major 
emphasis is to be on removing capital and labor from agricul­
ture, even larger bonuses for whole-farm participants are 
implied. On the other hand, if the policy-makers do not 
want to decrease the number of persons employed in agriculture 
only part-farm contracts would be accepted. 
Land retirement programs can be designed not only to idle 
cropland but also to transfer it to alternative public or 
private uses such as recreation, timber production or grazing. 
Where the retired land has a perceptable value for public 
recreational use, there is no reason that such use should be 
denied. It was shown that the value of land for public use 
can be taken into account in setting the payment rates. 
However, much cropland has a very low or negligible value 
for public recreational uses. 
Timber production can be a private use or a public use 
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depending upon whether the contract assigns the land owner or 
the government the right to harvest the timber. The tree 
planting that took place on Soil Bank land was for private 
use. The transfer of certain types of cropland to the 
production of forest products appears to be in line with long 
run economic goals. Whether or not the Soil Bank is the 
appropriate instrument for fostering this transfer is open to 
question. 
Grazing is another private use to which cropland can be 
transferred. If grazing is allowed on Soil Bank land, the 
cost for reducing crop production is lowered. Such transfer 
also appears to be in line with long run goals of economic 
efficiency. However, a government subsidized transfer of 
resources from crop production to livestock production may 
subject livestock producers to problems of over supply. 
This amounts to a transfer of income from livestock 
producers to crop producers « 
The duration and continuity of a land retirement program 
also affect the results obtained. Long term land retirement 
programs allow farmers to treat more of their capital and 
labor as variable costs than do short term contracts. Since 
fewer of their inputs are fixed with respect to long term 
contracts than for short term contracts, the government 
costs of reducing production tend to be less with the longer 
contractso 
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A land retirement program which operates continuously 
over a period of years provides each farmer an opportunity 
to retire his land at the point in time when his labor and 
capital can be most readily removed from agriculture. Such 
a program will tend to eliminate more production and transfer 
more capital and labor away, from agriculture per dollar of 
government- payments than will a program which operates for 
only a year or two at a time. 
The Level of Payment Rates 
Of major importance in future policy decisions is the 
question, what would be the cost of further reducing produc­
tion through voluntary land retirement? The experience with 
the 1956-60 Soil Bank program provides a starting point for 
answering this question. To answer the question it is 
necessary to quantify the relationship between land retire­
ment rental rates and the amount of production control 
attained. One method of measuring the relationship between 
payment rates and production is to first examine the 
relationship between payment rates and the quantity of land 
retired. This relationship was termed the land supply 
function. Once it is obtained, the next step is to measure 
the association between the amount of land retired and the 
reduction in crop production. 
In this study an attempt was made to estimate the Soil 
Bank land supply function for five midwest states using 
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counties as observations. Three payment rate variables were 
used; the ratio of the Soil Bank payment rate to gross product 
the ratio of the Soil Bank payment rate to gross product minus 
production expenditures and the ratio of the Soil Bank pay­
ment rate to land value. When applied to estimate the levels 
of participation that would have prevailed under different 
payment rate levels, the various equations gave differing 
results. For example, in the cornbelt and wheat counties the 
average level of participation was 4.87 per cent in i960. The 
estimated levels of participation for a 25 per cent higher 
payment rate ranged from 6.3 to 8.7 per cent. 
It was estimated that the 1956-60 Soil Bank program 
eliminated approximately $1.60 worth of crop production for 
each dollar of government payments in the midwest states 
studied. If the added Soil Bank land was equivalent to that 
already retired, the production eliminated per dollar of 
government payment would have been about $1.25 if rates had 
been high enough to bring 6.3 to 8.7 per cent of the land 
into the program. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The problem of estimating the effects of possible 
expanded Soil Bank programs on crop production and the 
employment of labor and capital in agriculture remains 
largely unsolved. No single approach promises to provide 
answers to all of the relevant questions. It appears that 
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further analyses using data from the 1956-60 Soil Bank 
program could be helpful. The use of the county as a unit of 
observation is appropriate for such analyses where it is 
desired to draw policy implications which apply over broad 
areas. However, many of the interesting relationships tend 
to be hidden in the county data. It is not a substitute for, 
but rather a supplement to, data obtained on individual farms. 
As time passes, the 1956-60 Soil Bank experience becomes 
increasingly unsatisfactory as a basis for projecting the 
effects of future land retirement programs. Greater emphasis 
must be placed upon studies making use of more recent data. 
The possibility of constructing a rather complete model of 
the agricultural economy making use of empirically estimated 
agricultural production functions and demand and supply 
functions for agricultural products and agricultural inputs 
is becoming less remote. The development and application of 
such a model would seem to be a useful method of comparing 
land retirement with alternative agricultural policies. 
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APPENDIX A: PROCEDURES AND DATA USED IN ANALYZING 
SOIL BANK PARTICIPATION IN FIVE MIDWEST STATES 
The results from an analysis of county data for a sample 
of counties from five midwest states are reported in various 
parts of this study. This appendix provides details on how 
the sample was selected, where the data were obtained, and 
how they were used in the analysis. The five states included 
in the analysis were Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota 
and South Dakota. These states make up parts of four major 
types of farming areas: the cornbelt, the wheat and small 
grains area, the dairy area and the range livestock area. 
Over the ten year period, 1949-58, these five states accounted 
for the following percentages of United States production of 
the crops listed: corn, 36.0; wheat, 22.8; sorghum grain, 
9.7; oats, 45.7; barley, 32.6; and soybeans, 24.7. The 
sample involved 80 counties out of the 402 counties in the 
region. The object of sampling instead of dealing with all 
402 counties was to reduce the cost of the analysis. 
Approximately 165 items of information were obtained for 
each county in Iowa and Minnesota and 320 items of informa­
tion were collected for each of the counties in North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Nebraska. 
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Sampling Procedure 
To draw the sample the five state region was divided into 
21 subrogions corresponding to the type of farming area used 
by the United States Department of Agriculture (70). Sub-
region boundaries were modified slightly when necessary to 
make them coincide with county lines. To determine the 
number of counties to be drawn in each subregion, the total 
number of counties in the subregion was multiplied by .2 and 
rounded to the nearest whole number. Within each subregion 
counties were chosen randomly. Table 19 lists the counties 
in the sample. Counties 1 through 16 are the wheat area 
counties, while counties 17 through 28 belong in the dairy 
area. The range livestock area includes counties 29 through 
37. Counties 38 through 80 are in the cornbelt. 
Data Sources 
For each county, six types of data were collected: 
conservation reserve payment rates, acres in the conservation 
reserve, crop acreages, crop yields, prices and general 
characteristics of the agriculture and the population of the 
county. The latter category included such items as the 
average value of land and buildings per acre of farmland and 
the number of farmers over 65 years of age. 
Conservation reserve payment rates by county were provid­
ed by the Commodity Stabilization Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (75)• The acreage of land in the 
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Table 19= List of counties in sample 
County County Subregion County County Subregion 
number name number number name number 











1 Chase, Neb. 1 41 
2 Keith, Neb. 1 42 
3 Hettinger, N. D. 2 >\3 4 Slope, N. D. 2 44 
5 McLean, N. D. 
Sheridan, N. D. 
3 
6 3 46 
7 Cavalier, N. D. 4 47 
8 Foster, N. D. 4 48 
9 Renville, N. D. 4 49 
10 Cass, N. D. 5 50 
11 Steele, N. D. 5 51 
12 Walsh, N. D. 5 52 
13 Beadle, S. D. 6 53 
14 Clark, S. D. 6 54 
15 McPherson, S. D. 6 55 
16 Walworth, S. D. 6 56 
17 Cass, Minn. 7 57 
18 Itasca, Minn. 7 58 
19 Wadena, Minn. 7 59 
20 Grant, Minn. 8 60 
21 Morrison, Minn. 8 61 
22 Otter Tail, Minn. 8 62 
23 Dodge, Minn. 9 63 
24 Fillmore, Minn. 9 64 
25 Goodhue, Minn. 9 65 
26 Hennepin, Minn. 9 66 
27 Houston, Minn. 9 67 
28 Steele, Minn. 9 68 
29 Arthur, Neb. 10 69 
30 Blaine, Neb. 10 70 
31 Morrill, Neb. 10 71 
32 Corson, S. D. 11 72 
33 Custer, S. D. 11 73 
34 Lyman, S. D. 11 74 
35 Pennington, S. D. 11 75 
36 Scotts Bluff, Neb. 11 76 
37 Todd, S. D. 11 77 
38 Keya Paha, Neb. 12 78 
39 Tripp, S. D. 12 79 
40 Butler, Neb. 13 80 
odge, eb. 
Douglas 
T.vrtn _ T i 
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Soil Bank for 1959 and I960 was also provided by the 
Commodity Stabilization Service. 0 Acreage and yield data 
were used for the eight crops : corn, grain sorghum, wheat, 
oats, barley, flax, soybeans and all hay. Data on acreages 
harvested was obtained from the 1959 Census of Agriculture 
(640. Planted acreages for corn, sorghum, wheat, oats, barley, 
flax and soybeans for counties in North Dakota, South Dakota 
and Nebraska were obtained from the respective state agricul­
tural statistics publications. 
Data on yields of each of the eight crops were collected 
for each year from 1950 to i960 from the respective state 
agricultural statistics publications. In case of missing 
observations, district yields were used if they were available. 
For some crops such as hay in Iowa it was necessary to use 
yields reported in the Census of Agriculture using only the 
years 194-9, 1954 and 1959* Table 20 is a key to the source of 
the yield and acreage estimates for each crop in each state. 
Support prices for 1959 by county for all of the eight 
crops except hay were obtained from the Federal Register (63, 
pp. 3038, 4-017, 4125, 454-6, 5959, 6232, 8537). The United 
States support price and the average price received by farmers 
for each of the eight crops in 1959 were taken from Agricul­
tural Statistics (68). Average hay prices by state for 194-8 
2^U. S. Department of Agriculture. Commodity Stabiliza­
tion Service. Washington, D. C. Conservation reserve acres 
by county -for 1959 and i960. Private communication. 1961. 
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Table 20. Sources of yield and acreage data 
State Corn Sorghum Wheat Oats Barley Flax Soybeans Hay 
Iowa a b c a b c a b 
Minnesota a d a a a c c a 
Nebraska e a e e e d c a 
North Dakota e d e e e e c c 
South Dakota e c e e e e f a 
aHarvested acres were obtained from the Census of Agri­
culture (64-) for 1954 and 1959• Yields per harvested acre 
were obtained from the state agricultural statistics 
publications for the years 1950 through i960. 
^Yields were not reported in the state agricultural 
statistics publications. Acreages and production were obtain­
ed from the Census of Agriculture for the years 194-9, 195*+ and 
1959* Yields for these three years were computed from the 
acreage and production data. Other years were disregarded. 
^Acreage and yield data were obtained from the same 
sources as in a but yields for one or more years in one or 
more counties were missing. The missing yields usually appli­
ed to crops that were of minor importance in the particular 
county. In these cases, yields for the crop reporting district 
were used if available. If district yield estimates were not 
available, that particular year was disregarded in computing 
average yields. 
dThis crop was disregarded in this state because of its 
minor importance and the absence of yield data. 
^Harvested acres and yields were obtained from the same 
source as in a. Planted and harvested acreages were obtained 
from the state agricultural statistics publication. 
fAcreage and yield data were obtained from the same 
source as in e but some observations were missing. 
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to 1959 were obtained from Agricultural Statistics (68). 
Information on general characteristics of agriculture 
and the population by county were obtained from the United 
States Census of Agriculture, 1959 (64), and the United 
States Census of Population, i960 (65). 
Operations on the Data 
In no case did variables enter the regression analyses 
in exactly the same form that they were obtained from the 
statistical sources. Most frequently they entered the analy­
sis in the form of ratios such as the ratio of Soil Bank 
acres to total acres of cropland. In several cases the 
variables used in the regression analysis were derived by 
means of a fairly lengthy set of computations. Notable 
examples are the variables dealing with the productivity of 
land. 
Method of estimating normal yields 
To estimate normal yields, annual average yields for 
each of the eight crops as reported in the state agricultural 
statistics publications were meaned for the eleven year period 
1950-1960 for each county. For those states and for those 
crops where planted acreages were reported by county, the 
ratio of the planted acres over harvested acres for each year 
was computed. In such cases, yields per harvested acre were 
converted to yields per planted acre by multiplying by the 
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inverse of this ratio. Thus, for Nebraska, North Dakota and 
South Dakota, where crop failure tends to be more frequent, 
planted acres and yields per planted acre were used. For Iowa 
and Minnesota, where crop failure is less frequent, no data on 
planted acres were available so harvested acres and yields per 
harvested acre were employed. The yields used are not direct­
ly comparable between the two areas but the estimated total 
production per acre of cropland is comparable. The average 
yields for the period, 1950-1960, were assumed to represent 
normal yields (per planted acre or harvested acre) for the year 
1955* To convert them into normal yields for 1959, the 1955 
yields were multiplied by a constant correction factor 
representing yield trends. This technique assumes the same 
percentage increase in the yield of each crop for all 
counties. To estimate the yield trend for each crop, a simple 
regression of annual average yields over the five state area 
on time was computed. The period was 1950-1960. The regres­
sion coefficient was divided by the mean yield to obtain the 
annual proportional change in yield. The annual proportional 
change was multiplied by four and applied to the 1955 normal 
yields to estimate 1959 normal yields. The estimated annual 
proportional yield changes for the eight crops were : corn, 
.028; wheat, .057; sorghum grain, .121; oats, .027; barley, 
.025; flax, .111; soybeans, .012; and hay, .020. Planting 
rates were subtracted from normal yields for all crops except 
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hay. The planting rates were obtained from Crop Production 
Practices (70, 71) for certain subrogions. Where estimates 
of planting rates were not available they were approximated 
by using the estimates for near-by or similar areas. 
Method of estimating normal crop acreages 
Acreages for each of the eight major crops in 1954 were 
assumed to be normal. The year 1954 was chosen in preference 
to 1959 so that possible effects of the Soil Bank program on 
the cropping pattern would be eliminated. For North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Nebraska, harvested acres of corn, wheat, 
oats, barley, flax and soybeans were converted to planted 
acres by multiplying by the ratio of planted acres to harvest­
ed acres in 1954 as computed from the acreages reported in the 
respective state agricultural statistics publications. The 
object in converting to planted acres in the three states was 
to prevent possible abnormal weather in 1954 from affecting 
the acreage pattern. 
Method of valuing crops 
The county normal price for each of the seven grain crops 
was set equal to the season average U. S. price for the crop 
plus the difference between the local support price in 1959 
and the U. S. support price in 1959» No equivalent method of 
establishing a price surface for hay was available. For this 
study the average price for baled hay for each state over the 
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eleven year period 1948-59 was used as the value of hay per 
ton for the counties in the state. The value of cropland 
pasture per acre was set equal to the estimated value of hay 
produced per acre minus a constant charge of #8.50 per ton of 
hay to cover the cost of mowing, raking, baling and hauling 
the hay. 
Method of estimating normal gross product from cropland 
The normal value of each of the eight crops produced was 
computed for each county by multiplying normal acreage times 
normal price times normal yield for each crop. These were 
summed to obtain the total value of the eight crops produced 
for each county. Other harvested crops were assumed to have 
the same average value per acre in each county as the eight 
crops. The total value of all crops produced was estimated 
by multiplying the total value of eight crops produced by 
the ratio of total acres of all crops harvested to total 
acres of eight crops harvested in 1954. To obtain normal 
gross product from cropland, the value of cropland pasture 
was added to the value of all crops produced. 
Mathematical formula for deriving normal gross product 
estimates 
The procedure for deriving the normal gross product 
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The symbols are defined as follows: 
Aj^ = estimated normal acreage of crop j in county k 
A^ = total acres of cropland harvested in county k 
in year t as reported in the Census of 
Agriculture 
A?,, = acres harvested of crop j in the county k in 
J the year t as reported in the Census of 
Agriculture 
A*? . = acres harvested of crop j in county k in year 
J t as reported in the state agricultural 
statistics publication 
A?, t = acres planted in crop j in county k in year t 
J as reported in the state agricultural 
statistics publication 
C = cost per ton of making hay 
= gross product for cropland in bounty k 
Pj = U. S. farm price per bushel or ton for crop j 
J in 1959 
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pS = U. S. support price for crop j in 1959 
Pjk - estimated farm price per bushel or ton for 
crop j in county k 
P^k = support price for crop j in county k in 1959 
Rjk = Plating rate for crop j in county k 
Y.: = average yield for crop j in the five state 
region, 1950-60 (bushels or tons) 
Y1k = normal yield per acre for crop j in county k 
for 1959 (bushels or tons) 
^ikt - yield per harvested acre of crop j in county 
k in year t as reported in the state agricul­
tural statistics publication (bushels or tons) 
b. = annual increase in yield for crop j in the 5 
state region 
j = crop index 
1 = corn 
2 = sorghum 
3 = wheat 
b = oats 
5 = barley 
6 = flax 
7 = soybeans 
8 = all hay 
9 = cropland pasture 
k = county index 
t = time index 
1 = 1950 
2 = 1951 
11 = I960 
Method of estimating selected expenditures for crop production 
The selected expenditures for crop production by county 
included six components: expenditures for machine hire; 
230 
expenditures for hired labor: expenditures for fuel and 
lubricants; expenditures for seeds, bulbs, plants and trees ; 
fertilizer costs and lime costs. The first four were taken 
directly from the Census of Agriculture, 1959 (64-). The 
quantity of fertilizer and the quantity of lime used in 1959 
were obtained from the same source. The quantities and 
expenditures for fertilizer and lime were obtained for 1954-
from the 1954 Census of Agriculture. Fertilizer and lime 
expenditures for 1959 were estimated by multiplying the 
reported 1959 quantities by the implied 1954 prices times a 
constant representing the ratio of 1959 fertilizer prices to 
1954 fertilizer prices for the state. The procedure is 
summarized as follows : 
Em2k = E$2k S;i;:::8o 
t? n ,Emlk ^m2k. _ , 
= Qm2k VV S;!..go 
®2k = Ji 
The symbols are defined as follows : 
E , = estimated variable expenditures for crop 
production in period n for county k 
Ejjj^ = expenditures for input m in period n for 
county k 
Emnk = expenditures for input m in period n for 
county k as reported in the Census of 
Agriculture 
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P v = state average price for input m in period n 
for county k 
Q , = quantity of input m used in period n in 
county k as reported in the Census of 
Agriculture 
m = item index 
1 = machine hire 
2 = labor hire 
3 = fuel and lubricants 
i+ = seeds, bulbs, plants and trees 
5 = fertilizer 
6 = lime 
Method of measuring yield variation among counties 
The variation in yield per acre by county was measured by 
estimating the coefficient of variation of an annual yield 
index constructed for each county. The annual county yield 
indexes were obtained by weighing annual yields of corn, 
wheat, and oats first by their respective averages in 195*+ and 
secondly by their respective prices in 1959* The 195*+-
acreages were assumed to represent the normal cropping pattern 
without the Soil Bank. The 1959 prices were assumed to repre­
sent farmers expected prices in 1959 and i960. Yields of 
other crops were not incorporated in the index because com­
plete series of yield data for these other crops were not 
available for every county. The operations are summarized 
n = period index 
1 = 1954 
2 = 1959 
below 
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where, Ikt = index of yield for county k in year t 
Ik = mean of yield indexes for county k 
CVk = coefficient of variation of yield index 
in county k 
k = crop index 
1 = corn 
2 = wheat 
3 = oats 
and other symbols are as previously defined. 
Method of measuring changes in farmers' 
expected return from cropping 
Two estimates of farmers' expected gross returns from 
production of corn, wheat and oats were constructed, one for 
the year 1955 and one for the year 1959. Both estimates were 
based upon 1954- acreages and mean yields for the preceding 
four years. The crops were valued at 1955 prices for the 
first period and at 1959 prices for the second period. The 
computational procedure is as summarized below: 
t2 
Z Y 
- y ,5=î! 
jkt 
On* = £<-^5—> Adk Pjkn 
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where. G .. = expected gross returns from corn, wheat and 
oats in period n in county k 
P, -h- = expected price of the jth crop in period n 
in county k 
n = year 
1 = 1955 
2 = 1959 
tj = the first year of the preceding four years 
tg = the preceding year 
The other symbols are previously defined. 
Table 21. Gross product, land value, Soil Bank payment rate, 
selected expenditures and Soil Bank participation 
for 80 midwest counties 
Dollars per acre Per cent 
Estimated Soil Bank Selected of crop­
gross Land payment expen­ land in 
County product value rate ditures Soil Bank 
number 1959 1959 1959-60 1959 I960 
1 21.18 63-59 9.50 4.74 4.4-5 
2 25-34- 82.94 9.50 5.80 1.23 
3 15.58 50.14 10.00 3.20 7.99 
4 14.13 36.47 8.50 3.68 6.68 
5 16.20 43.91 9.00 2.99 5.25 
6 15.97 40.36 8.50 2.56 5.26 
7 20.86 61.79 11.50 4-. 50 4.30 
8 18.71 55.33 9.50 4-. 76 8.06 
9 16.04 57.29 10.50 2.71 13.94-
10 24.76 112.96 14.50 6.65 7.97 
11 22.61 71.71 12.00 4.77 4-.81 
12 24.71 109.71 14.50 9.44 9.72 
13 16.76 54.94 11.00 3.93 17.99 
14 19.73 56.73 12.00 3.93 15.78 
15 16.32 37.25 9.00 3.14- 9.33 
16 16.71 46.63 9.00 3.82 5.89 
17 19.66 39.35 8.50 6.67 17.97 
18 21.40 65.32 7.00 7.31 15.70 
19 21.75 53.85 10.50 7.83 24.37 
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Table 21. (Continued) 
Dollars per acre 
Estimated Soil Bank Selected 
gross Land payment expen-
County product value rate ditures 






































































































































































































































Table 21. (Continued) 
Dollars per acre Per cent 
Estimated Soil Bank Selected of crop­
gross Land payment expen­ land in 
County product value rate ditures Soil Bank 
number 1959 1959 1959-60 1959 I960 
59 30.37 147.92 16.00 8.27 5.31 
60 26.64 134.54 14.00 7.09 3.75 
61 26.87 110.30 13.50 6.45 6.69 
62 34.99 165.84 14.50 8.28 2.69 
63 - 30.14 133.41 13.50 7.93 9.38 
64 40.92 305.23 20.00 9.97 3.52 
65 30.27 l40.4l 15.50 7.35 5.82 
66 45.71 298.91 20.00 12.90 0.32 
67 43.14 281.80 19.50 11.53 0.65 
68 42.88 296.94 19.00 10.86 1.74 
69 47.03 321.90 20.50 12.23 0.59 
70 46.16 350.66 21.50 13.51 1.07 
71 36.62 191.53 17.00 8.70 3.43 
72 30.22 110.14 15.00 9.14 7.11 
73 40.66 251.45 20.00 10.65 1.20 
74 38.28 191.19 17.50 10.21 2.42 
75 40.53 308.06 21.50 9.86 3.20 
76 43.50 322.81 20.00 13.43 1.30 
77 43.26 302.94 20.50 12.80 1.51 
78 38.51 204.56 15.50 10.16 1.51 
79 41.70 274.72 19.00 13.50 1.83 
80 33.34 198.12 15.00 9.30 1.43 
Table 22. Expenditures for fertilizer, lime, machine hire, 
labor hire and fuel and lubricants for 80 midwest 
counties 
County 
number Fertilizer Lime 


















Table 22, (Continued) 
Dollars per acre. 1959 
County Machine Labor Fuel and 
number Fertilizer Lime hire hire lubricants 
3 0.36 0.36 0.52 1.62 
4 0.20 —  —  0.60 0.65 1.92 
5 0.2 7 —  —  0.28 0.51 1.63 
6 0.12 — —  0.13 0.30 1.67 
7 0.76 — —  0.45 0.73 2.25 
8 0.86 —  —  0.31 0.88 2.19 
9 0.2 7 —  —  0.18 0.45 1.58 
10 0.96 — —  O.38 1.62 2.74 
11 0.87 —  —  0.24 0.87 2.26 
12 1.63 —  * •  0.46 3.30 3.06 
13 0.07 —  —  0.35 0.60 2.43 
14 0.06 —  —  0.26 0.70 2.37 
15 0.02 — —  0.34 0.47 1.92 
16 0.02 — — 0.66 0.70 1.98 
17 
18 
0.58 0.85 1.24 1.02 3.21 
0.55 0.31 1.11 1.32 3.89 
19 1.14 1.4-2 ' 1.26 1.13 3.20 
20 1.4-2 — 0.77 1.03 3.20 
21 1.33 0.94 1.53 1.28 3.98 
22 0.86 0.39 1.24 1.73 3.86 
23 3.18 2.85 1.54- 2.26 4.03 
24 1.57 4.29 1.44 2.48 3.82 
25 2.07 2.01 1.56 2.44 4.49 
26 3.44 0.4-7 2.18 13.43 7.79 
27 1.96 3.50 1.11 3.99 4.27 
28 2.84 0.98 1.47 2.42 4.81 
29 0.05 —  —  0.35 2.67 1.79 
30 0.51 — —  0.14 0.91 O.83 
31 1.05 — —  1.16 2.70 3.15 
32 0.01 —  —  0.34 0.97 1.78 
33 0.01 * — 0.50 2.30 2.85 
34- 0.01 — —  0.50 0.82 1.50 
35 0.01 —  —  0.57 1.26 1.90 
36 2.85 —  —  3.22 9.11 7.10 
37 0.01 —  —  O.32 1.36 1.66 
38 0.08 —  —  0.21 0.79 1.54 
39 0.07 —  —  0.46 0.90 1.99 
4-0 1.65 0.21 0.96 0.83 3.78 
4-1 0.14 —  —  0.53 0.92 3.92 
42 1.19 —  —  0.89 1.26 3-85 
4-3 1.4-8 0.13 0.90 0.85 3.94 
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Table 22. (Continued) 
Dollars per acre, 1959 
County Machine Labor Fuel and 
number Fertilizer Lime hire hire lubricants 
1* 0.60 0.12 0.63 0.87 2.97 
45 1.68 0.35 0.92 0.65 3.38 
46 2.87 0.02 1.49 1.71 2.82 
47 3.19 — — 1.25 1.35 3.14 
48 1.78 — — 1.02 0.82 2.97 
49 1.85 1.44 1.16 2.20 3.26 
50 1.21 — ™ 1.22 3.23 3.56 
51 2.10 O.32 0.89 1.58 3.71 
52 2.92 0.20 1.21 6.39 4.23 
53 1.10 0.64 1.26 1.39 3.66 
54 2.15 0.57 0.96 2.85 3.37 
55 0.82 — — 0.83 2.40 3.41 
56 1.96 1.16 1.48 1.65 3.55 
57 1.73 0.26 1.18 2.92 3.58 
58 1.57 0.59 1.03 1.89 3.23 
59 0.92 0.21 0.91 1.57 3.83 
60 0.22 — — 1.00 2.26 3.43 
61 0.86 — — 0.49 0.96 3.27 
62 1.77 — — 0.82 1.03 3.49 
63 1.77 — — 0.68 0.96 3.33 
64 1.78 0.98 1.09 1.84 3.44 
65 0.69 — — 0.79 0.88 3.75 
66 3.22 0.16 1.05 2.55 4.30 
67 3.38 0.02 1.04 1.61 4.15 
68 1.44 0.94 1.51 2.53 3.90 
69 2.53 O.36 1.23 2.62 4.14 
70 2.58 O.38 1.51 3.33 4.00 
71 0.57 0.18 1.14 2.26 3.36 
72 1.07 0.24 1.28 2.03 3.36 
73 0.90 0.16 1.14 2.68 3.63 
74 1.48 0.23 1.12 2.33 3.80 
75 0.77 0.17 1.16 2.36 3.97 
76 2.31 0.21 1.20 3.47 4.34 
77 1.91 0.20 1.00 3.57 4.39 
78 2.40 0.14 1.16 1.07 3.99 
79 2.97 0.19 1.18 3.42 3.98 
80 2.08 0.16 1.02 1.07 3.65 
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Table 23. Expenditures for seeds and operator and family-












19 59 number 
Expend!- Operator 
tures for and family 
seeds, workers per 
dollars thousand 
per acre acres 
1959 1959 
1 0.31 2.80 
2 0.33 2.51 
3 0.34 2.14 
4 O.31 1.90 
5 0.29 2.30 
6 0.35 3,55 
7 O.32 2.05 
8 0.53 2.35 
9 0.24 1.81 
10 0.95 1.88 
11 0.54 2.47 
12 0.99 3.06 
13 0.49 4.17 
14 0.55 3.75 
15 0.39 3.73 
16 0.46 3.33 
17 0.54 20.85 
18 0.41 30.00 
19 0.96 18.52 
20 0.75 6.36 
21 1.03 20.67 
22 0.91 13.13 
23 1.37 10.61 
24 1.21 12.40 
25 1.24 12.97 
26 4.23 22.60 
27 1.44 15.92 
28 1.95 14.42 
29 0.04 2.02 
30 0.06 1.54 
31 0.60 4.39 
32 0.33 2.58 
33 0.19 8.16 
34 0.25 1.92 
35 0.20 4.20 
36 2.57 9.45 
37 0.08 2.86 
38 0.13 3.74 
39 0.31 3.09 
40 0.82 9.03 
4l 0.62 5.71 
42 0.64 7.29 
43 0.68 9.47 
44 0.66 8.40 
45 0.67 9.57 
46 0.78 4.93 
47 0.84 4.56 
48 0.70 7.04 
49 1.01 6.64 
50 1.38 8.03 
51 1.08 8.58 
52 1.86 11.93 
53 1.48 9.89 
54 1.29 6.71 
55 I.09 7.84 
56 1.33 8.43 
57 1.20 8.24 
58 1.18 8.54 
59 1.01 8.74 
60 0.17 8.10 
61 0.87 5.59 
62 1.17 8.65 
63 1.19 7.04 
64 1.72 7.61 
65 1.25 8.92 
66 1.77 8.83 
67 1.34 8.75 
68 1.38 7.86 
69 1.67 9.89 
70 2.05 8.55 
71 1.18 11.75 
72 1.16 12.42 
73 2.13 11.81 
74 1.26 13.17 
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Table 23. (Continued) 
Expendi­ Operator Expendi­ Operator 
tures for and family tures for and family 
seeds, workers per seeds, workers per 
County- dollars thousand County dollars thousand 
number per acre acres number per acre acres 
1959 1959 1959 1959 
75 1.44 10.09 78 l.4o 13.41 
76 1.90 13.10 79 1.77 9.68 
77 1.73 10.33 80 1.33 11.82 
Table 24. Variables associated with the level of Soil Bank 
participation for 80 midwest counties, I 
Per cent of Expected 
farms in Per cent Coefficient return i960 
classes V, VI of farmers of variation 4 
Co. and part-time over 65 for yields expected 
no. 19 54 1959 1950-60 return 1950 
1 19.10 15.15 .2028 0.9893 
2 14.31 10.96 .2397 1.1608 
3 21.98 3.59 .3568 1.2990 
4 27.74 10.34 .4064 1.1596 
5 22.57 7.90 .2852 1.3573 
6 27.37 4.26 .3022 1.2314 
7 28.58 6.33 .3684 1.3311 
8 21.84 10.73 .3396 1.2412 
9 9.93 7.59 .2510 1.2485 
10 8.81 9.02 .2313 1.1685 
11 9.90 8.70 .3383 1.4183 
12 23.81 11.35 .2736 1.3163 
13 22.37 11.54 .2693 0.7240 
14 20.44 11.68 .1896 0.8458 
15 24.86 5.95 .3544 1.0445 
16 11.72 6.53 .3393 1.1697 
17 60.51 13.47 .1417 0.8320 
18 60.38 15.88 .1395 0.8418 
19 57.51 17.40 .1750 0.9043 
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Table 24. (Continued) 
Per cent of Expected 
farms in Per cent Coefficient return I960 
classes V. VI 
and part-time 
of farmers of variation 4 
Co. over 65 for yields expected 
no. 1954 1959 1950-60 return 1950 
20 20.38 11.10 .1541 0.8898 
21 42.34- 10.76 .2328 1.0035 
22 38.30 13.81 .1263 0.9052 
23 16.43 9.39 .1775 1.0119 
24 17.57 11.82 .1348 0.9110 
25 17.79 11.11 .1525 O.98IO 
26 31.15 13.68 .1223 0.9204 
27 22.29 11.89 .1541 0.9894 
28 14-. 21 9.32 .1468 0.9457 
29 5.56 19.00 .3100 0.9551 
30 9.30 12.34 .3893 0.9091 
31 25.67 11.68 .2365 1.1454 
32 26.26 11.87 .3013 0.9071 
33 32.11 17.43 .3299 0.9819 
34 14-. 89 13.49 .4609 1.1007 
35 36.10 15.24 .3728 0.9872 
36 13.64- 7.76 .1517 1.0303 
37 22.?3 14.53 .2956 0.9001 
38 19.44 15.00 .2902 O.7876 
39 25.76 14.86 .3534 1.0686 
4-0 16.92 9.61 .3852 0.7458 
4-1 14.22 12.00 .2545 0.7154 
42 17.73 14.75 .3687 0.7385 
1+3 26.06 13.52 .3997 0.8939 
44 16.93 11.45 .3076 O.7OO9 
45 19.06 11.86 .2714 0.8847 
4-6 13.83 13.29 .3454 1.0898 
4-7 10.40 14.38 .2619 1.0889 
48 15.91 11.30 .3333 1.0329 
4-9 11.44 12.12 .2711 0.7309 
50 17.49 8.57 .2360 0.6885 
51 12.17 9.43 .2880 0.6893 
52 27.52 14.05 .3671 0.6674 
53 4.42 6.42 .1576 0.8010 
54 16.23 11.86 .2402 0.7339 
55 14.01 11.43 .1587 0.8126 
56 6.13 7.19 .1694 0.7907 
57 17.59 11.32 .2210 0.7628 
58 8.74 7.98 .1742 0.7459 
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Table 24. (Continued) 
Per cent of Expected 
farms in Per cent Coefficient return I960 
classes V. VI 
and part-time 
of farmers of variation •» 
Co. over 65 for yields expected 
no. 1954 1959 1950-60 return 1950 
59 8.33 8.85 .3503 0.5918 
60 28.74 10.54 .2226 0.5943 
61 11.95 8.79 .1866 0.8602 
62 12.67 7.44 .1411 0.9045 
63 11.16 7.95 .1337 O.9O7O 
64 4.92 9.75 .1265 0.7491 
65 13.88 10.06 .1767 0.8526 
66 7.82 8.01 .1256 0.9098 
67 5.71 7.91 .1346 O.9II3 
0.7804 68 16.60 14.39 .1639 
69 9.92 10.64 .1367 0.8801 
70 12.48 11.80 .1623 0.7985 
71 30.22 17.70 .1772 0.8915 
72 36.48 15.55 .2097 1.0313 
73 19.77 13.95 .1767 0.8634 
74 31.73 15.59 .1706 0.9489 
75 15.42 12.16 .1073 0.7812 
76 21.95 13.87 .1200 0.8972 
77 13.93 13.18 .1221 0.8015 
78 13.50 10.79 .1642 0.9874 
10.31 9.85 .1550 0.9084 
80 13.46 9.18 .1968 0.9686 
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Table 25. Variables associated with the level of Soil Bank 
participation for 80 midwest counties. II 
Per cent Per cent Acres of 
Per cent of males of cropland Per cent 8 crops 
of farmers employed harvested of farm 1959 
County over 55 by agri­ by owners land in Acres of 
no. 1959 culture and part pasture 8 crops 
I960 owners 1954 1959 1954 
1 35.42 38.38 66.52 49.64 0.93 
2 34.26 33.74 73.34 55.34 0.92 
3 20.36 63.60 85.61 24.59 0.95 
4 32.04 85.49 87.08 52.04 0.87 
5 23-94 54.90 82.02 22.46 0.97 
6 22.15 75.70 75.38 27.85 0.99 
7 29.96 65.23 76.50 5.17 0.90 
8 26.93 47.63 84.15 16.52 0.92 
9 27.43 59.41 84.68 9.31 0.84 
10 30.50 17.68 70.88 3.28 0.98 
11 32.08 74.06 71.67 6.81 0.97 
12 36.44 47.81 82.18 4.91 0.88 
13 31.85 27.18 67.51 29.22 0.91 
14 31.62 65.65 74.38 22.33 0.99 
15 22.82 65.16 80.18 39.59 0.88 
16 24.16 32.46 75.79 40.48 0.97 
17 36.62 27.71 93.19 7.84 0.90 
18 35.08 7.15 96.05 4.44 0.77 
19 41.07 41.03 92.80 12.47 0.82 
20 34.08 58.24 77.94 5.53 0.98 
21 32.29 40.99 94.37 10.47 0.99 
22 36.40 49.59 85.41 6.27 0.92 
23 31.84 45.78 72.58 8.39 1.07 
24 32.49 49.87 71.01 9.32 1.03 
25 33.03 33.38 69.17 12.63 1.00 
26 37.87 1.16 88.93 10.86 0.99 
27 • 33.97 44.56 76.19 8.69 1.01 
28 29.25 31.08 71.09 7.28 1.08 
29 36.00 85.10 60.11 86.31 1.67 
30 40.26 66.56 89.39 72.09 0.90 
31 39.93 55.35 65.19 67.09 0.98 
32 28.32 62.63 82.61 72.61 0.91 
33 42.00 25.23 85.46 77.61 1.06 
34 
35 
31.05 67.05 81.53 56.86 0.70 
32.66 6.63 87.47 71.40 0.89 
36 22.69 25.48 43.05 50.07 1.02 
37 35.17 55.95 79.65 74.80 0.79 
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Table 25. (Continued) 
Per cent Per cent Acres of 
Per cent of males of cropland Per cent 8 crops 
of farmers employed harvested of farm 1959 
County over 55 by agri­ by owners land in Acres of 
number 1959 culture and part pasture 8 crops 
I960 owners 195*+ 1959 Î954-
38 36.56 81.87 81.55 67.08 0.87 
39 32.38 54.92 81.59 50.27 0.88 
40 29.77 55.55 55.28 13.80 1.00 
4l 32.80 20.61 66.71 23.25 1.03 
42 38.71 65.72 71.96 48.46 0.85 
J+3 35.95 59.55 63.81 38.18 0.89 
lj4 32.32 61.34 61.16 37.25 0.95 
34.83 43.63 58.36 14.26 1.04 
46 32.53 47.51 60.27 11.25 1.03 
47 33.41 60.46 58.74 22.33 1.00 
48 31.47 47.54 57.75 29.34 0.96 
49 33.07 50.75 45.30 5.01 1.01 
50 31.90 19.81 57.38 10.00 0.97 
51 38.87 22.97 49.42 6.18 1.04 
52 35.80 1.67 52.74 6.67 0.95 
53 24.76 57.37 44.92 10.20 1.05 
54 33.03 41.40 50.62 5.02 1.01 
55 31.69 12.56 51.19 12.89 0.98 
56 25.55 46.42 43.31 8.00 1.05 
57 30.95 15.10 45.64 5.35 0.97 
58 25.71 53.63 62.81 4.54 0.99 
59 26.92 71.99 56.27 22.24 0.98 
60 30.37 37.14 61.58 16.69 1.01 
61 29.07 49.40 65.95 7.91 1.01 
62 28.11 43.37 59.45 4.44 1.03 
63 29.37 48.21 68.51 7.91 1.01 
64 28.85 37.42 46.61 8.54 1.02 
65 27.83 65.52 67.16 10.15 1.01 
66 27.72 39.59 49.60 3.68 1.06 
67 27.24 41.71 59.78 4.37 1.05 
68 34.45 31.67 51.30 7.79 1.01 
69 28.93 38.64 49.83 6.70 1.07 
70 30.37 18.50 40.76 4.05 1.03 
71 37.20 29.60 62.68 20.43 0.94 
72 39.18 37.32 77.87 25.27 0.90 
73 34.94 35.29 57.68 12.75 1.05 
74 37.85 10.33 67.78 16.83 1.02 
75 31.20 17.18 66.05 6.07 0.96 
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Table 25» (Continued) 
Per cent Per cent Acres of 
Per cent of males of cropland Per cent 8 crops 
of farmers employed harvested of farm 1959 
County over 55 by agri­ by owners land in Acres of 
number 1959 culture and part pasture 8 crops 
I960 owners 1954 1959 1954 
76 33.75 7.47 57.66 8.60 1.01 
77 34.16 18.72 62.18 6.48 1.02 
78 30.44 51.76 63.80 11.23 1.05 
79 26.38 31.22 55.34 6.58 1.06 
80 28.31 53.08 63.36 9.50 1.05 
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APPENDIX B: PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE 
SOIL BANK LAND IN HAND COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
The purpose of this analysis was to measure the 
difference in productivity between the Hand County land in 
the Soil Bank and the land remaining in production. A sample 
of 100 Hand County farm operators in two groups was drawn 
during June 1961 in the county ASC office. Group I included 
farm operators who had one or more conservation reserve 
contracts. Group II included non-participants. Legal 
descriptions of the land farmed by each operator were 
obtained along with sketches or overlay tracings of the Soil 
Bank land for each participating farm. With the aid of Hand 
County soil maps provided by the Agronomy Department of 
South Dakota State College average yields for corn and wheat 
were estimated for the Soil Bank land and the other cropland 
27 
on each farm. 
Procedure 
The Hand County ASC Office listed 958 farm operators in 
Hand County in June, 1961 when the sample was drawn. There 
were 342 Soil Bank contracts in force at that time. A few 
operators had more than one contract. The sample of Soil 
2?The soil maps and yield data for Hand County were 
obtained by private communication by Everett White, 
Department of Agronomy, South Dakota State College, 
Brookings, South Dakota. 
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Bank participants was drawn from the ASC addressograph file 
by taking each sixth Soil Bank participant after a random 
start. The non-participant sample was drawn from the ASC 
card file of farm operators in the same manner. Since the 
card file included Soil Bank participants as well as non-
participants, participants' names were discarded when they 
were drawn. Both the addressograph file and the card file 
listed farmers in alphabetical order within townships. 
Legal descriptions of the land operated by each partici­
pant and each non-participant in the sample were obtained 
from the ASC card file of farm operators. These were used 
to locate each farm on the soil map photographs. The crop­
land on each farm was distinguished from non-cropland by 
markings on the soil maps. The number of acres of each type 
of soil in the cropland on each farm was measured by plani-
meter. The total measured acres of cropland for each farm 
was checked for consistency with the acres of cropland 
reported in the ASC card file. 
To identify the cropland that was in the Soil Bank, 
descriptions and sketches of the tracts under Soil Bank 
contract were copied from information in the file of con­
tracts at the time the sample was drawn. These were used 
later to locate the Soil Bank land on the soil map photo­
graphs. For some farms it was necessary to have overlay 
tracings made of the Soil Bank land to assure correct 
2k 7 
identification on the soil maps. 
Estimated corn yields and wheat yields for each type of 
soil were provided by the Agronomy Department of South Dakota 
State College. These were used in conjunction with the 
measured acres of each type of soil to estimate the average 
yields of these crops for the Soil Bank land and the other 
cropland on each sample farm. 
Table 26 summarizes the estimated average yield of corn 
and wheat for Soil Bank land and for cropland operated by 
non-participants in Hand County. The estimated wheat yields 
on the non-participants' cropland was 2.2 per cent higher 
than the estimated wheat yields on Soil Bank land. For 
corn the non-participants' yields were 2.6 per cent higher 
than the yields on the Soil Bank land. The results are 
consistent with our expectations that the Soil Bank land is 
less productive than the other cropland in the county but 
the indicated differences are small. Differences of this 
magnitude would be expected about one-half of the time in 
such samples if there was no difference in productivity 
between the two groups of farms in the county. 
Row 3 of Table 26 shows the average conservation 
reserve indexes for participants and for non-participants 
in the Hand County sample. The participants had a 1.5 per 
cent higher average index than did the non-participants. 
Sample differences of this magnitude would be expected about 
Table 26. Summary of soil productivity estimateand conservation reserve 
indexes for Hand County, South Dakota 



















1 Estimated wheat yield 
bu. per acre 10.696 10.932 .236 .332 -A32 . 904 
2 Estimated corn yield 
bu. per acre 15.316 15.708 .392 .585 -.592 1.762 
3 Conservation reserve 
index 100.521 99.021 1.500 1.141 -.796 3.796 
It- Ratio of C.R. index 
to corn yield 6.803 6.512 .291 .272 -.276 .820 
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20 per cent of the time if no difference existed between the 
average conservation reserve indexes for the two groups of 
farms in the county. The Hand County Soil Bank participants 
in the sample had less productive land but higher conservation 
reserve indexes than did the non-participants in the sample. 
Row 4 of Table 26 shows that the average ratio of C.R. index 
to corn yield was 6.803 for participants and 6.512 for non-
participants . 
In drawing the sample of Soil Bank participants, no 
distinction was made between part-farm and whole-farm 
participants. Of the 48 participants 33 held whole-farm 
contracts and 15 held part-farm contracts. All of the part 
farm participants and 5 of the whole-farm participants 
operated cropland that was not under Soil Bank contracts. 
The cropland on the farms in the sample was divided into 
four categories: land under whole-farm contracts, land under 
part-farm contracts, land operated by participants but not 
under Soil Bank contracts, and cropland operated by non-
participants. The estimated corn yields for each category 
of cropland are shown in Table 27. The land under whole-
farm contracts and the non-participants' cropland rated 
higher than any of the other three categories. These results 
agree with our expectations but the indicated differences 
among categories are small. 
2^ 0 
Table 27. Estimated average corn yields for four classes of 
land in Hand County 
Estimated average corn 
yield, bu. per acre 
Land under whole-farm Soil Bank contracts 15.46 
Land under part-farm Soil Bank contracts 14.99 
Non-Soil Bank land operated by Soil Bank 
participants 15.52 
Non-participants' cropland 15.85 
